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ABSTRACT  
The thesis investigates principal-principal (PP) conflicts arising in mergers and 
acquisitions (M&A) in Asean 5 countries; Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Thailand and Singapore. This thesis is the first study adapting the well-established 
Lintner dividend model (Lintner, 1956) to examine the potential use of the model 
as measurement of PP conflicts in Southeast Asian market study where 
availability of continuous long-term data are usually lacking. The issue is of 
importance to investors and for the growth of equity markets in Asean countries in 
Southeast Asia and probably well beyond.  
 
According to prior research, large controlling shareholders in Asian public listed 
companies do cause agency conflicts (Becht, Franks, Mayer, & Rossi, 2010; 
Burkart & Lee, 2008; Claessens, Djankov, Fan, & Lang, 2002). However, the net 
effect cannot be estimated with any degree of accuracy without understanding and 
being able to distinguish the single effect of an investment project. The 
relationship between large shareholders and agency conflicts is difficult to test 
empirically since no public information is provided at the individual investment 
project level, which differs from cases of corporate mergers and acquisitions 
(M&A) (Amihud, Lev, & Travlos, 1990). This thesis is novel in that it reduces 
this gap by extending a recently developed framework of PP conflicts by 
investigating the impact of large controlling shareholders in M&A in Asean 5 
countries; Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand.  
 
Four main components make up for the contributions that can be drawn from this 
thesis. First, the issue of PP conflicts, argued by Young, Peng, Ahlstrom, Bruton 
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and Jiang (2008) as a major and especially prevalent concern in emerging 
markets. Broadly, PP conflicts refer to conflicts between controlling shareholders 
and minority shareholders in a corporation (Dharwadkar, George, & Brandes, 
2000) and include an element of expropriation of profit. The second component is 
where M&A provides situations in which PP conflicts may be worsen. It is noted 
that M&A activities in Asean 5 are highly significant. Thirdly, this research is the 
first direct study of PP agency conflicts, ownership and financial variables for 
Asean 5 public listed companies. Finally, the fourth component is that the study 
includes elements of time-invariant (including rarely changing variables) and 
time-variant variables in the panel data model analysis which provide additional 
confirmation of the veracity of the modelling and robustness of analysis.  
Compared to prior studies undertaken elsewhere, the sophistication and 
robustness of the micro-econometric analysis used in the research is a significant 
enhancement. 
 
Data needed to test various hypotheses are sourced from the SDC M&A Database, 
SDC Ownership database and Thomson One Banker Database. Further data have 
been collected from companies listed in the individual stock exchange markets of 
the five countries. The task was not straightforward and while appropriate to 
recognise efforts by various databases to collect and compile helpful sources, 
there remains much more work to be done in terms of manual collection of data 
from published annual reports. This exercise leads to the final sample which 
comprises of 1,013 deals (807 acquiring companies) from years 2000 to 2008 in 
various industries.  
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Statistical and data issues, such as controlling for endogeneity effects, and 
treatment of time-invariant and time-variant data in the models, are systematically 
addressed. The diagnostic testing opens up the potential for the analysis to utilise 
Hausman-Taylor (HT) and fixed-effects vector decomposition (FEVD) 
techniques. The current research extends the econometric robustness of analysis 
using Tobit regression. 
 
PP conflicts associated with M&A are found to be rampant. Furthermore, PA 
conflicts are also significant in this region. These suggest consequences in terms 
of limited willingness by investors to participate in share investment as part of 
individuals’ portfolios strategy. Similarly, challenges by regulators in each capital 
market to promote the secondary market are addressed in this thesis by advocating 
the use of dividend ratio policies as an indicator for PP conflicts.  
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CHAPTER 1:  INTRODUCING THE STUDY 
 
1.1  Background of the study 
 
The core of the problem in Asian agency conflicts is how to protect the minority 
shareholders from the expropriation of controlling owners (Mitton, 2002; Nam, 
2001). However, evidence of the alleged expropriation from controlling 
shareholders remains inconclusive because it is only anecdotal evidence that is 
available
1
. The relationship between large shareholders
2
 and agency conflicts is 
difficult to be tested empirically since no public information is provided for 
individual investment projects, unlike cases of corporate mergers and acquisitions 
(Amihud, et al., 1990).  
 
As opposed to employing the well-established agency theorem of principal-agent 
(PA) conflicts, this study looks at the less popular and relatively new principal-
principal (PP) conflicts. It is contended that the agency problem in a concentrated 
ownership environment is not necessarily between PA but rather it is among the 
principals or shareholders themselves (large and minority shareholders), known as 
PP conflicts (Dharwadkar, George, & Brandes, 2000; Young, Peng, Ahlstrom, 
Bruton, & Jiang, 2008). This thesis is the first study adapting the well-established 
Lintner dividend model (Lintner, 1956) to examine the potential use of the model 
as a PP conflicts measurement in an Asian market study. It is also of importance 
                                                 
1
 For instance in November 1997, United Engineers Malaysia (UEM) a conglomerate in Malaysia 
acquired 32.6% of its financially troubled parent, Renong at an inflated price that cause the 
minority shareholders to infer UEM’s action as a bailout at their expense. UEM share price fell by 
38% the day the transaction was announced  (Lopez, 2000). 
 
2
 The terms large shareholder and concentrated ownership are used interchangeably (Banchit & 
Locke 2011,Song 2007) 
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in general aspects of emerging market companies, and may be the key direction 
for extensions in future research. (Bhaumik & Selarka). 
 
Finance and economic fraternities are familiar with the sound and established 
agency theorem called principal-agent (PA) conflicts where management (agent) 
undertaking M&A activities are viewed to serve their self-interests as opposed to 
increasing shareholders’ (principal) wealth. Public companies in the United States 
and United Kingdom are characterised by ownership dispersion. Reasons for 
conflicts of interest among the management (agent) and shareholders (principal) 
include diversifying their (the agents’) employment risk, entrenchment 
opportunity (Himmelberg, Hubbard, & Palia, 1999) and increasing their prestige 
and remuneration with the increased size of the company (Andrade, Mitchell, & 
Stafford, 2001; Erickson & Wang, 1999; Jensen & Ruback, 1983; Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1997). In addition, scholars point out that, “some of the cleverest 
evidence on agency problems...comes from acquisition announcements” (Shleifer 
& Vishny, 1997, pp. 746-747).  
 
It is generally known that large or controlling shareholders in dispersed ownership 
settings are in a position to effectively monitor agents on behalf of other non-
monitoring or minority shareholders. The notion is that management and large 
shareholders work cooperatively in a model where information asymmetries are 
reduced between PA to efficiently reduce agency costs and increase company 
value. (Chidambaran & John, 1998; Demsetz, 1983; Shleifer & Vishny, 1986; 
Shleifer & Vishny, 1997).  
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And unlike public companies in the United States and United Kingdom, most 
public companies in the rest of the world such as Western Europe and Southeast 
Asia demonstrate a different ownership structure where agency conflicts between 
PA are supposedly minimised. It is documented that up to 50% of publicly traded 
Western European companies (Faccio, Lang, & Young 2001b) and up to 70% of 
public listed companies in Southeast Asia (Claessens, Djankov, & Lang 1999a) 
are affiliated with a business group, for which a controlling shareholder often uses 
pyramids  or cross-holdings to control a large group of companies. These 
companies are controlled by large shareholders themselves; in the hand(s) of 
individuals, family members, governments or industrial groups (Claessens, 
Djankov, & Lang, 2000b; Faccio & Lang, 2002; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & 
Shleifer, 1999; Lins, 2003).   
 
It is often found that controlling shareholders hold some managerial ties that 
enable their involvement with management (Maury & Pajuste, 2002). This 
influence by large shareholders is one of the main reasons why many Asian 
corporations failed, due to investing in risky projects and weak performance that 
ultimately contributed to the disastrous financial crisis in 1997 (Claessens, 
Djankov, & Lang, 1999a; Dhnadirek & Tang, 2003; Lemmon & Lins, 2003).   
 
Shleifer and Vishny (1986) argue that as ownership by large shareholders rises, 
the M&A activities are more likely to occur. Large controlling shareholders may 
utilise the strategy to expropriate value from the minority shareholders, especially 
in countries with low investor protection (Bae, Kang, & Kim, 2002; Bigelli & 
Mengoli, 2004; Guan, 2005). The divergence of interest between large 
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shareholders and minority shareholders allows the former to extract private 
benefits by making suboptimal investment decisions through M&A  (Bigelli & 
Mengoli, 2004). 
 
Combining the well-established theory on M&A with the relatively new findings 
of a ‘problem’ known as PP conflicts, this study seeks a solution to a primary 
research question which is: Do large controlling shareholders expropriate from the 
minority shareholders in mergers and acquisitions? This study is focused on M&A 
activity because a number of studies have suggested that these undertakings are 
often used by management to serve their self-interest (Bae, et al., 2002; Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1997).  
 
This research adopts the literal meaning of M&A in the economic context that can 
be used interchangeably to describe takeovers or M&A activities. Payment of 
dividends to shareholders may provide some solution to this paradigm because 
these payments sometimes are outcomes of misuse of capital which can 
compromise overall shareholders’ wealth (Myers, 1977).   
 
Existing literature on European M&As shows mixed evidence of expropriation. 
By defining expropriation as “the disproportional sharing of gains (or losses) 
among different shareholders”, Faccio & Stolin (2006, p. 1416) study all 
acquisitions by European group-affiliated companies over the period 1997-2000 
and they negate the hypothesis of expropriation. They conclude that while there 
might be some presence of minority expropriation in Europe, M&As are not 
expected to be used as a devious mechanism. In addition, M&A studies of 
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Swedish (Holmen & Knopf, 2004) and Belgian companies (Buysschaert, Deloof, 
& Jegers, 2004) contradict the expropriation notion. They argue that bidders with 
concentrated ownership experience positive returns post M&A. 
 
However, a single country study by Bigelli and Mengoli (2004) on Italian 
acquisitions supports the expropriation hypothesis, since returns are negative 
(positive) when companies buy lower (higher) companies within their pyramid. 
They find consistent evidence of transfer of wealth from the minority shareholders 
to the controlling shareholders at the upper level of the pyramid.  
 
Although there has been quite extensive research on expropriation by controlling 
shareholders utilising M&A in western countries, this is not the case for the Asian 
market. Empirical results regarding M&A in Southeast Asia remain scant and 
inconclusive due to unavailability of data (Kamaly, 2007; Wong & Cheung, 
2009). Most M&A research is confined to performance studies and predicting 
M&A issues (Mat-Nor & Mohd Zin 1996; Rahman & Limmack 2000; Song 
2007a).  
 
Some exceptions to the trend are studies on expropriation of companies’ profit  by 
controlling shareholders such as a research done by Bae, Kang, & Kim (2002) on 
Korean companies. In their study, the authors discover that controlling 
shareholders use acquisitions to transfer wealth from minority shareholders to 
themselves. Bidder companies in business groups, known as chaebol, experience 
negative returns around the announcement of an acquisition, whereas the non-
bidding companies belonging to the same chaebol have positive average returns at 
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the same time. Share prices of bidders drop when making acquisitions, resulting 
in minority shareholders losing out while the controlling shareholders gain from 
the increase in value of the acquired companies in their group.  
 
At times, large shareholders may influence management’s decision to pay a 
dividend at the expense of the minority shareholders by disbursing company cash 
for their personal advantage (Truong & Heaney, 2007). Faccio et al. (2001b) 
describe in their study how dividend payouts can be an evidence to capture 
expropriation by controlling shareholders which include public listed companies 
in Western Europe and East Asia.  In many corporations, minority shareholders 
are indicated putting pressure to the management by paying out dividends in order 
to release cash from the clutch of insiders (management and controlling 
shareholders) ( La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, &  Vishny, 2000a).  
 
It is argued in this thesis however, that higher dividends lead to higher 
expropriation. The management’s supposedly main objective to increase 
shareholders’ wealth may be questioned after engaging in large investment 
exercises such as in M&A. M&A involve major cost and structural changes to the 
company that increasing dividends after these actions would otherwise result in a 
negative impact to the overall company’s performance. 
 
 Relating to this study, Banchit and Locke’s (2011) is the first study that uses 
dividend payout as a proxy to measure PP conflicts. They find some evidence of 
cash appropriation from public listed companies in Asean 4 countries (except 
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Singapore) through higher cash dividend payout, which negatively affects 
company growth and hampers future development. 
 
This thesis is novel in that there is no prior research addressing PP conflicts in 
M&A activities in Asian markets, particularly in the economic bloc of the Asean 
5 countries. This research will contribute significantly to the relatively new area 
of PP conflicts in general and to the development of M&A setting and activities in 
Southeast Asia specifically.  
 
1.2 Overview of Asean 
 
On 8 August 1967, the Bangkok Declaration was signed and witnessed by five 
foreign ministers representing five recovering war torn countries, namely 
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. Known as the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations or ASEAN in short, it is the world’s third 
largest regional economic trade bloc after the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) and the European Union (UN). Figure 1 maps the countries 
in the Association. Currently, there are ten ASEAN members where five other 
states joining later are Brunei (1984), Vietnam (1995), Laos (1997), Myanmar 
(1997) and Cambodia (1999). However, M&A in these countries are not 
significant which is explained later in Section 1.3 and shown in Table 2 that may 
affect the overall results. Hence, only the five main countries are analysed for this 
thesis. 
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With the exception of Thailand, all four of the father founding countries were 
colonised by numerous western powers for hundreds of years prior to and after 
World War II in 1945. These wounded but fast-healing countries were finally 
independent by 1967 and had to look for each other for help in their quest for 
economic security and socio-cultural stability (Stief, 2010). In his speech, then 
Foreign Minister of Singapore, Mr.  S. Rajaratnam spoke about the formation:  
 
“We (ASEAN) are not against anything, or anybody, we want to ensure a stable 
Southeast Asia, not a balkanised Southeast Asia. And those countries who are 
interested, genuinely interested in the stability and prosperity of Southeast Asia, 
and better economic and social conditions, will welcome small countries getting 
together to pool their collective resources and their collective wisdom to 
contribute to the peace of the world” (as cited in ASEAN history website, 2009). 
 
 
 
Figure 1 : Graph of ASEAN. 
From Embassy of Indonesia, Retrieved from http://embassyofindonesia.it/wp-
content/uploads/2011/02/ASEAN-Map.jpg 
The ASEAN region includes Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines, 
Brunei Darussalam, Vietnam, Cambodia, Myanmar and Laos. 
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ASEAN can attest to be an accomplishment as 40 years after conception it is 
described as probably “the most successful inter-governmental organisation in the 
developing world today” (ASEAN, 2009). 
 
Table 1 Basic indicators of ASEAN 5 
 
Country 
 Populations 
(thousands, mid 
2011)  
 Area (sq km)  
Indonesia 245,613,043 1,904,569 
Malaysia 28,728,607 329,847 
Singapore 4,740,737 697 
Philippines 101,833,938 300,000 
Thailand 66,720,153 513,120 
TOTAL  447,636,478 3,048,233 
 
CIA World Factbook, (2011). Basic indicators of countries.  
               Retrieved from CIA World Factbook. 
 
In 2011, as shown in Table 1, the population of Asean 5 countries is in excess of 
447 million, with a total area of 3 million square kilometres. Indonesia has the 
largest population at 245 million people while Singapore with the smallest area 
also has the lowest population at 4.7 million people.  
 
Despite the fact that ASEAN presently has ten country members, this thesis is 
focussing on these five countries, mostly due to availability of data. Furthermore, 
as the association started with the integration mutually as a bloc 40 years ago, the 
study can provide a valid comparative result, meeting a need for more empirical 
research in ASEAN studies in particular and for the Asian market in general.  
 
Growth in developing Asian markets is very high, exhibiting persistent positive 
annual increases in Gross Domestic Product (GDP). As shown in Figure 2, there 
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is a continuing expansion in economic activity through the period 1998 to 2010 
for Asean 5. The Asian financial crisis in 1998 saw a long dip in the percentage 
change during that period, but Asean 5 quickly recovered after 1998. The positive 
change prevails even during the world economic downturn in 2008 and 2009 
(including the developing economies and Asia); differing from many mature 
economies that record negative changes in GDP during 2008 and 2010.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 : Annual GDP (%) growth in the world 1998 – 2010 
World Economic Outlook Database (2011). Annual GDP (%) growth in the world. 
Adapted from International Monetary Fund 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2011/01/weodata/weoselagr.aspx 
 
 (* Refer to Appendix 1 for details of countries in the group) 
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1.3 Development of capital control market: Asean 5 and 
Mergers & Acquisitions (M&A) 
 
Table 2 reports the total number of effective deals from years 2000 to 2008 for 
public listed M&A in the 10 Asean countries. There were 4,282 effective deals
3
 
which accounted for over US$116.24 billion in transactions for the 9 year period. 
Malaysia had the highest number of effective deals (2,196 or 51%), then 
Singapore (1,333 or 31%), and Laos had the fewest (2 or 0.05%). Vietnam and 
Laos joined Asean in 1997, 31 years after Asean was formed while the other 
countries (with no figures available) joined much later. The five countries that 
joined much later than 1967 record insignificant M&A data, lessening the need to 
complete necessary analysis to generalise the overall results from this thesis.  
 
Malaysia and Singapore have been dominating M&A activities in the region 
(Pickering Pacific Com, 2009) due to their advanced economic development 
compared to other Asean countries. Malaysia is also said to be the fastest growing 
market for mergers and acquisitions in the Asia-Pacific region as companies seize 
on record valuations and relaxed takeover rules to catch up with rivals in India 
and Singapore (Chong & Porter, 2010). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3
 Finance industry was excluded for the purpose of this study. 
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Table 2: M&A deals in ASEAN 10 (2000-2008) 
 
Nation 
Effective Deals 
Effective Deals (Disclosed 
value) 
Number Percentage US$ million Percentage 
Indonesia 144 3.36%  $       16,920.70  14.56% 
Malaysia 2196 51.28%  $       29,713.63  25.56% 
Thailand 393 9.18%  $       13,045.74  11.22% 
Singapore 1333 31.13%  $       48,751.51  41.94% 
Philippines 187 4.37%  $         7,793.19  6.70% 
Vietnam 27 0.63%  $             19.24  0.02% 
Brunei 0 0.00%  $                  -    0.00% 
Laos 2 0.05%  $                  -    0.00% 
Cambodia 0 0.00%  $                  -    0.00% 
Myanmar 0 0.00%  $                  -    0.00% 
 
4282 100%  $     116,244.00  100.00% 
 
Note: Thomson Reuters. (n.d.). M&A deals in Asean 10 countries.  
Retrieved from SDC Thomson Database. 
 
In terms of value, Singapore as a developed nation dominates the market with 
US$48.8 billion representing 42% of the total value from 2000 to 2008. Figure 3 
shows the breakdown of the M&A deals value for Asean 5 market.  
 
 
Figure 3: M&A deals value in ASEAN 5(2000 - 2008) 
Thomson Reuters. (n.d.). M&A deals in Asean 10 countries.  
Retrieved from  SDC Thomson Database. 
 
 
Indonesia 
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7% 
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Within Southeast Asia, these five countries are regarded as major in the economic 
expansion through M&A. Metwalli and Tang (2002, 2009) describe that the 
convenient geographical proximity along the busy Strait of Malacca and the 
southern part of the South China Sea, as well as stable growth rate as reasons why 
Asean 5 has led the world’s M&A activity for the past 20 years. The study of 
Asean 5 can be generalised for Southeast Asian. 
 
With the advancement of equity markets, the need for growth in the M&A sector 
also rises. Table 3 shows the number of effective deals including the disclosed 
values from 1980 to 2010. There were no data available prior to 1980 which 
shows that the activity in Asian generally was still at an infancy level. From only 
30 confirmed deals for public acquirers in the 1980s, M&A deals grew to 2,350 
deals in the 1990s. The trend continued from 2000 to 2010 when M&As more 
than doubled to 5,876 confirmed deals. 
 
The value of deals reported was from a mere USD0.153 million in the 1980s to a 
whopping USD166.48 million in total in the 2000s. Some of the explanations for 
this phenomenal growth of M&A activities in the region were the drive for 
companies to acquire market share in the rapidly developing growth of the equity 
markets. M&A is regarded the fastest and less risky mode of entering into a new 
business in order to gain technology and market share (Song, 2007b). 
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Table 3: Number of M&A deals from 1980 to 2010 
  
  
1980-1989 1990-1999 2000-2010 
Confirmed M&A (without 
value deals disclosed) 
30 2350 5876 
Confirmed M&A (deals 
value disclosed)    
 
Indonesia 0 44 188 
 
Malaysia 5 687 1285 
 
Singapore 13 442 1103 
 
Philippines 1 62 176 
 
Thailand 0 99 527 
 
Total  deals 19 1334 3279 
 
 Deal value  
(USD Millions)  
       .153  60,146.02    166,487.24  
 
Note: Thomson Reuters. (n.d.). M&A deals in Asean 10 countries.  
Retrieved from SDC Thomson Database. 
 
1.4 Problem statement 
 
In many public listed companies with concentrated ownership, non-controlling 
shareholders or minority shareholders have not been treated fairly due to lack of 
development in capital markets that leads to deficient protection for them (La 
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 1998; La Porta, et al., 1999). In addition, 
companies that have greater level of ownership concentration may also have 
lesser in firms’ value compared to those companies with more dispersed 
ownership (Barontini & Siciliano, 2003).  
 
An important agency issue that has not been the core of attention in public listed 
companies with large, controlling shareholders is known as PP conflicts. The 
deterioration of firms’ values in acquiring companies post-M&A may be 
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aggravated with the existence of PA as well as PP conflicts. There have been 
many studies in PA conflicts in developed markets like the US and UK, but these 
studies may not be a fair indicator of the agency disputes in Asean markets which 
are dominated with highly concentrated ownership.  
 
In developed countries, corporate control is used as one of the mechanisms for 
external control. Although this mechanism does exist in Asian countries, it is not 
effective due to high ownership concentration and lack of regulatory shareholders’ 
protection. PP conflicts are more relevant to address the Asean market. This has 
not yet been established in the literature for Asean markets in M&A studies. This 
study aims to study the existence of PP conflicts in the Asean 5 markets via 
M&A. Furthermore, PP conflicts pre-and post-M&A will be analysed in this study 
to ascertain which level of controlling shareholders are dominant in influencing 
performance. Finally this thesis will answer the question of whether concentrated 
ownership in Asean 5 markets empowers large shareholders to expropriate income 
in M&A activities for their own benefits.  
 
The role played by dividend payouts ratio should be inherent in addressing 
concentrated holding companies or PP conflict issues. Dividend payment is 
regarded as an avenue for the controlling shareholders to extract resources away 
from the company (Easterbrook 1984; Faccio et al. 2001; La Porta et al., 2000a) 
for their own private benefits (Chiou et al., 2010). Recently, Banchit and Locke 
(2011) find that PP conflicts do exist in the Asean 4 (Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Singapore and Philippines) market via higher payment of cash dividends. 
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Metwalli and Tang (2002) report that M&A activities in Asia have expanded 
significantly from US$16.1 billion in 1990 to US$48.2 billion in 2000, and by 
2004 as noted by Kim (2009) one third of total world M&A activities were in 
Asia. In 2007 the transaction value reported by Metwalli and Tang (2009) rose to 
US$135.3 billion contributing to the positive trend during mid-2000s. It has also 
been reported that the value of deals in Asean 5 was from a mere USD 0.15 
million (19 deals) in the 1980s and had increased dramatically to USD 166.48 
billion (3277 deals) in the 2000s as shown Table 3. This shows that M&A 
activities in the selected Asean countries can provide a solid platform for the 
study of PP conflicts in the region. 
 
1.5 Research questions 
 
The main research question is: Do large shareholders expropriate from minority 
shareholders in mergers and acquisitions in Asean 5 (Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Singapore, Thailand and Philippines? The other research questions in relation to 
the above are: 
 
1. Do large, controlling shareholders impact to PP conflicts in Asean 5 
mergers and acquisitions? 
2. Do dividend payouts change after M&A in Asean 5 acquiring companies? 
3. Do large shareholders exacerbate PP conflicts? If yes, at what percentage 
is the largest shareholders’ threshold that has an impact on PP conflicts? 
4. Do the second largest shareholders help to exacerbate PP conflicts? 
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5. Is principal-agent (PA) a prominent problem for acquirers in Asean 5 
companies? 
 
1.6 Research objectives 
 
1. To determine if large, controlling shareholders have an impact on PP 
conflicts in Asean 5 mergers and acquisitions. 
2. To determine whether dividend payouts change after M&A in Asean 5 
acquiring companies. 
3. To determine the concentration threshold level of large shareholders in 
Asean 5 mergers and acquisitions. 
4. To determine whether second largest shareholders exacerbate PP conflicts. 
5. To also investigate whether principal-agent (PA) conflict is a prominent 
problem for the acquiring companies in Asean 5. 
 
1.7 Significance of the study 
 
This thesis is novel in that there is no prior research in these mostly developing 
markets addressing M&A and related PP conflicts issues in Asean 5 countries. So 
far, only two studies have been done on the issue of PP conflicts in M&A in a 
single Asian country. Chen and Young (2009) address the PP perspective with 
cross-border M&As in China’s public listed companies while Bae, Kang, & Kim 
(2002) discover that controlling shareholders use acquisitions to transfer wealth 
from minority shareholders to themselves. 
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As M&A activities continue to flourish in this region, they impact significantly on 
growth of GDP in these countries and also on the distribution of income.  
Accordingly, the findings from the research will have significant implications for 
policymakers and practitioners not only in the five selected countries, but also on 
policymakers and practitioners in other trading partners of ASEAN 5.  
Additionally, this thesis will add to knowledge and contribute to future research 
and education in four key areas.  
 
First, the study will contribute to the understanding of PP conflicts in the M&A 
context. Most Asian companies experience the unique problem (Dharwadkar, et 
al., 2000) of PP relationship but previous research is mostly based in developed 
markets and focuses on PA conflicts. This is supported by Young et al.(2008) as a 
major and especially prevalent concern in emerging markets. Such studies in 
developed countries with mature capital markets usually find a negative impact of 
agency conflicts on company value. Questions remain unanswered as to how 
much impact the PP conflicts have on the company performance associated with 
M&As. Decision makers and investors, especially minority shareholders, can 
utilise the findings to understand the impact of M&A initiatives on their funds 
invested and the related risks and potential gains. Valuation models associated 
with this analysis will be of assistance to investors in the evaluation of their 
investment strategies. 
 
Secondly, the study will significantly enhance knowledge about M&A activities 
in Asean 5 countries. Comprehensive cross-country research on M&A activities 
and PP conflicts has not been undertaken previously for the Asean 5 countries.  
     
19 
 
This may have been due to the lack of available continuous long-term data, but 
this problem is now overcome with the availability of a database. A further 
significant contribution is the empirical work focusing on the long-term impact of 
companies involved in M&A.  
 
Thirdly, this research is the first direct study of PP agency conflicts, ownership 
and financial variables for Asean 5 listed companies. Prior research in mature 
markets provides insights, but these are not necessarily generalisable in the 
developing market context and this study assists in bridging this gulf.  
 
Finally the inclusion of time-invariant (including rarely changing variables) and 
time-variant variables in the panel data model analysis provides additional 
confirmation of the veracity of the modelling and robustness of analysis.  
Compared to prior studies undertaken elsewhere, the sophistication and 
robustness of the micro-econometric analysis used in the research is a significant 
enhancement. 
 
1.8  Organisation of thesis 
The remainder of the thesis is organised as follows. In Chapter 2 a review of the 
main themes of M&A and PP variables’ literature is undertaken. This review is 
primarily based on previous studies that focus on both theoretical and empirical 
research for the themes. Chapter 3 provides a discussion on the institutional 
framework as well as the M&A practices in Asean 5 countries. It also includes a 
brief discussion on the development of institutional background for each country 
and the role of various monitoring organisations.  
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Chapter 4 describes the hypotheses development and research method, 
measurement of variables, data and Chapter 5 provides a discussion on the 
methodology and econometric framework undertaken for the empirical analysis. 
Chapter 6 provides a discussion on the empirical results for univariate analysis, 
while Chapter 7 provides the empirical results for the multivariate analysis. 
Finally, Chapter 8 presents the conclusions, contributions and future directions for 
PP conflicts’ research.  
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CHAPTER 2: REVIEW OF LITERATURE  
 
2.1  Introduction 
 
The interconnectedness of financial issues is well established. The links between 
financial policy and ownership structure (M. Jensen, 1986; Leland & Pyle, 1977), 
dividend and management ownership (G. R. Jensen, Solberg, & Zorn, 1992; 
Moh'd, Perry, & Rimbey, 1995; Rozeff, 1982) and dividend with large 
shareholders (Faccio et al., 2001b; La Porta, et al., 2000a) have been largely 
substantiated. The potential relationship between dividend payment decisions with 
large shareholders associated with mergers and acquisitions (M&A) has been 
somewhat neglected and this is especially the case in Asian companies where the 
institutional framework and ownership structures are different from companies in 
mature economies.  
 
This chapter discusses relevant literature explaining how large, controlling 
shareholders expropriate minority shareholders. This principal-principal (PP) 
conflict is the central agency problem facing companies in the Asean 5, especially 
those active in M&A. These companies are also characterised by highly 
concentrated ownership, and the lack of investor protection in their capital 
markets opens up the possibility for large shareholders to aggravate PP conflicts.  
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2.2 Agency Theory: Principal-Agent (PA) conflicts 
Eighty years ago, Berle and Means (1932) explained in their well-known book, 
“The modern corporation and private property”, how a large number of small 
public companies in the United States were becoming more widely-held. The 
authors found that shareholders in modern corporations were losing their rights 
and power to a group of managers or directors who ran their businesses. The 
shareholders were also described as just being capital suppliers with even less 
priority than bondholders or lenders. With this phenomenon, the main 
consequence to the business structure is the separation of ownership and control.  
 
M. Jensen and Meckling (1976) label this separation and control as an agency 
problem and define it as “a contract under which one or more persons (the 
principal(s) engage another person (the agent) to perform some service on their 
behalf which involves delegating some decision making authority to the agent  
(M. Jensen & Meckling, 1976, p. 308). 
 
Agency relationship is when there are “two (or more) parties when one, 
designated as the agent acts for, on behalf of, or as representative for the other, 
designated the principal” (Ross, 1973, p. 134). At the same time, investors around 
the world are willing to part with thousands or millions of dollars’ worth of their 
personal wealth and voluntarily transfer their shareholding control and rights to 
strangers they call managers and boards of directors.  
 
Agency theory explains that conflicts between different stakeholders may vary 
and may be classified as managerialism (conflicts between shareholders and 
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management), asymmetric information (conflicts between large and minority 
shareholders), debt agency (conflicts between shareholders and debt holders) and 
other agency conflicts (between managers and other parties companies deal with) 
(John & Senbet, 1998). In summary, agents are assumed to be self-interested and 
likely to pursue goals for their own interest which could damage shareholder 
wealth, i.e. value of company. 
 
M. Jensen and Meckling (1976) continue by clarifying that the agents’ actions in 
running the business using the shareholders’ resources may depart with the 
principal’s main objective of maximising their investment. The actions by agents 
who are core in the decision making process of the company will sometimes result 
in negative impacts to the principal (owner or shareholder of the company) - also 
known as principal-agent (PA) conflicts. Agents may take direct or indirect 
financial benefits at the expense of maximising shareholders’ wealth.  Examples 
include on-the-job consumption of company assets for their own benefits, 
redirecting corporate assets to personal accounts and making non-profitable 
investment decisions.  
 
Past studies use two general internal and external mechanisms to show mitigation 
of PA conflicts by improved company’s performance. Internal mechanisms, 
including better governance by boards of directors, concentrated ownership and 
remuneration packages for managers and financial policies (debt and dividend 
policies) are some of the governance measures exercised to align PA goals 
(Hermalin & Weisbach, 1991; G. R. Jensen, et al., 1992; Rosenstein & Wyatt, 
     
24 
 
1997). These mechanisms however, are not sufficient to eradicate all PA conflicts 
given the complexity of modern corporations. 
 
It is suggested that external mechanisms are used to complement the internal 
controls already in place to minimise PA conflicts. These include market control 
(mergers and acquisitions), managerial labour market and product market (M. 
Jensen, 1993; Schleifer & Vishny, 1997). Managers are threatened by the 
possibility of being taken over so they react by minimising inefficiency within the 
company. 
 
Research into costs associated with PA conflicts is documented quantitatively by 
Ang, Cole, & Lin (2000) who use two alternative accounting measures for 
companies sampled; effective or expense ratio (ratio of operating expenses to 
annual sales) and efficiency ratio (ratio of annual sales to total assets). Using 
Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) theory on a sample of 1,708 small and unlisted 
United State (US) companies in 1992, they divided them into two groups: zero-
agency-costs (manager is sole shareholder) companies and non-zero-agency-costs 
(management owns less than 100% of company’s equity) companies. They 
confirm that PA problems persist when results show that agency costs are more 
severe when managers are not the sole shareholder. Further multivariate analysis 
also shows that agency costs are positively (negatively) related with the number 
of non-manager shareholders (level of management ownership).  
 
Many researchers observe that owners or shareholders of companies in capital 
markets outside the US and the United Kingdom are not dispersed shareholders, 
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but are rather more concentrated (Claessens, et al., 2000b; La Porta, et al., 1999). 
For example, Claessens et al. (2000) find that a single shareholder controls more 
than two-thirds of the 2,980 companies taken in their sample across nine Asian 
countries. They also report that concentration of control is decreasing with the 
level of countries’ economic development where more dispersed ownership 
occurs in Japan, followed by Korea and Taiwan.  
 
There is also extensive family control in more than half of East Asian 
corporations. La Porta et al. (1999), Claessen et al. (2002), and Dyck and Zingales  
(2004) find that the agency problem noted by Berle and Means (1932) and Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) are potentially less applicable outside the US and the UK.  
 
Companies with large and minority shareholdings have other agency problems 
(Yen & Andre, 2007), especially in countries with weak legal and regulatory 
protection for public and minority shareholders (Dharwadkar, et al., 2000). These 
researchers believe that the main agency problem outside the US and UK is when 
the large, concentrated shareholders expropriate company assets to the detriment 
of the minority shareholders. 
  
2.3 Agency Theory: Principal-Principal (PP) Conflicts 
 
Research in mature markets suggests that large shareholders are important in 
reducing PA agency conflicts. They have higher incentives and more resources to 
efficiently monitor company performance (M. Jensen & Meckling, 1976; 
Schleifer & Vishny, 1986). These large shareholders may attain private benefits 
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from this control that may be translated into financial and non-financial benefits 
for them. A non-financial benefit is the amenity of being in control (Demsetz & 
Lehn, 1985) while  financial benefits from being in control can be explained in the 
context of expropriating the wealth of minority shareholders (B. Maury, 2004).  
  
Dharwadkar et al. (2000) stress that the traditional agency solutions to mitigate 
PA conflicts in developed economies are not necessarily effective in emerging 
economies due to that the existence of other unique conflicts. Two different types 
of ownership and control frictions that need to be considered are the traditional 
PA conflicts and principal-principal (PP) conflicts (Dharwadkar, et al., 2000; 
Young, et al., 2008).   
 
PA conflicts are a result of lack of goal congruence between shareholders 
(principal) and managers (agent) who are appointed to administer the company’s 
assets. Though this traditional problem has been widely explored, Dharwadkar et 
al. (2000) point out that agency theorists offering solutions in mature markets 
have not considered the PP problem. Figure 4 provides a schematic explanation of 
the difference between PA and PP.  In the context of PP conflicts, the underlying 
factors of information asymmetry, moral hazard and adverse selection still prevail, 
but the problems lie mainly in the conflicts between large and small shareholders 
(Su, Xu, & Phan, 2008).  
 
PP conflicts consist can be explained as a range of subsets. Large shareholders 
might use their voting power to control the company for their own interests while 
other dispersed shareholders and stakeholders bear the cost (Johnson, La Porta, 
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Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 2000). Conflicts between shareholders may be 
shown in outright expropriation, such as controlling shareholders not paying 
dividends but appropriating funds for themselves, transferring profits to other 
companies they control and; indirect expropriation by making non-profitable 
business ventures. (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1999; Morck, 
Stangeland, & Yeung, 1998; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; Song & Chu, 2011).  
Managerial entrenchment is also an issue (Schulze, Lubatkin, Dino, & Buchholtz, 
2001) through appointing unqualified family members to top management 
positions. 
 
 
Figure 4 : Principal-Agent (PA) and principal-principal (PP) conflicts, 
Retrieved from “Corporate governance in emerging economies: A review of the principal-
principal perspective.” by M. N. Young,. M. W. Peng, D. Ahlstrom,  G. D. Bruton & Y. 
Jiang, 2008. Journal of Management Studies, 45(1), p. 200.  
Copyright 2008 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.  Reprinted with permission. 
 
 
PP conflicts are potentially more detrimental than PA conflicts in emerging 
economies. Faccio, Lang and Young (2001b) document the problems of East 
Asian corporate governance as more severe than in mature markets due to the 
extraordinary concentration of control. Ownership in East Asia is mostly block or 
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single shareholders (Claessens, et al., 2000b; Lins, 2003). Weak legal protection 
for minority shareholders (Dharwadkar, et al., 2000; R. La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1997) results in a more vulnerable status for minority 
shareholders than would be the case in more mature markets with stronger 
legislation.  
 
2.4 Agency theory and expropriation  
 
Expropriation can be defined broadly as ‘the act of taking from the owner’ 
(Singhai, 2002). Agency theory categorises the risks of expropriation in two 
settings, the first setting is when shareholders engage outsiders to run the 
corporations as decision makers. Here, the main victims will be the shareholders 
of the company when managers’ actions are not in accordance with the 
maximisation of shareholders’ wealth (Jensen and Meckling 1976).  
 
Also, there is the potential for shirking; managers may expropriate shareholders 
by being incompetent, conducting excessive or insufficient investment or resisting 
value-increasing takeovers. Johnson, Boone, Breach and Friedman (2000) boldly 
express expropriation by managers as ‘stealing’ and illustrate in their paper how 
managers steal company’s retained earnings and earn private financial utilities 
from these actions. The authors note that some of the ways management steal are 
by paying their own personal debts, opening up another company with different 
shareholders and crediting money to foreign bank accounts.  
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In the second setting, dominant shareholders assume control over managers and 
victimise minority shareholders by expropriating their wealth. This condition 
exists when control of companies is in the hands of concentrated owners 
(individual, families or business groups). Claessens et al. define this expropriation 
as ‘the process of using one’s control powers to maximise own welfare and 
redistribute wealth from minority shareholders’(1999, p. 2). The agency problem 
related to this form of expropriation is more complicated when it contradicts the 
assumption that large shareholders who have the power and means to monitor 
managers are expropriating the other minority shareholders instead.   
 
Some of these forms of conduct can be outright expropriation, such as taking a 
company’s resources for themselves by not paying out dividends, tunnelling or 
transferring resources out to another company within the business group, 
corporate opportunities, mergers and acquisitions (Johnson, La Porta, et al., 
2000). 
 
There is a need for more investigation into this second form of expropriation. 
Literature has provided enough evidence and clarity associated with manager-
shareholder conflicts and provides effective governance for companies to be able 
to punish unaccountable managers or reward those who perform well. However, 
the complexity of expropriation with costs or benefits associated with large and 
minority shareholders, especially in emerging markets calls for answers in more 
empirical studies.  
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2.4.1 Evidence of expropriation 
Various measures have been employed to proxy expropriation of minority 
shareholders in the finance literature. Claessens et al. (1999) utilises discount in 
Tobin’s q (market value of assets divided by book value of assets) as their 
dependent variable with ownership variables. They compare the values of q of 
widely-held companies that embark on corporate diversification and have at least 
one shareholder with 10% ownership, 20% or more ownership in the year 1996. 
Their study consists of 2,368 companies with ownership data from 1996 from 
countries in Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, 
Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand. Only small samples are available from 
Indonesia (6%), Malaysia (8%), Philippines (4%), Singapore (7%) and Thailand 
(6%). 
 
In this paper, Claessens et. al. conduct ordinary least square (OLS) fixed-effects 
and random-effects regression models on these data and conclude in their study 
that increasing ultimate owners’ control increases their ability to expropriate 
minority shareholders in East Asian countries. Their argument is that this occurs 
because the controlling shareholders take more benefits out of the diversification 
exercise and only bear part of the costs. This can also be investigated in 
performance studies and is not entirely looking at expropriation per se.  
 
Agency theory provides a framework for articulating expropriation as it applies to 
dividend payout policies of companies. Faccio et al. (2001b) build their 
expropriation proxy by relating dividend rates with controlling shareholders’ 
ownership rights (O) and their control rights (C). Their definition of O is the 
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controlling shareholder’s share of ownership in the corporation, while C is the 
control rights. For example, an investor who owns 50% of shares in company A, 
40% of shares in company B, and 30% in company C has (0.5x0.4x0.3) 6% of O 
in A, but 30% of C. Their argument is that dominant controlling shareholders 
have the discretion to transfer company’s wealth by paying out more dividends. 
Most of the time managers may not reduce the existing dividend rates without 
risking a sharp fall in share market values and future access to capital. 
Additionally, Faccio et al. also run OLS regression in a sample of 5,897 
corporations from East Asia and Western Europe, collecting ultimate owners (for 
year 1996) of each corporation who own at least 5 per cent of shares. Based on 
their result, they report that expropriation is highly detrimental in Asian 
companies (lower dividend paid) but not in Europe. They also assert that the 
presence of a second largest shareholder may combat expropriation pressure from 
the largest shareholder. The authors also summarise that the controlling 
shareholders may extract high returns from big projects financed by unrepayable 
debts that had low or negative outcomes for the companies’ financial 
performance. 
 
It should be noted that the above study was done at the height of the financial 
crisis in 1997-1998 in the Asian market and this macroeconomic catastrophe 
definitely had an impact on the overall results of the study, especially when 
compared with the less affected Western markets at that time.  
 
The perplexity of why companies pay dividends motivated Adjoud and Ben-Amar  
(2010) to explain expropriation by also using dividend ratios but with relation to 
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corporate governance variables in Canada. They use a one year lagged dividend as 
a determinant, consistent with Lintner (1956), to maintain stable dividends over 
time. Their results do suggest that better shareholder rights are associated with 
higher dividend payouts supporting the outcome hypothesis of dividend which 
means that shareholders are well protected by the governance system in the 
developed market. The outcome model of dividends means higher dividends with 
better corporate governance quality while the substitution model of dividends 
means lower dividends with higher governance quality (better governed firms 
have lower agency costs because of separation of ownership and control) (La 
Porta, et al., 2000a) 
 
When a controlling shareholder in a business group in India wants to transfer or 
tunnel profits across companies (to subsidiaries), Bertrand, Mehta and 
Mullainathan (2002) explain that this shareholder may do so by offsetting non-
operating  losses and gains to another company he owns. The authors called this 
method of expropriation as propagation of shocks, and describe this process of 
diverting cash from companies where the controlling shareholder has low-cash-
flow-rights to another company he has high-cash-flow-rights (high ownership 
rights) in. These shocks between transfers are isolated using regression to measure 
company’s actual reported performance on its predicted performance, and on the 
predicted performance of other companies in its group. The authors use firm-level 
data on earnings, industry, group membership and ownership structure and 
indicate that though they would have used dividends as their expropriation proxy, 
lack of availability in data prevented them to do so. 
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The legal system provides another strand of literature that could be used to 
measure expropriation. It is noted in the literature that the protection of minority 
shareholders who incur higher risk amongst all the other stakeholders in the 
corporation can only be addressed by the legal system of the country. Direct 
intervention in the form of sound corporate governance and strict enforcement 
actions by government is the only way to mitigate the blatant actions of some 
controlling shareholders that may be a costly failure to the whole market and 
country’s reputation (Johnson, La Porta, et al., 2000; La Porta, et al., 1998; 
Singhai, 2002).  
 
Basically, courts in civil law and common law countries approach tunnelling or 
expropriation actions subjectively based on their definition of scope. Courts in 
civil law countries such as France, Italy and Belgium may accommodate 
tunnelling more often than courts in common law countries such as the US or UK. 
This is because civil law assumes that the business transaction is consistent with 
the scope of directors’ duties (especially if the controlling shareholder is in the 
business group of companies), and are not based on fairness to minority 
shareholders (Johnson, La Porta, et al., 2000). 
 
2.4.2 Large shareholders and expropriation 
Large shareholders are deemed to be advocates for an ultimate balance in decision 
making between the shareholders and managers. In publicly held corporations, 
these large shareholders hold a sizeable fraction of all voting rights and may solve 
the problems of ‘modern capital markets’ where there is always the inevitable 
agony in monitoring management to act in the best interests of the shareholders. 
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The large shareholders are in a position where they can benefit from inside 
information they can obtain from management, while at the same time being able 
to influence the corporate outcomes because of their powerful voting rights 
(Zeckhauser & Pound, 1990).  
 
Different definitions of large shareholders are analysed in the literature. Dahya, 
Dimitrov and McConnell (2008) define a dominant shareholder as one who can 
significantly influence selection of the company’s board. Their data include the 
largest single owner of voting rights in companies with at least 10% of the 
company’s votes.  La Porta et al. (1998) and Claessens et al. (2000) identify 
controlling owners when they hold more than 20% of the shares in the company. 
In reality, while 33% voting power would in fact give de facto control,  Loh  
(1996) describes a 15-25% control over voting rights as sufficient for control over 
a corporation. It is ubiquitously agreed that large or controlling shareholders are 
those who are more likely to wield a large influence over a company and thus 
impact decision-making processes. Shareholders who hold less than the 
controlling shares are regarded as the minority or small shareholders. 
 
Cronqvist & Nilsson (2003) assert that large shareholders frequently own more 
control rights than cash flow rights in public traded companies, and thus have a 
higher entrenchment effect to be able to expropriate the minority shareholders. 
They use owners with 25% or more of Swedish public listed company votes to 
assume control and find that lower valuation (Tobin’s q and return on assets) 
outcome associated with controlling owners. The authors find that since Sweden 
is a developed country with efficient legal enforcement and accounting standards, 
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the agency problem of owners stealing by direct diversion of cash flow into the 
pockets of the controlling owners) is not appropriate to explain this outcome of 
lower performance as can be explained in other developing market (Johnson, 
Boone, et al., 2000). However, these low performances occur due to the fact that 
these large shareholders are more passive in their actions by making sub-optimal 
investment.  
 
Claessens et al. (1999) state that expropriation is the “process of using one’s 
control powers to maximise own welfare and redistribute wealth from minority 
shareholders”. They confirm that the agency problem in East Asian countries is 
not because unaccountable managers are not dealt with, but rather due to the issue 
of expropriation of minority shareholders by controlling shareholders. The 
evidence of this outcome is when they find a positive relationship between 
expropriation (lower market values) and the separation of cash flow from voting 
rights. Morck, Andrei and Vishny (1988) further illustrate that expropriation 
occurs when company performance decreases where large owners assume full 
control and extract private benefits from the minority shareholders. 
 
Fama and Jensen (1983) demonstrate various ways in which managers who own 
enough shares can dominate board members; by paying themselves with an 
excessive salary; negotiating ‘sweetheart’ deals with other companies under the 
manager’s control; investing in negative-net-present-value projects; and 
withdrawing corporate funds. Stulz (1988) notes how managers with large 
shareholdings feel entrenched and are not afraid of losing their jobs even if they 
have to resist value-increasing tender offers.  
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Large shareholders may also opt to collude with managers to divert resources off 
the company and share private benefits (Becht, et al., 2010; Burkart & Lee, 2008). 
These conflicts may be exacerbated when large shareholders also hold managerial 
positions in the company. Furthermore, one of the key assumptions of PP 
conflicts is that managers act as agents and answer directly to the controlling 
shareholders (Young, et al., 2008).  
 
Developed markets with high investors’ protection believe concentrated 
shareholders help to eradicate agency conflicts. Shleifer and Vishny (1986) 
suggest in their paper that large shareholders are needed to monitor managers and 
to look for ways to better company performance. Basically, no expropriation by 
large shareholders is found for public listed companies in the United States 
(Holderness & Sheehan, 1988). In fact, these controlling shareholders appear to 
reduce agency costs by constantly monitoring the management team actions as 
well as supervising them. Since the stakes for controlling shareholders in these 
companies are higher, it is no doubt that they have more incentives to monitor top 
management decisions for a sustainable performance (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972). 
Furthermore, power rests more heavily among controlling shareholders over 
management in lieu of minority shareholders (Cubbin & Leech, 1983) 
 
Investors are also known to invest in companies when they know companies have 
controlling shareholders that may be likely to expropriate. Giannetti and Simonov 
(2006) observe that in a developed market such as Sweden, domestic investors 
and individuals who are board members prefer to invest in companies in which 
controlling shareholders have stronger incentives to extract private benefits 
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because of the strong information connection they have between each other. They 
conclude that the fear of expropriation may be stronger with dire consequences for 
markets that lack both investor protection and enforcement of law.  
 
Concentrated ownership may result in unfavourable outcomes for companies with 
less investor protection in certain markets. La Porta, et al. (1998) show that 
companies with controlling shareholders are not willing to undertake 
diversification to reduce risks. Another issue may be these companies may find 
problems in raising equity finance as minority shareholders are afraid of being 
expropriated by the managers and large shareholders.  
 
The self-interest of agency problems proposed by Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
state how managers make decisions for companies and act not entirely for the 
benefit of shareholders but rather to satisfy their personal needs. Gomez-Mejia et 
al. (2005) claim that this view help to explain how managers will work with any 
party to satisfy their private interest. Therefore, the issue of large shareholders 
acting on behalf of the minority shareholders advocated by agency theorist may 
also be in question since their interest will much more closely tied with the 
managers/executive directors (Davis, 1991).  
 
Board members are elected to represent company shareholders in order to align 
the objectives and interests of principals with the actions of agents. However 
large, controlling shareholders have stronger ties to the managers/executive 
directors and are known in the literature to have a considerable influence over the 
election of directors, especially when most of public companies are mostly owned 
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by family members. Hence, the board and managers owe their allegiance to the 
controlling shareholders as opposed to the whole body of investors (Singhai, 
2002).  
 
This study does not take into account board ownership in the analysis as this will 
not give a true representation of corporate ownership in the East Asian market. 
This is because many of these holdings are owned by directors through indirect 
ownership and usually in the form of private limited companies or nominee 
companies whose identities remain anonymous (Chu & Cheah, 2004).  
 
A comprehensive analysis of Asian companies’ ownership structure by Claessens, 
Djankov, & Lang (1999a) reports that the ten largest families in Indonesia, 
Philippines and Thailand control half of the corporate sector, while in Malaysia 
and Singapore they control a quarter. The researchers also note in the year 2000 
the output of the top 15 family-controlled companies make up 21.5% of GDP in 
Indonesia, 76.2% in Malaysia, 48.3% in Singapore, 46.7% in the Philippines and 
39.3% in Thailand (Claessens, et al., 2000b). There is much interlink among these 
controlling companies, direct and indirect, and also between companies and their 
governments that have formed weak legal and regulation systems.  
 
A number of studies have identified the main players in the large shareholdings in 
East Asian companies. Large controlling family businesses such as the Suharto 
family in Indonesia and Marcos family in the Philippines are also known to have 
controlling stakes in many industries. Some of Thailand’s large companies are 
owned by the royal family and the military. In Malaysia and Singapore, large 
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state-owned enterprises and political parties have substantial business holdings 
(Claessens, Djankov and Lang, 1999).  
 
Asian market studies, as explained above, contrary to empirical results derived in 
developed markets, have concluded that concentrated ownership may hamper 
companies’ overall value due to expropriation issues. Shleifer and Vishny (1997), 
Morck et al. (1998), and La Porta et al. (1999) state that as large shareholders hold 
more control over a corporation, these conflicts will manifest themselves in the 
form of expropriating the small shareholders. Claessens et al.(1999) summarise it 
as: “Controlling shareholders not paying out dividends by enriching themselves, 
or transferring profits to other companies they control, or through pursuit of non-
profit-maximising objectives by large investors” (p.5). 
 
Not only that, Morck et al.(1998) also show that concentrated control may stump 
companies’ growth as opposed to companies with diffused ownership as large 
shareholders may put their interests first by preserving their investment in the 
company. By using cash flow associated with controlling shareholders, La Porta, 
Lopez, Shleifer and Vishny (1999) state that countries that have laws to better 
protect minority shareholders will also have higher valued companies than those 
companies with less regulation.  
 
Some of the merits in legal protection include whether shareholders may send a 
nominee if they cannot attend a meeting for a vote; ability to mail their proxy vote 
directly; allowing legal mechanisms against oppression by directors; and that 
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minority interests may vote cumulatively for their choice of directors or board or 
if the company is mandated to pay dividend (La Porta, et al., 1998). 
 
The weaker the formal legal institutions and regulatory protection of the public 
and minority shareholders, the more concentrated ownership in companies 
becomes (Young, et al., 2008).  The concentration of ownership impedes further 
development of corporate control (Guan, 2005) and may aggravate agency 
conflicts. In Thailand, minority shareholding is limited and diffused with their 
rights difficult to uphold due to the infrequency of public meetings for 
shareholders. Further problems, such as confused roles and responsibilities of 
government agencies in regulating shareholder rights and weak creditors’ control 
because of long-term “cronyistic” relations between banks and companies 
(Brown, 2006, p. 285), worsen the conditions for minority shareholders.  
 
Another instance is in Malaysia where, according to Guan (2005), large 
shareholders and other insiders who do not work towards maximising the value of 
the company may escape punishment from threat of takeover. This is because 
large ownership stakes arising from a company’s concentrated shareholding 
permits most takeovers in the country to occur through friendly negotiations 
between the controlling shareholders of the involved companies (Guan, 2005). 
This may confirm the comment by La Porta et al. (1997) that minority investors in 
countries with low level of investor protection, such as in Asean 5 countries, will 
be less protected in the event of corporate wrongdoings.  
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It has been proven by Nam (2001) that expropriation among shareholders seems 
to be very serious in Asian business groups. He reiterates that the agency view of 
managers attempting to maximise their interests in diversification is not even in 
question, especially when distorted resource allocation may occur even before 
corporate profits are determined. Hence, the aim to detect expropriation via 
financial or market values may be deceiving because of this view.  
 
Faccio et al. (2001) observes that companies with controlling shareholders in Asia 
extract high returns from projects that incur negative investment returns and pay 
lower dividends than their counterparts in Europe. Chang (2003) finds large 
shareholders in Korean companies use insider information to transfer profits to 
less profitable and less promising affiliates through intragroup trade, and that 
there is no evidence of better company performance with concentrated ownership. 
 
The role of second largest shareholder may be efficient to curb the agency 
problems arising from the largest shareholder. In a developed market, the second 
large shareholder actually reduces the ability of the controlling shareholder to 
effectively control the corporation (Barclay & Holderness, 1989). However, as 
many East Asian corporations have single controlling owners with no second 
controlling owners (Claessens, Djankov, & Lang, 2000a), this may actually 
intensify the agency conflicts in the market.  
 
 
 
     
42 
 
2.5 Empirical studies on PP conflicts 
 
As discussed above, large controlling shareholders may create another set of 
agency conflicts especially in emerging markets, and Asia in particular. This has 
brought more empirical research to recent focus on large shareholders and PP 
conflicts. 
 
It is noted by Young et al. (2003) that there is a vagueness in the distinction 
between PA and PP. They reiterate that the over-riding characteristic of PP 
conflicts is the use of ownership control to expropriate minority shareholders. It is 
also concluded that some PP characteristics are “concentrated ownership and 
control, poor institutional protection of minority shareholders, weak governance, 
lower firm valuations, lower levels of dividend payout, inefficient strategy, less 
investment in innovation and expropriation of minority shareholders” (Young, et 
al., 2008, p. 197). 
 
Empirical studies investigating PP conflicts are still relatively new and not well 
developed.  Su et al. (2008) use three dependent variables to capture PP conflicts: 
level of board compensation, board size and the proportion of independent 
directors in listed Chinese companies from 2000 to 2003. They assert that these 
board members are usually being appointed by large shareholders to represent 
them in making decisions on matters such as corporate diversification or capital 
expenditure.  
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Su et al. use the Herfindahl index (Kwoka, 1985) of largest shareholders by 
squaring the sum of the percentage of shares held by the 10 largest shareholders. 
Hence, one way to detect the expropriation is to examine the board structure. Due 
to the size of their sample, they employ feasible generalised least squares (FGLS) 
regression to test their hypotheses. Their results show a curvilinear relationship 
where low levels of agency costs are detected at low to medium levels of 
concentration, while at higher levels, increasing agency costs are reported.  
 
It appears that there are grounds for accepting that board members owe their 
allegiance to the large shareholders who appointed them. Board monitoring is less 
efficient in Asian markets, and their appointments are basically to conform to the 
country’s code of conduct Here, board size and board composition do not 
influence the dividend policy in the corporation (Subramaniam & Devi, 2011). 
Besides, board compensation is essentially audited and monitored by the audit 
committee and may not reflect the true nature of expropriation by large 
shareholders.  
 
Chen and Young (2010) extend the research of PP conflicts by analysing a sample 
of cross-border mergers and acquisitions of Chinese companies from 2000 to 
2008. In their analysis, they study performance measurement using cumulative 
abnormal returns (CARs) to predict company value when the government is the 
majority owner of the bidders. These findings favour the view that in China the 
negative relationship with government ownership and CARs provides some 
evidence that increased ownership is associated with increased PP agency costs.  
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Another study by Jiang and Peng (2010) analyses 877 publicly listed large 
corporations with concentrated ownership in seven Asian countries. These 
countries are Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan 
and Thailand. They explore PP conflicts during the economic crisis that hit Asia 
in 1997 by taking dependent and independent variables in 1996, a year before the 
crisis. A 5% control right (percentage of total outstanding shares) is used to 
measure the largest shareholder concentration and control, while their dependent 
variable is excess control (difference between cash flow rights and control rights 
of the largest shareholder). They conclude that family firms have higher excess 
control rights which may permit them to expropriate. The presence of multiple 
blockholders (companies that have more than one shareholder with more than 5% 
control rights) is found to be able to constrain potential expropriation of minority 
shareholders. 
 
Banchit and Locke (2011) explore the concept of PP conflicts by measuring them 
with cash dividends paid out to large shareholders. A cross-sectional analysis is 
conducted in a small sample of 194 companies in Asean 4 (Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Thailand and Philippines) by regressing cash dividend to total assets, with other 
variables including the large shareholdings (measured at 5% to 20% concentration 
level). They assert there is evidence that suggests the presence of large 
shareholders paying more dividends and this impacts negatively with the cash 
flows and growth, which in turn implies PP conflicts in Asian markets. It is 
summarised that minority shareholders are at risk of being expropriated which 
suggests the urgent need for stronger investor protection in these markets to 
improve the attractiveness for investor performance. 
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Since the idea of dispersed ownership does not universally hold true, especially in 
emerging markets, Young et al.(2008) strongly affirm that PP conflicts is the 
major concern of corporate governance in emerging markets. The literature 
focusing on PP conflicts is developing (Chen & Young, 2010; Jiang & Peng, 
2010; Su, et al., 2008) but the researchers assert that because of the unique nature 
of the PP problem, it has been ignored by mainstream agency theory research and 
more studies should address the problem stemming from large shareholders (S. J. 
Chang, 2003).  
 
The current study accepts this challenge in addressing this unique yet crucial 
problem, using cross-country analysis of multiyear data for the five most active 
economies in East Asia. This will help to illuminate PP conflict issues with the 
potential for improving financial and economic outcomes in the region.  
 
2.6 Agency theory: Dividend policy  
 
It is pertinent to all financial managers that dividend payments must be aligned 
with maximising shareholders’ value. Therefore, the optimal dividend policy that 
is adopted by a company must reflect a “balance between current dividends and 
future growth, and maximises the company’s share prices” (Brigham & Houston, 
2010, p. 490). Dividend policy is also regarded as one of a long term financing 
strategies for company.  This is because dividend policy is a company’s plan that 
takes into account whether to pay out earnings as dividends as opposed to 
retaining them for reinvestment in the company (Hussainey, Mgbame & Chijoke-
Mgbame, 2010). 
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Therefore, it is no surprise that companies’ dividend policy become one of the 
most common subjects in finance literature from the 1950s (Lintner, 1956; 
Modigliani, 1982). It has also been related to many other corporate matters; from 
agency related issues to valuation of shares.  
 
Before the famous Miller and Modigliani’s (1961, hereafter M&M) seminal paper 
on dividend policy of irrelevance theory, the consensus belief among corporate 
members was that higher dividends lead to higher company’s value. Retained 
earnings (a bird in the bush) which is payoff in the future is highly risky for the 
shareholders (might fly away) (Gordon and Shapiro,1956; Gordon 1959; Lintner 
1962; Walter 1963). 
 
However, the dividend irrelevance hypothesis pioneered by M&M (1961) who 
state that under a strict set of assumptions of perfect market, they theorised that a 
company’s value is determined only by its basic earning power and not on how its 
income is divided between dividends and retained earnings. They conjure that 
“…given a firm’s investment policy, the dividend payout policy it chooses to 
follow will affect neither the current price of its shares nor the total returns to 
shareholders” (p.414). 
 
M&M further attest all dividend policies implemented by any company are 
effectively similar to a shareholder, because the shareholder can create 
“homemade” dividends by adjusting his/her portfolio in a way that matches 
his/her preferences. Their assumptions of a perfect capital market for the dividend 
irrelevancy hypothesis can be summarised as follows: (1) no differences between 
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taxes on dividends and capital gains; (2) no transaction and flotation costs 
incurred when shares are traded; (3) all market participants have free and equal 
access to the same information and (4) no conflicts of interests between managers 
and shareholder (no agency problem/PA conflicts).  
   
Nevertheless, due to the required assumptions about the nature of perfect capital 
market in M&M’s dividend irrelevance hypothesis, empirical work testing the 
impact of dividend policy on the value of a company remains unsolved (Al-
Malkawi, 2005). M&M’s theory is greatly contested by his critics, and especially 
so when the hypothesis is bound with the stringent perfect market assumptions. 
Even if one of these assumptions is relaxed in a study, it can be change the whole 
concept altogether.   
 
Most investors do have to pay tax for their dividend income and incur transactions 
costs when they sell their shares in the real world. Walter (1963) accounts this by 
stating that “…the cash-flow stream (both before and after account is taken of 
taxes imposed on recipients of dividends and capital gains) are conditioned by 
dividend policy” (p.290).  Furthermore, Gordon (1963) and Lintner (1962) affirm 
that the required of return of a company will be reduced as a result of increased 
dividend payout, and inevitably will negatively affect the company’s value. This 
is because eventually, the shareholders are less confident of gaining their capital 
gains back from reduced retained earnings (due to dividend payments).  
 
Another important assumption of M&M’s perfect capital market is that there are 
no conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders; and that shareholders 
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have perfect information of the market. Again, these assumptions may be quite 
impossible in the real world. As has been explained in Section 2.2, agency 
conflicts refer to the misalignment of objectives between the managers and the 
owners or shareholders of the company. Consequently, the shareholders will incur 
(agency) costs by monitoring the managers’ actions.  The payment of dividends 
might assist to bring into line the interests and mitigate the agency problems 
between managers and shareholders by reducing the free cash flows available for 
managers to spend unnecessarily (Rozeff, 1982; Easterbrook, 1984; Jensen, 
1986). 
 
Agency theory (PA conflict) also supports the notion of using dividends to limit 
the conflicts among the agents and principals by reducing the gap in information 
assymmetry or disequillibirium. Any payouts of dividends to shareholders convey 
credible inside information to the market which are usually private to the insiders 
(board of directors and management)  (Bhattacharya, 1979; Miller & Rock, 1985). 
It is assumed that dividend payments require managers to participate in the capital 
market more frequently because cash dividends paid will use up company funds. 
Hence, any future investments will ensure managers supply as much information 
as possible to the shareholders in order to apply for more funds. 
 
2.6.1 Dividends as direct returns to shareholders 
This section describes how dividend payouts become one of the main sources of 
income for shareholders. This in turn eventually becomes a disadvantage to the 
other minority shareholders when the ownership of the company is concentrated 
to a single shareholder.  
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In reality, dividend payments is an unwritten contract between shareholders and 
corporate management (Myers, 1990). For companies, their after-tax earnings can 
basically be dealt with in two ways: dividends and retained earnings. Furthermore, 
a shareholder prefers a dividend despite the personal tax liability incurred from 
the dividend received (Frankfurter & Wood Jr., 2002). 
 
Investors have two main expectations from the contractual basis of their 
investments which are returns through dividend distributions and capital 
appreciation upon selling their share investments. (Berle & Means, 1932, p. 247).  
Hence, the direct relationship between the shareholders and the company’s 
resources takes the form of dividend payments, as in the ‘a bird in hand 
hypothesis’ (Gordon and Shapiro,1956; Gordon 1959; Lintner 1962; Walter 
1963).   
 
In fact, Gordon (1959) claims that capital appreciation can be ignored in a 
prediction model because it is related to the future price based on the expected 
dividends and/or earnings.  He also suggests that there are three possible 
hypotheses for why shareholders would own a share. The first reason is to obtain 
both dividends and earnings, second is to obtain dividends, and the third reason is 
to get the earnings. He examines four industries by analysing four industries 
(chemicals, foods, steels, and machine tools) from 1951 to 1954 in a simple linear 
regression model. He finds that dividends have more significant impact on share 
price than retained earnings which mean that shareholders do prefer dividend 
payouts.  
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In fact, Walter (1963) boldly claims that the satisfaction of an shareholder in 
owning any share “..is whole (or almost wholly) monetary in character” (p.281). 
Companies do regard paying out dividends as a cost which eventually will affect 
the share prices. He deduces that the net cash flows from companies’ operations 
are available for payment of debt and interests, capital expenditures and dividend 
payments. 
 
How equity shareholders receive their returns can be shown in the following 
discounted cash flow (DCF): dividend and capital gains (Brigham & Ehrhardt, 
2005, p. 317).  In this model, the single way a shareholder may receive cash from 
the company is via dividend payment, hence capital gains is the change of the 
present value of expected future dividends (Bagwell & Shoven, 1989). 
   
  
    
 
          
Where       = current price of the ordinary share                                                                                                                        
      = the expected dividend to be paid at Year 1 
       = the required rate of return 
      = growth of dividend  
 
Dividend payments are also regarded as the cheapest way to the shareholders’ 
objective of having a stable flow of income from their capital investment (Allen & 
Michaely, 2002).  
 
There have been mixed and inconclusive results even though many studies have 
looked into the issues of dividend policy. Most of these data also come from the 
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developed markets with little emphasis on emerging markets. In relation to this 
thesis, it builds upon the argument that in an M&A, dividends can prominently be 
measured to identify the existence of expropriation by large controlling 
shareholders.  
 
2.6.2 Dividends as proxy for PP conflicts 
The most prominent agency problem in East Asia is the expropriation of profit 
from large controlling shareholders as established in the literature (Bebchuk, 
Kraakman, & Triantis, 1999; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997) which typically reflects PP 
conflicts. As mentioned by Faccio et al., (2001 p.55) “dividends play a basic role 
in limiting insider expropriation because they remove corporate wealth from 
insider control”. In another statement, “dividends signal the severity of the 
conflicts between the large, controlling owner and small, outside shareholders” 
(Gugler & Yurtoglu, 2003, p. 733).  
 
This thesis builds upon this research by relating dividends to large controlling 
shareholders. The next issue to address is whether lower or higher dividends 
explicate PP conflicts? Contradictory studies have been undertaken on higher or 
lower dividend payouts related to expropriation among large shareholders.  It can 
be argued that the high concentration of shareholdings using direct and indirect 
voting rights may worsen the expropriation among minority shareholders 
especially during mergers and acquisitions.  
 
Before the argument regarding higher or lower dividends and the link to 
expropriation can be considered, the reason why corporations pay dividends must 
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be understood. Why dividends are paid is always an intriguing quandary as 
suggested by many scholars including Renneboog and Trojanowski who state that 
“the controversy about why firms should pay dividends has not been satisfactorily 
resolved” (2007, p. 2).  
 
The prominent paper by Lintner (1956) that features interviews with 28 selected 
US companies was the first study to investigate the answer to this quandary. The 
findings reveal that there are considerable differences amongst companies but also 
reiterate some significant similarities as pointed out by Marsh and Merton (1987):  
 
1. Managers prefer to have a long-term target payout ratio and will avoid 
increasing the dividends unless the new level of payout can be sustained at 
least in the near future. 
2. Changes in the companies’ dividends are usually triggered because of a 
major unexpected and persistent change in the earnings. 
 
In short, Lintner concludes that dividends are sticky, tied to long-term sustainable 
earnings, paid by mature companies and often smoothed (consistent) from year to 
year. 
 
In the PA context, dividends play a basic and important role in the reduction of 
agency cost. By paying out dividends, corporate earnings or free cash flows are 
returned to investors and are no longer available to management to benefit 
themselves (M. Jensen, 1986; Rozeff, 1982). Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
corroborate that managers are reluctant to pay out dividends for shareholders’ 
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benefit, preferring to enjoy the corporation’s income for their own perquisite 
consumption. This corresponds to the free cash flow theory developed by 
Easterbrook (1984) and discussed extensively in later work (Bena & Hanousek, 
2008; Gugler & Yurtoglu, 2003). 
 
Companies in the UK use dividends to maintain shareholder loyalty, supporting 
the free cash flow theory that the market is disciplining the managers (Dickerson, 
Gibson, & Tsakalotos, 1998). This is shown in a negative relationship with 
dividend payments to the probability of companies being taken over. The authors 
conclude that managers who are resistant to their companies being taken over 
because of fear being dismissed prefer to pay more dividends in order to satisfy 
their companies’ shareholders. These shareholders would be reluctant to make any 
unnecessary drastic changes to their companies’ portfolio when they are satisfied 
that their investments are well managed.  
 
Dividend payout policy acts as a mechanism to interpret a company’s recent 
performance and its future forecast, and availability of cash (Asquith & Mullins, 
1983). A company’s public announcement about dividend disbursals to 
shareholders helps to inform them about the company, unlike other 
announcements such as repurchases or share splits that may not show a clear 
picture about the company’s cashflows and overall performance.  
 
It has also been confirmed by Gugler & Yurtoglu (2003) in German companies 
that the dividend payout ratios can measure the severity of the conflicts between 
large and small shareholders. They predicted a U-shape relationship in which the 
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dividend ratios increase first with the largest shareholder and after 34.4% of 
voting share; the dividend ratio starts to fall.  They explain that this might occur 
where at a level between 30% to 40% control of the largest shareholder, the 
benefit of having high payouts benefits all shareholders. However, as the holdings 
increase, the private benefit of control outweighs the benefit of having high 
payouts.  
 
Studies in the developed market do not support that controlling shareholders 
expropriate company wealth. One of the earliest studies in the United States on 
this issue is by Zeckhauser and Pound (1990) who find no changes in payout 
ratios with the presence or absence of large shareholders, and that these 
controlling owners signal the market for better future performance. This notion is 
based on the idea that dividend payments signal a company’s financial position 
and  prospects to the market (Bhattacharya, 1979; Miller & Rock, 1985) which are 
in contrast to the theory to free cash flow of using dividend to return cashflow to 
shareholders.   
 
It is also noted by Kumar (1988) that  dividends are unable to completely signal 
any private information to shareholders, moreover, he shows that it is partially 
transmitted in equilibirium. He describes that given the conflicts of interest by the 
managers, any information about the company’s investment prospect will be 
distorted to induce a more “suitable” reinvestment response from shareholders. 
Thus this reinforces why dividends are not suitable for explaining the  PA context. 
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Dividends in the realm of agency theory explained above are developed for the 
benefit of dispersed ownership structures with managerial control. High 
shareholder protection in a capital market may also help to reduce minority 
expropriation. Australian companies frequently use the role of higher dividend (or 
debt) to control agency problems (Setia-Atmaja, Tanewski, & Skully, 2009).    
 
Prominent studies have also shown that dividend matters in Asian companies. 
Investors in emerging markets are particularly concerned about large 
shareholders’ controlling decisions on dividend policies where there is tendency 
for expropriation of cash holdings for their own private benefits (Chiou et al. 
2010). This leads to the next issue of whether higher or lower dividends clarify 
expropriation.  
 
Expropriation by controlling shareholders can be explicated through lower 
dividend payments. La Porta et al.(2000) argue that companies with weaker 
shareholder protection pay lower dividends. Large shareholders expropriate by 
paying out lower dividends to keep resources in the company and within their 
control (Easterbrook 1984; Faccio, et al., 2001; La Porta, et al., 2000a) and are 
likely to accumulate more cash within the company (Mancinelli &Ozkan 2006). 
Gugler and Yurtoglu (2003) assert that dividend payouts decrease with an 
increase in the control stake of the largest shareholder in Germany. Reasons for 
low payout to shareholders can be explained when the shareholders have the 
power to not pay out profits, but rather indulge in more private benefits of control 
(Maury & Pajuste, 2002). 
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At times, large shareholders may influence management decision making at the 
expense of the minority shareholders by paying out dividends for their personal 
advantage (Truong & Heaney, 2007). In their study of 8,279 companies in 37 
countries around the world, they find that there is a convex relationship between 
the largest shareholding and dividend payout and support the notion of 
substitution theory where dividends reduce agency conflicts. The likelihood of 
paying dividends decreases at lower levels of shareholdings but start to increase 
when the largest shareholder holds equity approaching 30%. The researchers also 
conclude that dividends are higher / (lesser) in the countries practising civil law / 
(common law) due to the fact that common law countries have better legal 
protection. There is evidence of higher potential for conflicts among shareholders 
in Norway with more earnings paid out as dividends (Berzins, Bohren, & 
Stacescu, 2011). 
 
In another study, Faccio et al. (2001) investigate the relationship between 
dividend payout and controlling shareholders in two regions; Western Europe and 
East Asia. They find that the presence of large shareholders in Western Europe 
helps to increase dividend rates, but large shareholders in Asian companies is 
associated with reduction in dividend payouts. The authors conclude that Asian 
large shareholders collude with the managers to expropriate minority shareholders 
by withholding cash flows with lower dividend payouts.  
 
La Porta et al. (1998) also define the power exercised by shareholders (attached 
with each share) to enable them to vote for the directors who decide on all major 
corporate issues as one-share-one-vote. The researchers claim that dividends are 
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very much associated with these rights which enable them to disable managers 
from extracting cash flows off them from dividend payments (Grossman & Hart, 
1988; Harris & Raviv, 1988). 
 
It is argued that high levels of dividends paid to shareholders may also reduce the 
availability of funds for long-term investment which may negatively impact the 
company’s long term performance (Bond & Meghir, 1994). La Porta et al. (2000) 
find that shareholders use their legal power to force management to pay out 
dividends when growth prospects are down. There is also evidence in the first 
study of PP conflicts in the Asean 4 market (excluding Singapore) by Banchit and 
Locke (2011) who use dividends as their proxy. They find that higher dividend 
payouts exist at levels of percentage for large shareholders at 5% and 10% stakes. 
They also find that the significantly negative relationship with companies’ growth 
may indicate the presence of expropriation of cash resources. This affirms 
remarks by La Porta et al. (2000b) that when profits are not paid out to 
shareholders, some diversion of the profits may be used to invest in unprofitable 
projects. 
 
It is also noted in corporate governance studies that companies with weaker 
governance tend to have high agency costs with increased likelihood of cash 
dividend distributions (John & Knyazeva, 2006). DeAngelo et al., (2004) conduct 
a study on 25 companies in the US by analysing the pattern of dividend payouts 
from 1973 to 2002. Historically, they imply that profitable companies associated 
with large agency problems are also likely to pay out more dividends.  
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Dividends have been demonstrated in previous studies as providing evidence of 
how controlling shareholders expropriate minority shareholders. High dividends 
reduce the value of the company (Lins, 2003) and thus negatively impact its 
growth. Alternatively, lower dividend payouts mean that large shareholders prefer 
to keep earnings within the company for their easy access to expropriate for their 
own private benefits (R. La Porta, et al., 2000a; Pinkowitz, Stulz, & Williamson, 
2006). Discerning how both high and low dividends may reflect PP conflicts 
requires consideration of a range of other variables.  
 
2.7 Agency theory: M&A  
 
Generally, M&A are defined as to “reflect various forms of combining companies 
thorough some mutuality of negotiations” (Weston, Weston, & Chung, 1998, p. 
5). From a financial perspective, M&A rest within the framework of deterring the 
conflicts of interest that may impact the core element of maximisation of 
shareholders’ wealth (Sudarsanam, 2003).  
 
M&A are also some of the main external market mechanisms to combat PA 
conflicts in a general merger strategy. Manne (1965), one of the earliest 
commentators on mergers states, "Only the takeover scheme provides some 
assurance of competitive efficiency among corporate managers and thereby 
affords strong protection to the interest of vast numbers of small, non-controlling 
shareholders" (p.113). M&As are considered to induce incentives because the 
market control of being taken over penalises poor-performing managers due to 
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inefficient behaviour that may lower a company’s performance (Scharfstein, 
1988). 
 
Nevertheless, past studies have still not confirmed the effectiveness of M&A to 
reduce agency conflicts. In contrast to the view that M&A solve PA conflicts, the 
strategy is said to help manifest the agency problem. Mueller (1969) hypothesised 
that managers are motivated to increase the size of the company to better 
compensate themselves. Chevalier and Schaefer (1998) and Firth (1991) 
corroborate this notion when they report that companies in the UK and US engage 
in M&A actions because they want to increase company size, which later will lead 
to increased prestige and management compensation. 
 
Furthermore, there seems to be no strong association with better performance for 
acquirers post M&A (Cong & Xie, 2009). While earlier studies conjecture 
positive returns post-M&A with increased company value (Lang & Stulz, 1994), 
recent research shows that acquirers actually lower the company’s value after 
M&A (Moeller, Schlingemann, & Stulz, 2004).  
 
Some studies claim that only target companies benefit from M&A, while the 
acquirers gain nothing or even suffer negative returns post acquisition (Bruner, 
2002). His paper surveys evidence from 14 informal studies and 100 scientific 
studies from 1971 to 2001 and conclude that “target shareholders earn sizeable 
positive market-returns, and that bidders earn zero adjusted return, and bidders 
and targets combined earn positive adjusted returns” (Bruner, 2002, p. 48).  
 
     
60 
 
It is asserted that the overheads in M&A are so costly that they can outweigh the 
benefits. Grossman and Hart (1980) state that acquirer companies in M&A may 
have to pay an unexpected increase in profits to target company’s shareholders or 
risk having them hold on to their shares, which inevitably become more expensive 
if the M&A materialises.  
 
Many researchers agree that the non-valued added outcomes in M&As are mainly 
due to the conflicts between managers and owners (Ben-Amar & Andre, 2006; M. 
Jensen, 1986; M Jensen & Ruback, 1983), or agency problems. Nevertheless, 
empirical studies in event study of M&A continue to add to this already 
concentrated research area where most M&A studies are confined to the 
performance analyses (Rahman & Limmack 2000) and predicting M&A issues 
(Mat-Nor & Mohd Zin 1996). 
 
2.7.1  M&A and concentrated ownership 
Shleifer and Vishny (1986) establish in their paper that large shareholders in an 
M&A reduce PA conflicts which will ultimately increase the company’s value. 
Their sample for large shareholders consists of families on boards of directors, 
pension and profit-sharing plans, financial firms or investment funds. They find 
that large shareholders play an important task monitoring management regarding 
its capacity to initiate and complete an M&A. If conflicts with management occur, 
large shareholders can even invite and facilitate reliable third parties to bid for the 
company and later split their substantial gains with the bidder.  
 
     
61 
 
Many M&A related studies look at the impact of controlling shareholders by 
studying the performance after implementing M&A. In Canada, Ben-Amar and 
Andre (2006) find that the separation of ownership and control does not have any 
negative impact on corporate performance after takeover. However, when 
ownership is segmented to consider family controlled companies, then they find 
that positive returns are achieved instead.   
 
Support for Ben Amar and Andre is found in the work of  Yen and Andre (2007). 
They indicate that there is a non-linear relationship between concentrated 
ownership and post-acquisition performance over three years in the English-origin 
countries or in countries that have an English common law base. The study is 
based on a sample of 287 deals over the years of 1997 to 2001, and names eleven 
countries as English origin; Australia, Canada, India, Republic of Ireland, Israel, 
Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, South Africa, Thailand and the United 
Kingdom. They suggest that higher levels of ownership are associated with 
positive post-acquisition performance and decreasing agency costs. Nevertheless, 
they also note that separation of ownership and voting rights do lead to greater 
value destruction.  
 
Expropriation by large shareholders has also been observed using performance 
analyses of M&A. Many studies have been done in European markets where 
ownership structure is more concentrated than in the UK and US (Faccio & Lang, 
2002). Findings show mixed evidence of private benefits of control with weak 
minority shareholder protection. By defining expropriation as “the disproportional 
sharing of gains (or losses) among different shareholders”, Faccio & Stolin (2006, 
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p. 1416) study all acquisitions by European group-affiliated companies over the 
period 1997-2000 and they negate the hypothesis of expropriation. In this paper, 
the authors adopt ownership data compiled by Faccio and Lang (2002) and 
conclude that while there might be some presence of minority expropriation in 
Europe, M&As are not expected to be used as a devious mechanism by 
controlling shareholders. 
 
More M&A studies done for Swedish (Holmen & Knopf, 2004)  and Belgian 
companies (Buysschaert, et al., 2004) contradict the expropriation notion. The 
researchers argue that bidders with concentrated shareholder experience positive 
returns post M&A. They infer that the strong extra-legal institutions covering 
product markets, organised labour, press, tax compliance and social norm play an 
important role in mitigating the agency problem that could adversely affect 
company performance.  
 
On the other hand, single country research by Bigelli and Mengoli (2004) on 
Italian acquisitions seems to support the expropriation hypothesis. They find 
consistent evidence of transfer of wealth from the minority shareholders to the 
controlling shareholders at the upper level of the pyramid through negative 
(positive) returns when companies buy lower (higher) companies within their 
pyramid. This means that controlling shareholders in Italian companies compel 
corporate control in order to increase their private benefits and not entirely for the 
benefit of increasing shareholder wealth. Barontini and Siciliano (2003) also find 
that Italian companies sustain lower Tobin’s q suggesting higher risk of 
expropriation when the ultimate shareholder is either the state- or family-owned.  
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It is further reported in another study using Swedish companies, controlling 
shareholders escape the pressure of market control (M&A) by about 50% 
(Cronqvist & Nilsson, 2003) when compared to companies with dispersed 
ownership. In their study, the authors define controlling shareholders as 
“controlling minority shareholders” (CMS). Their main study however, was to 
analyse the effect of controlling shareholders on company value and they discover 
that Tobin’s q decreases with higher share percentage of controlling 
shareholdings. This position may allow the controlling shareholders to entrench 
themselves and expropriate the minority shareholders. The researchers claim that 
large shareholders favour private benefits instead of engaging in value-enhancing 
activities due to the minor impact they suffer upon negative corporate valuation 
results.  
 
Countries with weak legal systems for protecting minority shareholders 
exacerbate a situation for higher expropriation in M&A (Bae, et al., 2002; Bigelli 
& Mengoli, 2004; Guan, 2005). Asian companies have been known to suffer from 
lack of protection for minority shareholders. Studies in Korea have discovered 
that when chaebols (business groups) make an acquisition, the acquirer’s share 
price drops but the controlling shareholders gain because of the increase in value 
of other firms (the acquired) in the group (Bae, et al., 2002). The tunnelling view 
championed by Johnson et al. (2000) is supported in their findings that 
hypothesise business groups involved M&A are less concerned about maximising 
shareholders’ wealth and more concerned about benefitting the controlling 
shareholders.  
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This can be a nuisance in Asia since empirical research has established the 
occurrences of expropriation among PP, unlike in developed markets. The 
divergence of interests between large shareholders and minority shareholders 
allows the former to extract private benefits by making suboptimal investment 
decisions, such as through diversification and/or M&A  (Bigelli & Mengoli, 2004; 
Claessens, Djankov, Fan, & Lang, 1999). Controlling shareholders act in a self-
interested manner by tunnelling corporate resources or paying higher premiums to 
gain a larger empire for more self-privilege actions (Johnson, La Porta, et al., 
2000). As a result, higher premiums are paid out in mergers or takeovers and as 
argued by Sirower (1997) and Bruner (2002) destroy acquisition value.  
 
Yen and Andre (2007), as noted above, include Malaysia and Thailand in their 
expropriation studies, but the majority of the countries studied were related to 
developed economies. These mature markets are likely to have better and 
sophisticated legal protection for minority shareholder. Questions covering 
expropriation by large shareholders in emerging markets remain ambiguous. 
Furthermore, performance studies may not be sufficient to explain PP conflicts 
especially in the context of expropriation. Hence, there is still a vacuum of 
research on expropriation by controlling shareholders utilising M&A in the Asian 
market. Empirical results regarding M&A in Southeast Asia remain scant and 
inconclusive mainly due to unavailability of long-term data (Kamaly, 2007; Wong 
& Cheung, 2009).  
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2.7.2 M&A and PP conflicts 
As previously discussed, large shareholders are needed to monitor managers and 
to search for ways to increase company performance. Agency considerations are 
the most likely to answer the famous dividend puzzle (Black 1976); how 
companies choose their dividend policies (La Porta, et al., 2000b). From this 
perspective, large controlling shareholders are effectively monitored by minority 
shareholders through dividend payments. 
 
Dividend payouts also act as an attraction to this type of clientele, or large 
shareholder. Dividends has also been mentioned to act as a monitoring 
mechanism to control any inappropriate activities by the managers or agent (M. 
Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Hence, high dividends are paid out to ensure the 
shareholders’ perseverance and loyalty to the company (Allen & Bernardo, 2000).  
 
Companies with concentrated ownership have to endure both agency problems; 
PA and PP conflicts. PP is aggravated when there is a lack of a regulatory system 
for protecting minority interests. Following La Porta et al. (1999) and Claessens et 
al. (1999), this thesis traces the ultimate ownership of the largest shareholders in 
order to provide a clearer picture of the impact of M&As by those who are in 
control. Using dividend as proxy for PP conflicts, the analyses in this research 
may gauge the extent of expropriation in Asian corporations.   
 
Chapter one has also discussed of how acquirers do not create value but still 
M&As are being undertaken by companies worldwide, especially in recent years 
in Asean 5. However, is there a trade-off relationship between investment 
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(particularly in M&A) and dividend decisions? In perfect capital markets 
corporate investment and dividend decisions are not related to each other, 
according to Miller and Modigliani (1961). However, it is argued that the 
corporate markets in the real world have the presence of taxes, flotation cost and 
also agency costs that may have an impact on the investment decision (Asquith & 
Mullins, 1983). Results remain inconclusive; especially the fact that retained 
earnings should be accounted for only either for dividends to shareholders or for 
investment pursuits. 
 
M&M (1961) propose that in a perfect capital market, investment decisions 
should not be affected by how an investment is being financed. This implies that 
shareholders’ wealth is not affected by the financial decisions. Ultimately any 
dividend decisions must be independent of the investment decision and vice versa. 
Fama (1974) has verified this in his study by analysing 298 companies in the US 
from 1946 to 1968 where he finds that there is no evidence of dependency for 
dividends and internal investment decisions.  
 
On the other hand, other empirical research contradicts M&M’s (1961) theorem of 
independence between dividend and investment policies. Where there is 
asymmetric information, Leland & Pyle (1977) demonstrate in their paper that 
this will not be true in most cases. As discussed earlier, when a company suffers 
from agency conflicts, payout policy may provide an efficient partial remedy 
(Rozeff, 1982). 
 
Dhrymes and Kurz  (1967) note that earlier views relating to dividend being 
independent of investment policy, are at least true in the short run. They argue that 
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the dividend disbursals and investment outlays may be competing with the 
availability of resources in the company. Their analyses involve three-stage-least-
square regression models that produce positive and significant coefficients when 
they introduce dividend and investment as explanatory variables in their model. 
This corresponds to their theory that by carrying out one activity may cause for a 
postponement/cancellation to another since dividend (investment) decisions affect 
investment (dividend) decisions. They note that a company will prefer the first 
course of action (low-dividends, high-investment) since long-term returns will 
decrease when dividends are increased at the expense of investment. 
 
Smirlock and Marshall (1983) investigate causality tests of annual dividend 
payments and annual investment expenditure across firms in Standard and Poor’s 
400 share index and find there is no indication that investment decisions are 
affected by dividend decisions. On the other hand, Dickerson et al. (1998) suggest 
a trade-off between dividends and investment. They assert that an extra one pound 
given in dividends will be much more effective as a defence strategy against being 
taken over by other companies.  
 
With the above argument, it can be suffice to support that dividends may be 
suitable to gauge the extent of expropriation in PP conflicts, especially in the 
context of an investment activity. In the presence of an active market for corporate 
control, as evident in Asean 5, it is suggested that companies are encouraged to 
raise dividends to maintain shareholder loyalty (Dickerson, et al., 1998). 
However, in the long run this may be detrimental to the minority shareholders and 
negatively affect company value in general. This thesis has also laid out the 
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notion that M&A is the best investment event that can be quantitatively measured 
as a single event as compared to other investment announcements (Amihud, et al., 
1990). 
 
2.7.3  M&A performance and expropriation studies 
The concern over whether M&A is used as an expropriation strategy can be 
measured once the M&A is consummated. Past studies have looked at the overall 
performance studies to gauge the extent of expropriation as explained in Section 
2.4.1. Analyses are done on performance returns by measuring the shareholders’ 
wealth around the time scale or event window after an M&A announcement. 
Shareholders’ wealth can either be in terms of abnormal share returns or using 
other accounting operating ratio such as returns on assets or Tobin’s q. 
 
There will be two types of time interval or event windows used in these 
performance studies: short-term and long-term. The short-term period used for 
valuation of abnormal share returns accounts for days before and after the M&A 
announcement. The event period in these types of studies includes periods 
between 1 to 6 days (Loderer & Martin, 1990) or 30 – 60 days (M Jensen & 
Ruback, 1983). The short-term event windows must be assessed in considerable 
detail if the time period is too short that real value of valuation effects may be 
eliminated. Furthermore, following an M&A announcement, most often other 
market news or industry related news will be announced which would 
contaminate the net effect of wealth gained (if any) from the proposed M&A. 
(Song, 2007a).   
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Long-term studies are then suggested by lengthening the time period to several 
years in order to allow for the capital market to adjust to the information and the 
realisation of  (any) benefits (Sudarsanam, 2003). The event window can be from 
three, five or even seven years of study. Some examples of long-term studies’ 
time periods are 23 to 36 months (Firth, 1991; Rahman & Limmack, 2004) or up 
to 70 months (Langetieg, 1978). However, the longer the time period, the greater 
the chances other events, such as strategic, financial or political will impact the 
valuation of returns.  
 
Performance studies have their own limitation to be able to singularly conclude 
the extent of expropriation or PP conflicts. This is because the main issue of these 
studies is to measure the overall company returns, and not the conflicts per se. 
Some of the reasons benefitting controlling shareholders in performance studies 
include  how companies have lower revenue, higher costs, or unproductive assets, 
which should lead to lower net income relative to assets after controlling for other 
factors including the ownership structure (Nagar, Petroni, & Wolfenzon, 2002).  
 
Measures of performance have also been gauged in developed economies which 
may not be appropriate as far as Asean markets and developing economies are 
concerned. Authors in emerging market research have expressed their 
apprehension when using accounting measures as these are subject to 
manipulation by management and may be inaccurate (Wiwattanakantang, 2001). 
Another method of valuation for M&A is using pretax operating cash flow returns 
on assets as explained by Healy, Palepu and Ruback (1992, p. 139) that the proxy 
“represent actual economic benefits generated by the assets employed”. The 
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M&A value of transaction is also included in the analysis (Banchit & Locke, 
2011) or the transaction paid for M&A disclosed by the acquirer to the target 
companies. 
 
In addition, accounting rules in accounting-based studies may distort the 
performance measurement and lead to a bias conclusion in M&A assessments 
(Sudarsanam, 2003) and as a whole, the notion of expropriation. Dividends paid 
out are reported in their real value. Furthermore, as suggested by La Porta et al. 
(2000) dividends are used as a mechanism to disgorge cash flow out of the 
company and for this matter may eliminate the issue of biasness in accounting 
reporting format. Besides, the amount of dividend paid by company reveals its 
operating cash flow circumstances (Miller & Rock, 1985). 
 
There are also some limitations of concluding expropriation using performance 
measurement in market-based studies that include the need to have the exact date 
of an M&A announcement to measure the short-term period. As far as developing 
and Asian markets are concerned, this can be a challenge because often the 
information on companies planning to finalise an M&A may be leaked to some 
investors a long time ahead of the announcement date, sometimes up to three to 
four months earlier (Mat Nor & Mohd Zin, 1996). Furthermore, it is a challenge 
to ascertain whether the share prices reflect a true value of the company especially 
when it is pointed out by Khanna & Palepu (1997) that the emerging capital 
markets are illiquid and lack timely disclosure.  
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To reach any conclusion in any study, the differences or other variables that may 
impact the study must be considered. Fama and French (2001) suggest that bigger 
companies (total sales) with larger profitability (earnings or operating cash flows) 
and higher growth opportunities (sales growth) pay more dividends. Other 
variables that would have an impact on the measurement would be the sample 
size, country and industry differences, firm-specific effects and statistical 
methodology.  
 
In the US market, Harris and Raviv (1988) and Stulz (1988) assert that controlling 
shareholders may utilise leverage to inflate the voting power of their shares which 
consequently may reduce the disciplinary role of the market for corporate control 
or takeover. These issues are important to lessen PA conflicts in the US and 
Europe, markets that have effective market control as compared to the Asian 
market. Companies with dispersed shareholders use debts and corporate control 
interchangeably to ensure that professional managers are duly maximising the 
investors’ wealth. 
 
Faccio, Lang and Young (2001a) find that unlike in Europe, companies in Asia 
use debt to fund projects with higher risks. Despite the ineffectiveness of capital 
markets in Asia, debts are utilised more than equity which may mean the potential 
of expropriation is greater there. These loans are given by “related parties” who 
share a controlling shareholder with the borrower. The controlling shareholders 
impose more power and control over the companies’ resources. This also means 
that minority shareholders are at risk associated with high leverage problems such 
as higher costs of interests that may lead to the company facing financial distress 
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or bankruptcy (Fama & French 2001) and bigger gaps in information asymmetry 
due to assets being less tangible (Harris & Raviv 1988). Therefore, it is said that 
ineffectiveness of the Asian market helps to exacerbate PP conflicts and where the 
controlling shareholders may also dominate in policies involving leverage. 
 
It is also reiterated that M&As provide a fast avenue to growth for a company. 
Mature markets associated with PA conflicts advocate that since company size is 
a function of managerial utility, the remuneration and private benefits that may be 
seized by managers may demonstrate that M&A may be an irresponsible act after 
all. In the context of the Asian market, the theory of PP conflicts holds true and 
must be further investigated using other alternative measure than the performance 
matrix that is often used such as Tobin’s q or return on assets (ROE)..  
 
Usually the acquirers own zero or very few shares in target firms before M&A 
take place (Betton, Eckbo, & Thorburn, 2009). However, some studies observe 
that there are cases in which the acquirer not only owns a sizeable share parcel in 
the target company prior to the bid but is also the controlling owner (Bae, et al., 
2002; Croci & Petmezas, 2010; Holmen & Knopf, 2004). Croci and Petmezas 
note that minority shareholders in target companies in emerging markets gain 
significantly less than their counterparts in developed markets.  
 
The controlling managers of the acquirer companies motivate the choice for  
method of payment used in M&A (Amihud, et al., 1990). This method will consist 
of either cash or shares. Agency theory suggests that managers of acquiring 
companies who have better information than the outside shareholders will prefer 
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financing by shares if they believe that the company’s shares are overvalued, and 
use cash if they believe that their company’s stock is undervalued (King, Dalton, 
Daily, & Covin, 2004; Myers & Majluf, 1984). Acquirers and target companies 
that have similar dividend policies are generally paid using shares (Jeon, Ligon, & 
Soranakom, 2010). Their studies find that target shareholders may discontinue 
with the merger when there is a difference of policies with the acquirer.  
 
However, controlling shareholders of the acquiring companies may prefer to use 
cash instead of shares. This is true when PA studies find that managers with 
control rights prefer cash financing due to the fact that their ownership will be 
diluted after the merger and acquisition (Amihud, et al., 1990; Martin, 1996). 
When this occurs, cash will be depleted to finance the M&A. Dividend payout 
may show this association with the method of payment. As cash has been used to 
finance the investment, dividend payouts should be reduced.   
 
The relatedness of acquired firms to the acquirers can be considered as another 
control element in M&A settings. Relatedness is defined by King et al. (2004) as 
‘similarity in terms of resources or product-market similarity’. Palich, Cardinal, 
and Miller (2000) indicate that the relationship between company performance 
and relatedness is curvilinear; whereby performance increases as unrelated-
business diverse or change to related-business, but performance declines as 
related business companies diverse to unrelated-business (p.155). 
 
Another variable that has an impact on M&A performance is the acquirer’s 
experience. Haleblian and Finkelstein (1999) find that past acquisition experience 
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shows a U-shaped relationship between acquisition experience and M&A 
performance. This means that as companies gain more experience in making 
acquisitions, any negative relationship between acquisition experience and 
performance will be corrected with subsequent M&A undertakings. 
 
2.8 Summary 
 
This chapter examined existing literature pertaining to the relationship between 
PP conflicts and large controlling shareholders, and also identified the 
contribution to be endeavoured in this research. This review critically evaluates 
how the central issue in Asian capital markets is PP conflicts as opposed to the 
generally common PA conflicts in mature markets. Another stem of research that 
is important to be understood is the extent of PP conflicts associated with M&A.  
 
The main research problem of this study is investigating PP conflicts associated 
with M&A in Asean 5. It has been explained that PP conflicts seem to be 
extensive, if not unique in Asian capital markets. While there have been a 
growing number of studies on PP conflicts, no research has addressed M&A in 
Asean 5. The topic is concerning and interesting in the Asian context especially 
when the number of M&As has been dramatically and continuously increasing in 
the Asean 5 throughout the last decade (Metwalli & Tang, 2009).   
 
Controlling shareholders deciding to engage in M&A investment can be 
potentially another avenue for how the burgeoning PP conflicts in this region can 
be exacerbated.  Chapter 3 provides an overview of the institutional background 
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of capital markets in Asean 5; Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and 
Philippines. A summary of the capital framework and M&A regulations is tabled 
to understand the roles of various organisations in each country that may 
influence the regulatory protection standard of minority shareholders in Asia.    
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CHAPTER 3: INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter discusses the overview of the Asean 5 equity markets and the general 
framework of regulations that govern M&A activities. Some of the characteristics 
and ownership shareholdings of each of these countries are also discussed. 
 
The region of Association of Southeast Asian Nation (ASEAN) encompasses of 
ten countries with a combined population over 600 million people. However, 
about 90% of the total gross domestic product (GDP) value (USD2 trillion) 
reported in 2012, are accounted by the original five countries of ASEAN (ASEAN 
Exchanges, 2012). The unique feature of Asean 5 collaboration that continuously 
attracts investors is that the scope and diversity of different levels of capital 
markets its offering, from the frontier market like Thailand to developed market 
like Singapore. 
 
3.2 Brief overview of Asean 5 Capital Markets 
3.2.1 Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) 
The Indonesian capital market (formally known as Jakarta Stock Exchange) was 
formed in 1912, existing even before Indonesia’s independence in 1949 under the 
colonisation of the Dutch East Indies. The capital market was dormant in certain 
periods, including during World Wars I and II. In 1977, it was reactivated by the 
Indonesian Government with only 24 companies listed. The opening of its capital 
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market to foreign investors in 1987 has improved the capital market since. The 
merger of the Jakarta Stock Exchange and Surabaya Stock Exchange in 2007 
formed the Indonesian Stock Exchange (IDX). As at 31 December 2010 the 
numbers of public listed companies was about 400 with USD361.2 million in 
market capitalisation.  
 
3.2.2 Bursa Malaysia (BM) 
The capital market in Malaysia was first formalised in 1930 with the 
establishment of the Singapore Stockbroker’s Association and re-registered as the 
Malayan Stockbroker’s Association in 1937.  It then re-established as the 
Malayan Stock Exchange in 1960 where public trading of shares began. It 
changed its name again in 1964 as the Stock Exchange of Malaysia. It was later 
known as the Stock Exchange of Malaysia and Singapore in 1965 with the 
secession of Singapore from Malaysia. When the currency interchangeability 
between Malaysia and Singapore ceased in 1973, it was known as the Kuala 
Lumpur Stock Exchange while Singapore had its own Stock Exchange of 
Singapore (SES). And finally, in 2004 the current name of Bursa Malaysia was 
incorporated. As at 31 December 2010  there were about 950 listed companies and 
USD395 million in market capitalisation (Securities Commission Malaysia, 
2011). 
 
3.2.3 The Philippine Stocks Exchange (PSE) 
The Manila Stock Exchange was formed in 1927 and after three decades of 
existence, the two bourses including the Makati Stock Exchange (1963) were 
merged into the Philippines Stock Exchange (PSE). As of 31 December 2010, the 
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Philippine Stock Exchange had over 250 listed companies with a total market 
capitalisation of USD202 million. 
 
3.2.4 The Singapore Stock Exchange (SGX) 
The currency interchange ability between Singapore and Malaysia in 1973 saw 
the birth of its own Stock Exchange of Singapore after a long history of 
collaboration from 1930.  SGX was created in 1999 when the Stock Exchange of 
Singapore (SES) and the Singapore International Monetary Exchange (SIMEX) 
merged into one and since then SGX has been a leading financial centre in the 
Asia-Pacific region. SEC is divided into the SGX main board and the SGX 
SESDAQ (newer companies with no quantitative requirements for listing).  As of 
17 December  2010, SGX had over 778 listed companies with a combined market 
capitalisation of USD$646 million (Central Intelligence Agency, 2011; Monetary 
Authority Singapore) 
 
3.2.5 The Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET) 
The inception of the Thailand stock market began in 1962 as a limited partnership 
and became a limited company and changed its name to the Bangkok Stock 
Exchange Co Ltd (BSE) in 1963. The early years of Thailand’s capital market was 
regarded as a failure due to lack of official government support and limited 
investor understanding of the equity market.  Despite that, the Thai government 
soon realised the importance of an efficient capital market for the economic 
growth of its nation. After several amendments to securities exchange legislation 
the Securities Exchange of Thailand was enacted in 1975. Its name was formally 
changed to the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET) in 1991. As of 31 December 
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2009, the Stock Exchange of Thailand had over 570 listed companies with a 
combined market capitalization of USD264.73 million (Nangseuphim, 2010). 
 
3.3 Regulatory Framework of Mergers and Acquisitions 
3.3.1  Introduction 
Table 4 displays the summary of the capital framework, M&A general guidelines 
and the basic shareholder protection of countries in Asean 5. Each country has its 
own company laws and enactments that govern the acquisition by/of public listed 
companies.  
 
3.3.2 Indonesia  
There are four types of M&A transactions defined as M&A in Indonesia: mergers, 
consolidations, share acquisitions and asset acquisitions. There are two types of 
offer; mandatory offer and voluntary offer. In a mandatory offer, the acquirer is 
entitled to exercise control or meets certain takeover thresholds. A voluntary offer 
means that the takeover is not a mandatory offer.  
 
M&A of public companies in Indonesia are governed with the general 
requirements of Indonesia’s Capital Markets law, Financial Institutions 
Supervisory Board (Bapepam-LK) and Indonesia’s stock exchanges. The stock 
exchange is generally concerned with the procedure that involves listing of shares 
following a business combination. Apart from that, if any foreign investment 
element is involved further approval needs to be sought form the Capital 
Investment Coordinating Board (BKPM).  
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Bapepam-LK’s role is to ensure that any merger or consolidation statement that is 
being submitted by the board of directors and board of commissioners of a public 
company is accessed with due ‘attention to the interest of the company, the public 
and fair competition’. Under the Bapepam Regulation IX.H.1, the acquirer of a 
public company is obligated to keep the company, Bapepam-LK, ,the relevant 
stock exchanges and the public fully informed on the progress in negotiations to 
acquire a company.   
 
Any change in the company’s ownership that involves holding at least 5 % of the 
shares of a public company is required to be reported to Bapepam-LK. Duties of 
controlling shareholders are quite general in the sense that their “general principle 
is a business combination must not be detrimental to the interests of the company, 
minority shareholders, employees... or to the need to maintain fair business 
competition”. It is also interesting to note that these mergers, consolidations or 
acquisitions “are normally initiated by the controlling shareholders of the 
companies involved” (Suhardiman, Mohamad Kadri, & Johnson, 2008, p. 145).   
 
In Indonesia, the controller of a public listed company as defined by the chairman 
of Bapepam-LK is when the party owns 25% or more of the equity. This is 
enough to constitute a mandatory offer. With effect from 30 June 2008, this 
threshold was increased to 50% or more. (Bagwell & Shoven, 1989; Hadiputranto 
Hadinoto & Partners, 2005). 
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3.3.3 Malaysia 
The main regulatory bodies that govern the public takeovers and mergers in 
Malaysia are the Securities Commission Companies Commission, Bursa Malaysia 
Securities Berhad (Bursa Malaysia) and Malaysian Central Bank.  These bodies 
review the following regulations in Malaysia’s M&A. 
i) The Malaysian Code on Take-Overs and Mergers 1998 (revised to The 
Malaysian Code on Take-Overs and Mergers 2010 (Code)). This Code 
governs the conduct of all persons involved in takeover offers and 
mergers in Malaysia. 
ii) Capital Market and Services Act 2007 (CMSA) contains provisions for 
regulating the activities of markets and intermediaries in the Malaysian 
capital market, shareholding requirements and insider trading. 
iii) Companies Act that contains provisions that govern the conduct and 
affairs of companies that include the directors’ duties and declarations 
of substantial shareholdings and scheme or arrangements. 
iv) Bursa Malaysia Listing Requirements oversees whether companies 
comply with the Listing Requirements it they are listed in the Bursa 
Malaysia Stock Exchange.  
 
In Malaysia, the main means of controlling a public company can be categorised 
into a few main methods. They are: 
i) Takeover offer: this is where the shareholders of the target company 
are asked to accept an offer that has been made by a bidder. A 
mandatory offer happens when the bidder or acquirer holds or 
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exercises control of more than 33% or more of the target’s voting 
shares.  
ii) Scheme of arrangement: this is when the company enters into 
collaboration with the acquirer for them to take over the target 
companies. The target’s shareholders will then vote on a takeover 
proposal to put them in mutual agreement with the collaborating 
parties/acquirers. The target’s assets and shares are transferred to the 
acquirer. 
iii)  Acquisition of assets and liabilities: this is when the target sells its 
assets and liabilities to the bidder through an ordinary resolution by the 
target’s shareholders (requiring an approval of 50% and above). In 
2011, the 50% vote was revised to 75%. 
Where foreign ownership of shares is concerned, the Code has no distinction for 
the treatment of local or foreign bidders. (Wong & Partners, 2005)   
 
3.3.4  Singapore 
The takeover activities in Singapore are regulated by the Monetary Authority of 
Singapore (MAS), the Securities Industry Council (the Council) and the Securities 
and Exchange Act (SEA). The Council regulates the Singapore Code on Take-
Overs and Mergers to oversee M&A activities in Singapore. Its primary objective 
is to ensure fair and equal treatment of all shareholders in a take-over or merger 
situation of public listed companies in Singapore.  
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Three main takeover methods are applied in Singapore; share acquisition, merger, 
and asset acquisition. In 1999, the Code has the following definitions for a 
mandatory bid threshold. 
…any person acquiring shares which carry 25% or more of the voting rights of 
the company. The Companies Act of Singapore also defines “acquiring effective 
control” as the acquiring of shares carrying 25% or more of the voting rights, 
which triggers a bid obligation (Brigham & Ehrhardt, 2005, p. 12). 
 
In 2005, the mandatory threshold of 25 % was revised to 30 % or more of the 
voting rights. (Baker & McKenzie Wong & Leow, 2005; Brigham & Ehrhardt, 
2005). 
 
3.3.5 Philippines 
The M&A transactions in the Philippines are governed by the provisions of the 
Corporation Code, the Securities Regulation Code (SRC) and the Civil Code. 
Generally, it does not have specific M&A legislation like Malaysia and 
Singapore.  
 
Acquisitions are the most popular means of M&A in Philippines where they are 
done either with full or partial acquisitions of shares or assets of the target 
companies. Philippines recognise a merger when a surviving company absorbs a 
target company. While in consolidation, two or more companies consolidate to 
form a new corporation. (Safieddine, 2009, p. 1). The mandatory threshold 
according to SRC is when the purchaser (bidder) intends to acquire 35% or more 
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of the equity shares. M&As for foreign investors in Philippines are governed by 
the Foreign Investments Act. 
 
3.3.6 Thailand 
M&A of public companies in Thailand are governed by the Securities and 
Exchange Act (SEC Act) and the Public Limited Company Act (PLCA), Stock 
Exchange of Thailand (SET) and The Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) . 
There are three main forms of M&A in Thailand which are  
i) an amalgamation or consolidation,  
ii) an acquisition of shares in a target company,  
iii) an acquisition of assets of the target company  
(Baker & McKenzie Ltd., 2005, p. 1) 
The threshold or trigger point as it is called in Thailand is set at 25% or more 
acquisition of issued shares. There are a number of complex restrictions for M&A 
with foreign investors. They must abide by the Foreign Business Act (1999) that 
spells out various rules and restrictions as it is considered by the Thai Government 
that Thais are not ready to face foreign competition (Baker & McKenzie Ltd., 
2005). However, approval from the Director-General of the Department of 
Commercial Registration in the Ministry of Commerce may approve up to 100% 
foreign ownership (Baker & McKenzie, n.d.; F. Khan). 
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3.4 Shareholder Protection 
 
It is imperative in every country to have solid protection rights for investors. This 
is not only important to ensure that investor rights are protected from managers or 
controlling shareholders, it is also important to help induce the development of 
capital markets.   
 
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer (1998) examine legal rules of corporate 
shareholders of 49 countries, and emphasise that common-law countries (such as 
Malaysia and Singapore) generally have better investors’ protection than civil law 
rules. For instance, French civil-law (e.g. Indonesia and Philippines) seems to 
offer the weakest legal protection among the other types of civil laws (e.g. 
German and Scandinavian civil law). However, in terms of law enforcement, the 
best would be German civil law and Scandinavian countries.  
 
As can be seen in Table 4, Malaysia and Singapore are under common law so it is 
not surprising that M&A are most active in these two countries, as explained in 
Section 1.3. Furthermore as explained in Sections 3.3.3 and 3.3.4, both countries 
have special M&A regulations; Singapore has its own Singapore Code on Take-
overs and Mergers (incorporated in 1974 (reviewed 1999)) and Malaysia has its 
Panel on Take-overs and Mergers (incorporated 1998). 
 
For anti-director rights, La Porta et.al. (1998, pp. 1127-1128) measure how strong 
the legal system is in protecting minority shareholders from control in the hands 
of concentrated shareholders and managers. These measures include ability for 
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shareholders to vote via mail, pre-emptive rights for minority shareholders to buy 
new issues of shares and cumulative power to vote for board members. The 
country is given 1 for existence of protection and 0 if otherwise, whereby the 
score is added up to 5. As shown in Table 4, again Singapore and Malaysia top 
the score at 4; Philippines scores 3 while Indonesia and Thailand have a low score 
of 2.  
 
Mandatory dividend is not part of Asean 5 law which means that corporations 
there are not liable to pay out any fraction of their declared earnings as dividends 
to shareholders (Chaw & Susela, 2009). Countries
4
 that mandate dividend payouts 
are mostly found to pay higher than countries that have no mandatory law for 
dividend payouts. The mandatory act of paying actually helps to reassure minority 
shareholders that they are not being expropriated entirely by the controlling 
parties and also encourages higher participation in the equity markets  (La Porta, 
et al., 2000a).  
 
Countries that have a one-share-one-vote rule for their public listed companies are 
better at protecting their shareholders. It is contended that insiders or managers 
who own a relative amount of shares may not have control over the companies’ 
cash flow when this rule is in place, which is a substitution for the dividend right 
of every other shareholder ( Grossman & Hart, 1988; Harris & Raviv, 1988). Only 
Singapore and Malaysia have the rule in their regulations. However, a strand of 
research does conclude that mandating one-share-one-vote may not protect 
minority shareholders as efficiently as it should (Burkart & Lee, 2008) since 
                                                 
4
 Countries included are Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Greece and Venezuela ( La Porta, et al., 
2000a) 
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companies may resort to other alternatives to expropriate, via pyramiding or 
cross-ownership (Bebchuk, et al., 1999).  It is shown that East Asian corporations 
are utilising these methods of pyramiding and cross-ownerships to concentrate 
more control (Claessens, et al., 2000b). 
 
On the other hand, this thesis is limited to using the ultimate percentage of 
shareholders. East Asian companies have no significant deviations from one-
share-one-vote rule through to shares with different voting rights as investigated 
by Claessens et al. (2000a). They show that multiple methods used to enhance 
control in East Asian companies using, for example, multiple classes of voting 
rights, pyramid structures, crossholdings,  have no significant impact on the final 
voting rights attached to the shareholders’ shares.  
 
3.5 Dividend policy in Asean 5 
3.5.1 Introduction 
Dividend ratio is established in this thesis as the core proxy for PP conflicts. 
Therefore, it is imperative to discuss the highlights of dividend policy being 
practised in these five countries. In a nutshell, these countries do not impose a 
mandatory law for paying out dividends from the companies.  
 
3.5.2 Indonesia 
The Company Law of Indonesia contains the distribution of dividends in Part 3 
(Article 70) that “all net earnings after deduction for reserve fund shall be 
distributed to the shareholders as dividend, except other provided in the General 
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Meeting of Shareholders dividend can only be distributed if the company 
possesses a positive profit balance” ("Law on Limited Liability Company," 2007, 
p. 29). This is as stipulated in Chapter 1 (Article 1) where General Meeting of 
Shareholders means shareholders that have authority not given to the board of 
directors. 
 
3.5.3 Malaysia 
Companies Act 1965 in Section 365(1) reads, “ No dividends shall be payable to 
shareholders of any company except out of profits or pursuant to Section 60.” 
("Company Act," 1965). Section 60 relates to the application of the monies in the 
share premium account. Given that Section 60 does not include payment of cash 
dividend, a company may only give it out of its profits.  
 
Because the term profits has not been defined in the Act, according to a 
jurisdiction by Spanish Prospecting Co. Ltd (1911), ‘profits’ implies the 
fundamental meaning which is the amount of gain made by the business during 
the year (Chan & Devi, 2009). 
 
3.5.4 Philippines   
The law that regards dividend payments in Singapore is found in Section 43 of 
The Corporation Code of the Philippines (1980) stature that states:  
 
“The board of directors of a stock corporation may declare dividends out 
of the unrestricted retained earnings which shall be payable in cash, in 
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property, or in stock to all stockholders on the basis of outstanding stock 
held by them.”("The Corporation Code of the Philippines," 1980, p. 20). 
 
This statute does not mandate the companies to pay out dividends to the 
shareholders but it is noted by Salonga (2003) that historically the principal 
function of the dividend statutes is to preserve a ‘quantitative minimum of assets’ 
to protect creditors.  
 
3.5.5 Singapore 
In Singapore, the same rule applies for payment of dividends that states 
companies may pay dividends only out of profits. This is contained in Section 
403(1) of the Companies Act. The term “profits” is also not defined in the Act 
which means that there is no limit to what the maximum permissible dividend 
fund can be allocated by the companies (Yeo, Lee, Hanrahan, Ramsay, & 
Stapledon, 2008).  
 
3.5.6 Thailand 
The Public Limited Company Act of Thailand states in Chapter 7 (Section 108) 
that: “No dividend shall be paid out of funds other than profit. In the case where 
the company still sustains an accumulated loss, no dividend shall be 
paid.”("Public Limited Company Act B.E.2535," B.E.2535, p. 11) 
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3.6 Summary 
 
M&A activities become phenomenal especially in the 2000s and still a growing 
trend that calls for stronger legislation for shareholder protection. Special M&A 
regulations are available for two countries: Malaysia and Singapore while the 
other three countries have common authorities to monitor its countries M&A 
activities. Mandatory dividend is not part of Asean 5 law which means that 
corporations there are not liable to pay out any fraction of their declared earnings 
as dividends to shareholders. Table 4 shows the summary of capital framework, 
M&A regulations and shareholder protection development of the M&A market in 
Asean 5 from the 1980s to 2010 explained earlier.  
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Table 4: Summary of capital framework, M&A regulations and shareholder protection 
Capital Framework Indonesia Malaysia Singapore Thailand Philippines 
Legal system Civil law  Common Law Common Law Civil Law  Civil law  
Parliament Act governing 
companies 
The Company Law, Capital 
Markets Law, M&A 
Regulation (1998) 
Companies Act 1965, 
Security Industry  
Act 1983 and Securities 
Commission Act 1993  
  
Companies (Amendment) 
Act 2005, Securities and 
Futures Act,  
Securities and Exchange Act 
1992 (SEA), Public Limited 
Company Act (1992), 
Foreign Business Act (1999) 
Corporation Code, Civil 
Code and  the Securities 
Regulation Code (SRC), The 
Foreign Investments Act 
Regulatory authorities of 
companies 
Indonesian Capital Market 
and Financial Supervisory 
Board (Bapepam-LK), 
Capital Investment 
Coordination Board 
(BKPM), Indonesia Stock 
Exchange 
Companies Commission of 
Malaysia (CCM) 
The Bursa Malaysia   
Securities Commission (SC). 
Securities Industry Council 
(Council), Singapore Stock 
Exchange (SSE) 
Stock Exchange of Thailand 
(SET), 
Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) 
Philippines Stock Exchange 
(PEC) 
Special M&A regulators None Panel on Take-overs and 
Mergers (the Panel), 
Malaysian Code on Take-
overs and Mergers, 1998. 
(The Code) 
Singapore Code on Take-
overs and Mergers (The 
Singapore Code), Monetary 
Authority of Singapore 
(MAS) 
None None 
Types of transaction Mergers, consolidation: share 
acquisitions, asset 
acquisitions 
Mergers, consolidation: share 
acquisitions, asset 
acquisitions 
Merger, amalgamation, 
takeover: share transactions, 
asset transactions 
Amalgamation, 
consolidation, share 
acquisition, assets 
acquisitions. 
Mergers, consolidation: share 
acquisitions, asset 
acquisitions 
Takeover threshold 25 % of more of the voting 
rights. 
 
33 % or more of the voting 
rights. 
30 % or more of the voting 
rights. 
25 % of more of the voting 
rights. 
 
35 % or more of the voting 
rights. 
Shareholder Protection(R. La Porta, et al., 1998) 
One-share – One vote No Yes Yes No No 
Anti-director rights  
(out of 5)  
2 4 4 2 3 
Mandatory dividend No No No No No 
Minority shareholder  Shareholders which represent 
at least 10 % of the total 
numbers with valid voting 
rights. 
 
Establishment of  
Malaysian Institute of 
Corporate Governance (1998)  
Minority Shareholder 
Watchdog Group Limited 
(2000)  
Shareholders which represent at 
least 10 % of the total numbers 
with valid voting rights 
Shareholders which 
represent at least 10 % of 
the total numbers with valid 
voting rights. 
 
Shareholders which represent 
at least 10 % of the total 
numbers with valid voting 
rights. 
 
Shareholders which represent 
at least 10 % of the total 
numbers with valid voting 
rights. 
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CHAPTER 4:  HYPOTHESES AND EMPIRICAL MODEL 
DEVELOPMENT 
 
4.1  Introduction 
 
The previous three chapters have laid out the research objectives as well as the 
theoretical framework on PP and PA conflicts, and their relationships with M&A. 
Key institutional characteristics of Asean 5 capital markets and M&A regulations 
were also discussed. This chapter discusses the formulation of hypotheses from 
the previous chapters in order to develop the model for empirical analysis. In this 
study, PP conflicts are considered from two perspectives – using dividend ratios 
and. performance based proxy (Tobin’s q), while PA conflicts using efficiency 
ratio. 
 
PP conflicts can be dealt in an expropriation context by measuring conflicts using 
the performance based method (Chen & Young, 2010). It is propositioned that PP 
agency increases when companies are underperforming with increased 
concentration of ownership. Dividend ratios are claimed to be another way to 
measure the outcome of these conflicts in Asean 5 countries. Dividend is taken as 
proxy for PP conflicts and M&A issues. This is because not only is the 
information on dividend ratios readily available, but these payouts can determine 
the severity of conflicts when large shareholders are in control of company profits 
(Bebchuk, et al., 1999; Gugler & Yurtoglu, 2003).  
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Another key assumption of PP conflict is that managers are the agents for the 
controlling shareholders. Hence, PA conflicts are also measured with asset 
utilisation ratio as the proxy. In terms of the explanatory attributes, the study uses 
large controlling shareholder (continuous and interval data) and other firm- 
specific characteristics (leverage, performance, etc.). For M&A attributes, 
variables (effective date of M&A, method of payment, etc) have also been 
considered to address the main issue of PP conflicts associated with M&A in 
Asean 5 countries.   
 
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2 presents the theoretical 
framework of this study, Section 4.3 deals with the testable hypotheses 
development of the current study and Section 4.4 concludes the chapter.    
 
4.2 Theoretical framework 
 
Figure 5 presents the theoretical framework for this thesis. On the left hand side 
are the company specific variables, which previous studies have indicated to be 
important in terms of impacting the right hand side. The dashed arrow depicts the 
relationship between the controlling shareholders to the agency conflicts.  
 
Other control variables are namely the companies’ lag (t-1) of dependent 
variables, leverage, company size, performance measurement, sales growth, risks, 
industry and country variables. These are linked to the proxies for PP conflicts on 
the right hand side measured by dividend to cash flow, dividend to earnings, 
dividend to sales and dividend to market capitalisation (Faccio, et al., 2001b). 
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Since many studies have used performance based measurement as a proxy for 
expropriation, Tobin’s q is also taken into account for the robustness test. The 
asset utilisation ratio to indicate PA conflicts is included to ascertain if the 
relationship is significant in Asean 5.    
 
This study contributes to the investigation of PP conflicts by linking the 
relationship between the company characteristics and M&A variables which are 
indicated by the payment methods, industry relatedness with the acquirers and 
target companies and the value of M&A transactions. Control variables for M&A 
have also been identified to be growth, size, leverage and liquidity (Dickerson, et 
al., 1998). 
 
4.3  Method of analysis and hypotheses testing 
 
Based on the literature reviewed, hypotheses are formed and discussed next. To 
achieve the research objectives, the methods of analysis and expected signs in the 
empirical analysis are highlighted herewith. Following the framework in Figure 5, 
the hypotheses are formulated in three main categories. These investigations 
consist of the categories from the perspective of PP conflicts between 
concentrated ownership, firm-specific variables and M&A variables.  
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Figure 5 : Theoretical framework for Principal-Principal (PP) conflicts associated 
with mergers and acquisitions (M&A) in Asean 5 
 
 
 
Controlling shareholders 
- Largest shareholder 
- Second large 
shareholder 
- Concentration 
threshold 
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4.3.1 Ownership and PP conflicts  
4.3.1.1  Hypothesis 1 
This research supports the notion that large controlling shareholders divert 
resources away from the minority shareholders in their investment strategy 
(Shleifer & Vishny, 1997) by incorporating M&A which usually affects the 
overall performance of the company. It is also suggested that dividend ratios as a 
direct return to shareholders are one of the most justifiable measurements to 
assess the extent of expropriation (Faccio, et al., 2001b;  La Porta, et al., 2000a) 
and in this context, called PP conflicts. Many companies in countries such as 
those in East Asia have weaker regulation for shareholders’ protection and pay out 
lower dividends by keeping resources in the company to extract more private 
benefits for the controlling owners (Faccio, et al., 2001b;  La Porta, et al., 2000b). 
This current research suggests that in the context of post-M&A in Asean 5, 
expropriation may be manifested through increased dividend payments. 
 
In China, Lee and Xiao (2002) observe that companies with large shareholder 
concentration may expropriate minority shareholders in the form of cash dividend 
payout. Dividend payment is regarded as an avenue for the controlling 
shareholders to extract resources away from the company (Easterbrook 1984; 
Faccio et al., 2001; La Porta et al., 2000) for their own private benefits (Chiou et 
al., 2010). Recently, Banchit and Locke (2011) note that PP conflicts do exist in 
Asean 4 (Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and Philippines) markets through higher 
payment of cash dividends. 
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In mature markets where dispersed ownership prevails, dividend payment is 
utilised to monitor managers’ actions and reduce PA costs (Allen & Bernardo, 
2000;  Grossman & Hart, 1988; Harris & Raviv, 1988;  La Porta, et al., 2000b). 
On the other hand, in the context of concentrated ownership among few 
shareholders and lack of shareholders’ legal protection, the payment of dividends 
may indicate the presence of  expropriation between shareholders (Claessens, 
.Djankov, & Lang, 1999b). 
 
The net effect of a conflict may be distinguished from the effect of a single 
investment project as in the case of corporate M&A where public information 
must be made available to shareholders (Amihud, et al., 1990). M&A as an 
investment for the acquiring companies are viewed in research as a substitute 
between dividend disbursals as both outlays, investment and dividends  may be 
competing with the availability of resources in the company (Dhrymes & Kurz, 
1967). In order to achieve the first research question that states do dividend 
payouts change after M&A in Asean 5, the following hypotheses are stipulated 
and tested using the paired-sample t test. For Hypothesis 1, it is hypothesised that 
there will be lower dividend payouts before M&A and increased payouts after 
M&A.  
 
H1a: Acquiring companies’ dividend is lower before M&A 
H1b: Acquiring companies’ dividend is higher after M&A 
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4.3.1.2  Hypothesis 2a 
Prior empirical studies deduce that in markets with concentrated ownership such 
as in South East Asia, the main agency problem may be between the controlling 
shareholders and the minority shareholders (Claessens, et al., 2002; Johnson, 
Boone, et al., 2000). Controlling shareholders there dominate board members and 
managers to expropriate company resources for their private benefits (Faccio, et 
al., 2001b) and high dividend disbursals may be one of the ways this may be 
revealed and ultimately measured (Chiou, Chen, & Huang, 2010; Faccio, et al., 
2001b; C. Maury & Pajuste, 2002).   
 
Companies in certain countries have been found to pay higher dividends to 
suggest higher potential of conflicts between shareholders (Berzins, et al., 2011). 
It has also been discussed that since large controlling shareholders in Asia have a 
direct managerial role, including making M&A decisions for their companies, it is 
anticipated that a significant relationship between large shareholders and dividend 
payments may indicate PP conflicts. To answer the second research question 
whether large shareholders exacerbate PP conflicts, the second hypothesis states 
that there will be a positive relationship between dividend payment and largest 
shareholders associated with M&A.  
 
H2a: There is a positive relationship between the largest shareholders and PP 
conflicts (dividend) associated with M&A.  
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4.3.1.3  Hypothesis 2b 
Because many past studies have used performance measurement to proxy for 
expropriation from large shareholders, this study incorporates Tobin’s q as a 
robust measure of PP conflicts. Doukas, Kim, & Pantzalis (2000) explain that 
poorly  managed  companies in the US are more likely to be exposed to higher 
agency costs than well-managed  companies. This is a consequence of a a 
company performing below market value being  more likely to waste its free cash 
flows on non-positive net-present value projects. It is anticipated for the next 
hypothesis that that there is a negative relationship between company performance 
(Tobin’s q) and large shareholders. 
 
H2b: There is a negative relationship between large shareholders and PP 
conflicts (performance) associated with M&A 
 
4.3.1.4  Hypothesis 3a & 3b 
At both very low and very high levels of ownership, large shareholders may not 
show any signs of significant relationships. In European countries with 
concentrated markets, such as Germany and Finland, curvilinear relationships 
have been discovered where there are decreasing dividend payouts with increasing 
percentage of controlling shareholders (Gugler & Yurtoglu, 2003; C. Maury & 
Pajuste, 2002). They hypothesised that large shareholders help to reduce PA 
agency conflicts in these markets. However, these developed markets are also 
known for having strong legislation for shareholders’ protection, in contrast with 
most of the Asean 5 markets as had been explained in the last two chapters. 
Consequently, hypothesis H3 suggests that there may be a non-linear relationship 
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between large shareholder and PP conflicts. It is proposed that dividend payouts 
increase with increasing percentage of large shareholders (quadratic).  
 
H3a: The ownership by large shareholders is non-linearly related to PP 
conflicts associated with M&A.  
 
H3b: There is a positive relationship at high levels of ownership and a negative 
relationship at low levels of ownership. 
 
 
4.3.1.4  Hypothesis 4 
As suggested by Yen and Andre (2007), performance of acquiring companies 
with high ownership concentration is associated with decreasing agency costs. 
The second objective also seeks to answer at what percentage threshold this 
commences for large shareholders. In this study, the question is extended to the 
next hypothesis in order to test the different percentages of shareholdings that 
may significantly impact PP conflicts. 
 
H4:  There is a positive relationship between the largest shareholders’ 
concentration (at 5%, 10%, 20%, 30%, 40% and 50% cut off) and PP conflicts 
associated with M&A.  
 
4.3.1.5  Hypothesis 5 
The third objective, whether second large shareholders help to mitigate or worsen 
PP conflicts is justified in H5. The second large shareholders may have a 
prominent role in monitoring PA conflicts as suggested by Gugler and Yurtoglu 
(2003) in Germany. They find in Germany that larger holdings of the second 
largest shareholder reduce agency conflicts. However, this relationship may 
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actually worsen PP conflicts where collusion from both parties could form 
stronger incentives to expropriate in the Asean 5 market. It is hypothesised that 
there is a positive relationship between the largest and second largest shareholders 
associated with M&A in Asean 5. 
 
H5: There is a positive relationship between second largest shareholders with 
PP conflicts associated with M&A.  
 
4.3.2 PP conflicts and Company Debt 
4.3.2.1  Hypothesis 6 
One of the main determinants in dividend as an expropriation model usually 
includes company leverage as a control variable (Faccio, et al., 2001b). Within 
companies with dispersed ownership settings, debt is suggested by Jensen (1986) 
to reduce agency costs of free cash flow by reducing cash available for spending 
by unscrupulous managers. Harris and Raviv (1988) and Stulz (1988) assert that 
controlling shareholders utilise leverage and cooperate with the debtholders to 
inflate the voting power of their shares which consequently may reduce PA 
conflicts in the US and Europe.  
 
Companies with dispersed shareholders also use debt to ensure that professional 
managers are duly maximising their (shareholders’) wealth. This implies that in a 
dispersed ownership setting, the leverage ratio should be positively related with 
large shareholders in lowering PA conflicts (Zeckhauser & Pound, 1990). The 
effective role of large shareholders there is ensuring that the managers will not 
shift the company’s investment policies without the consent of debtholders. Large 
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shareholders in Asian markets, however, may use debt to facilitate expropriation 
in less regulated capital markets as found in Thailand,  Indonesia,  and  South 
Korea (Faccio, et al., 2001b).  
 
Furthermore, Faccio et al.(2001a) find that unlike in Europe, companies in Asia 
use debt to fund projects with higher risks  where loans are given by “related 
parties” who share a controlling shareholder with the borrower. The 
ineffectiveness of capital markets in Asia also allows for debt to be utilised more 
than equity which may mean the minority shareholders are susceptible to being 
expropriated. The controlling shareholders impose more power and control over 
the companies’ resources, which may be the cause of over-investment problems 
(Harvey, Lins, & Roper, 2004).  This also means that minority shareholders are at 
risk because of high leverage problems from higher costs of financial distress 
(Fama & French, 2002) and bigger gaps in information asymmetry due to assets 
being less tangible from the over-investment problem (Harris & Raviv, 1988).  
 
The commitment to pay out interest from high leverages reduces the ability of the 
company to pay out dividends, ceteris paribus, to shareholders (M. Jensen, 1986). 
The notion for the next hypothesis is an inverse relationship between the dividend 
and leverage as stated in previous literature (Al-Malkawi, 2005; Bradley, 
Capozza, & Seguin, 1998; Crutchley, Jensen, Jahera, & Raymond, 1999; Faccio, 
et al., 2001a; Gugler & Yurtoglu, 2003).  
 
H6: There is a negative relationship between leverage and PP conflicts 
associated with M&A. 
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4.3.3 PP conflicts and Company Growth 
4.3.3.1  Hypothesis 7 
La Porta et al.  (2000a) remark that shareholders may use their legal voting power 
to force management to pay out dividends when growth prospects are down.  A 
recent study in Asean 4 countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and Philippines) 
by Banchit and Locke (2011) using dividend policy as proxy for PP conflicts and 
found it is negatively related with the company’s growth rate.  
 
Sales growth is used as proxy for growth rate as it is an indicator of whether 
companies will reach their financial objectives, be competitive and achieve better 
future prospects (Chiou, et al., 2010; Kaplan & Norton, 1996).  The following 
hypothesis is formulated and anticipated to be negatively related with sales 
growth as the control variables for PP conflicts. 
 
H7:  There is a negative relationship between PP conflicts and growth rate 
associated with M&A. 
 
4.3.4 PP conflicts and Company Size 
4.3.4.1  Hypothesis 8 
Companies that are larger in size are suggested by the literature to  pay out higher 
dividends (Fama & French, 2001). Bigger companies rely less on internal finance 
since they have more flexibility in raising funds from capital markets with 
relatively lower costs. Company size is also usually incorporated in prior studies 
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as a control variable that has been shown to affect dividend ratios (Grullon, 
Michaely, & Swaminathan, 2002). Controlling shareholders in bigger companies 
with more resources are less monitored and as such the prediction is based on a 
positive relationship with PP conflicts.  
 
H8: There is a positive relationship between company’s size and PP conflicts 
associated with M&A. 
 
4.3.5 PP conflicts and company’s age 
4.3.5.1  Hypothesis 9 
The age of a company’s incorporation may an important determinant for 
dividends ratio with the argument that older companies are more stable and 
usually pay out more dividends compared to younger companies (Al-Malkawi, 
2007). Some studies do not support this notion and do not include this variable at 
all in their studies (Adjaoud & Ben-Amar, 2010).  It is of importance however in 
the M&A literature that mature companies have more experience and resources to 
enable them to undertake successful M&A outcomes with positive post-
performance. (Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999).  
H9: There is a positive relationship between company’s age and PP conflicts 
associated with M&A. 
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4.3.6 PP conflicts and M&A performance 
4.3.6.1  Hypothesis 10 
It is noted that controlling shareholders may make unprofitable investment 
decisions at the expense of other minority shareholders. This may be done in a 
self-interested manner by tunnelling corporate resources or paying higher 
premiums to gain a larger empire for more self-privilege actions (Johnson, et al., 
2000). As a result, higher premiums are paid out in mergers or takeovers, as 
argued by Sirower (1997), to destroy acquisition value. The following H10 
examines this relationship between M&A performance with PP conflicts,  
 
H10: There is a negative relationship between M&A values and PP conflicts.  
 
4.3.7 PP conflicts and method of payments 
4.3.7.1  Hypothesis 11 
Controlling shareholders of the acquiring companies may prefer to use cash 
instead of shares to purchase because they resent the fact that their ownership will 
be diluted after M&A (Amihud, et al., 1990; Martin, 1996). Theoretically, as 
internal cash is utilised to finance M&A, dividend payouts should also be 
reduced. Nevertheless, in the next hypothesis, dividend payout is hypothesised to 
be positively related with cash payment to show that PP conflicts are worsening 
when cash is depleted for dividend disbursals. 
H11: There is a positive relationship between payment method using cash and 
PP conflicts. 
 
     
106 
 
H11b: There is a negative relationship between payment method using shares 
and PP conflicts 
 
4.3.8 PP conflicts and toehold companies 
4.3.8.1  Hypothesis 12 
Questions about whether bidder companies have control pre-M&A are also 
investigated to ascertain shareholder control over the investment decision.  The 
relationship between the toehold companies is then hypothesised to have a 
positive relationship with PP proxy because large shareholders of the acquirers’ 
companies may make M&A decisions to acquire the companies to an extent of 
providing more private benefits for them.. (Bae, et al., 2002; Nam, 2001). 
 
H12: There is a positive relationship between toehold companies with PP 
conflicts 
 
4.3.9 PP conflicts and relatedness with target companies 
4.3.9.1  Hypothesis 13 
When companies are merging and/or acquiring a target company of another 
industry, Bae et al. (2002) and Holmen and Knopf (2004) advocate that 
expropriation is more likely to occur when acquirer and target are from different 
industries. However, large shareholders tend to expropriate regardless of whether 
these companies engaging in M&A are within related or non-related industries. 
H13 is suggesting from the past literature that the relationship between PP 
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conflicts and industry relatedness of target companies is negatively associated 
with M&A. 
 
H13: There is a negative relationship between industry relatedness of target 
companies with PP conflicts. 
 
4.3.10  PA conflicts and large shareholders 
4.3.10.1 Hypothesis 14a, 14b and 14c 
Though PA conflicts cannot be entirely eliminated by concentrated ownership, it 
is likely that this type of conflict may be material in Asean 5 markets. In fact, the 
role of large shareholders is indicated in mature market settings as a solution to 
PA conflicts. It has been reiterated that managers who are appointed by the large 
shareholders may collude with each other (Becht, et al., 2010; Burkart & Lee, 
2008)  to make M&A decisions that could exacerbate agency conflicts and 
adversely affect company’s efficiency. Hence, hypotheses 14 state the followings:  
 
H14a: Acquiring companies’ asset utilisation is higher before M&A. 
H14b: Acquiring companies’ asset utilisation is lower after M&A. 
H14c: There is a negative relationship between large shareholders and PA 
conflicts associated with M&A. 
 
4.4  Summary  
This chapter provides description of the theoretical framework used for 
formulating the hypotheses development. It then develops and explains the 
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hypotheses to be tested in the next chapter. Firm-specific variables of M&A 
motivation are incorporated to include size, growth, profit consideration and 
leverage (Ali & Gupta, 1999; Dickerson, et al., 1998). Other important 
determinants are deal characteristics such as M&A value of transactions, age of 
corporation, relatedness with the target company and method of payments (Hitt, 
Harrison, & Ireland, 2001).  
 
These hypotheses facilitate an understanding of PP conflicts, in particular the 
dividends as its proxy and various explanatory variables. The next chapter will 
present the methods for collecting data, definitions of the variables, econometric 
methods and models for testing the relationship of PP conflicts in Asean 5 M&A.  
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CHAPTER 5:  DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
5.0  Introduction 
 
This chapter discusses the methodological aspects of the current study. The 
methodological approach is overly positivist and the research methods are applied 
to data with the objective of discovering the current situation. The analysis for 
micro-econometric input and the data are drawn from secondary sources.  
 
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 5.1 presents the data collection and 
sample selection method. These procedures have been particularly time 
consuming, involving tedious and meticulous collection and checking of data for 
the analysis. The outcome is the use of extensive and reliable data from 807 
companies (1,013 effective deals) from the years of 2000 to 2008. Other control 
variables have also been collected for pre- and post-three years of effective deals 
which make up 6,400 total observations.   
 
Section 5.2 presents the description of the final sample. Section 5.3 addresses the 
measurement, conceptualisation and operationalisation of variables and provides 
explanation of dependent and independent variables used in this study.  This study 
uses two different types of proxies as a robust measurement for PP conflicts. 
Section 5.4 presents method. Section 5.5 presents specification tests including 
estimation of standard error, auto-correlation tests, testing of several coefficients 
jointly and a multicollinearity test. This section makes a new contribution by 
applying a recent but powerful regression analysis that involves the inclusion of 
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time-variant and time-invariant variables in the models. Finally, Section 5.6 
concludes. 
 
5.1  Data and sample selection 
 
Studies involving multiple developing markets usually face difficulties collecting 
reliable historical data for empirical analysis. Information in the databases is 
improving especially since year 2010 but the adverse effect of not having 
historical data would be to establish robust and rich generalisable results. This 
study endeavours to bridge this gap by relying on the availability of data from the 
best international databases and also from published online information. 
 
Table 5 presents the sample selection criteria for this study. The original dataset 
comprised 4,253 effective M&A deals. However, the final sample was reduced to 
1,013 deals (807 acquiring companies) from years 2000 to 2008 after going 
through the different stages of sample selection explained below. Generally, there 
are three main stages in building the sample dataset to ensure it is appropriate for 
the analysis.  
 
First, data is extracted from the Securities Data Corporation’s (SDC) PlatinumTM 
Worldwide Mergers & Acquisition Database. This database is regarded as the 
most comprehensive source of M&A transaction data (Lang & Tudor, 2003). 
Researchers in M&A studies have also been using this database extensively to 
conduct their analyses (Ben Amar & Andre, 2006; Faccio & Stolin, 2006; 
Kamaly, 2007; Luo, 2005; Martynova & Renneboog, 2009). 
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All completed and successful M&A companies from January 2000 through to 
December 2008 were collected inclusively. The sample then had to meet the 
following criteria.    
 
i) Acquiring firms are public listed companies 
ii) Deals are completed and are mergers, exchange offers or acquisitions 
of majority interests 
Second, financial variables in Worldscope/Thomson database (Thomson One 
Banker Analytics) are matched to the M&A companies selected in Stage 1. Since 
the accounting data are reported with a delay, the analysis uses data three years 
before and three years after M&A. These values are calculated as default in the 
database whereby the real market value in the home country is converted to US 
dollars using the exchange rate at the end of the company’s fiscal year. This is to 
ensure consistent measurement for data analysis (Cummins, Hassett, & Hubbard, 
1996). Financial and market data must also be available for bidder companies 
three years prior to the M&A transaction, and also four years post-M&A. This 
includes the year of M&A which does not capture the financial characteristics 
post-M&A. Thus the data spread from 1997 to 2011 covering 15 years. Other 
criteria include the following: 
 
i)  Companies excluded are those that are in the financial and utilities 
industries (SIC codes 6000 – 6999 and 4900-4942 ) as these 
companies are highly regulated and could bias the overall results 
(Fama & French, 2001; Louis, 2004; Song, 2007b) 
ii)  Entity key or Sedol codes are available for acquirers 
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iii)  Accounting and market values data are available on World 
scope/Thomson so that the various measures of dividend ratios, 
operating performance and the market’s assessments of the gains from 
M&A can be estimated 
iv) Data for the calculation of measures of financial performance and 
industry are available from years 1997 to 2011 
v) Multiple acquisitions are regarded as one observation in a three-year 
period. This will allow for a three-year clean observation of the 
bidding company’s financial performance (Song, 2007b) 
 
Third, ownership shareholding percentages are collected from Thomson 
Ownership database. This database derives its information from various sources 
including public announcements made by individual corporations, regulatory 
filings and stock exchange listings by corporations. An independent check with 
available historical annual reports (20% of the sample corporations) with 
shareholdings revealed that these are accurate. 
 
For the purpose of this thesis, the ownership data are collected one year prior to 
the announcement of the M&A. This is because the final decisions by the 
management for M&A would have been done prior to the announcement of the 
M&A. Hence, only acquirers with ownership data that are available one year prior 
to the announcement date will be selected which includes data from years prior to 
2000 up to 2007. Further checks also reveal that there are no significant changes 
in shareholdings after M&A.  
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There are some challenges faced during this stage. Ownership data in Thomson 
One database reports historical data only from 1997 onwards and even with that, 
the Thomson database has its own potential problems that require care when using 
this data (Ince & Porter, 2006). Availability of historical ownership data before 
2010 from the five Asean countries in this study is also very limited
5
. There are 
different reporting systems for each country. It is reported for the shareholding of 
the largest ten shareholders in Malaysia, Singapore and Philippines, the 
shareholding of the largest five shareholders in Thailand and the principal 
shareholder in Indonesia.    
 
Because of these missing values, annual reports for each company are then 
downloaded from the market’s stock exchange website or from their respective 
companies’ websites. There were also emails sent out to some companies 
requesting they send their annual reports.  
 
Most of the companies in Malaysia and Singapore contain published online 
annual reports from 2002 onwards. Indonesia, Thailand and Philippines only have 
recent annual reports. Differences in ownership reporting standards pose further 
challenges where only Malaysian annual reports published top 30 major 
shareholders, while companies in the other four markets may report from the top 5 
to top 20 shareholders.  
 
From here, the types of large shareholders are identified to ascertain whether they 
are individuals, companies or institutional investors. If the dominant owner was a 
                                                 
5
 As explained by Thomson Reuters customer support in their corresponding email regarding the 
limited coverage.  
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nominee, the dominant was traced in the notes to confirm who the owner was (if 
disclosed).  
 
For instance, GHL Systems Bhd Inc in Malaysia acquired a private company 
which was announced and became effective in April 2005. As there was no data 
available via Thomson, the next step was to search the published annual report for 
the said company for information on major shareholders registered in April 2004. 
The substantial shareholder, reported in the 2004 Annual Report, named JMF 
Asset Management Sdn Bhd at 19.05% as the nominee. Herewith, this is traced in 
the disclosure to a company named BSNC Corporation Berhad.  
 
Another example is when a company in Indonesia, Bakrie & Brothers Tbk PT 
acquired a public company and was announced in January 2008. Ownership 
required is a year before the announcement which was either  December 2006 and 
January 2007. Its published 2007 annual report has five items on its list of 
shareholders (including Public at 29.2%) as at December 2006 with Pt Bakrie & 
Brothers Tbk as the substantial shareholder at 50.25%.  
 
Due to inconsistencies in reporting the list/analysis of substantial/major 
shareholders for companies in each country, the analysis only uses the first two 
substantial shareholders. This will also eliminate any bias results due to the 
differences of share classes practised in the five markets. As explained in Section 
3.4, East Asian companies have no significant deviations from one-share-one-vote 
rule through shares with different voting rights (Claessens, et al., 2000a) which 
will not affect the results even with the differences of class shares.  
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This exercise leads to the final sample which comprises of 1,013 deals (807 
acquiring companies) from years 2000 to 2008 with various different industries. 
Table 5 shows the selection criteria for the deals included in the sample.  
 
Table 5: Sample selection criteria 
 
Total available effective deals 
Effective deals from 2000 - 2008 (SDC Database) 4,253 
Minus 
   
 Banks, other finance and utilities  
 
738 
     
Multiple bids 
1,728 
 
     
No data available (ownership, financial data) 
 
774 
 
  
Total available effective deals for analysis 
(Comprises of 807 acquiring companies) 
 
1,013 
 
 
5.2  Measurement, conceptualisation and operationalisation of 
variables 
5.2.1 Dependant variables 
Ratio of common dividends to cash flow is used when available. If no data are 
available, information on the common dividend is taken from the difference of  
total dividends and preferred dividends (Denis & Osobov, 2008). Because of the 
differences in accounting standards in each country, other measures of dividend 
payout ratio are analysed as well. This is also important because some of the 
accounting methods chosen are taken into account from the recognition of 
differences in timing of the revenue and costs and poor record-keeping in some 
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companies (Frederikslust et al., 2008). Following research by Faccio et al. 
(2001b), the thesis incorporates three other different specifications of dividends 
which are dividend to earnings ratio, dividend to market capitalisation and 
dividend to sales. The description of variables and method for the calculations are 
explained in Table 6.  
 
Lag of dividends or last year’s dividend data are also included in the model 
because empirical studies of dividend models persistently find this important in 
explaining this period’s dividend. Excluding them would result in a biased  
estimation to the model (DeAngelo, et al., 2004;  Fama, 1974).  
 
The principal-agent (PA) conflicts must also be investigated. Following Ang et al. 
(2000) and Singh & Davidson (2003), the assets utilisation ratio (total sales/total 
Assets) is used as a PA agency proxy for this study.  The relationship between PA 
conflicts and explanatory variable is set to be inversely related. This ratio provides 
for management’s ability to employ the company’s assets efficiently. Poor asset 
utilisation ratio will reflect poor management decisions in generating revenue for 
each dollar of shareholders’ investment. Because this ratio is based on the items 
before net income, then the large shareholders may not have any access to sales 
revenue.  
 
For robust analysis, Tobin’s q is also being used as one of the dependent variables 
following many past studies that have used this in their methods (Cronqvist & 
Nilsson, 2003; Dahya, et al., 2008; Wiwattanakantang, 2001). Their argument that 
Tobin’s q acts as a proxy for performance measurement will indicate that 
     
117 
 
lower/higher company value shows higher/lower expropriation incidence by the 
dominant shareholders.  
 
However, company performance can also influence the ownership structure which 
may cause endogeneity issues in the model (Jensen & Warner 1988). For instance, 
Himmelberg et al.,(1999) show that managerial ownership is an endogenous 
variable in models of panel data set company performance (Tobin’s q). They 
observe that this could occur because the owners of the company have access to a 
greater monitoring technology which means that the value of company will be 
higher because company resources will not be splurged unnecessary to the 
managers. This study incorporates the endogeneity issue by identifying this in the 
regression model by utilising Hausman-Taylor and dynamic Tobit analysis.  
 
Most often, Tobin’s q ratio is calculated as market value of assets measured by the 
sum of market value of debt and equity divided by replacement of assets. 
However, replacement cost information is not readily accessible because of the 
unavailability of financial information from past decades and the inactivity of 
corporate debt markets in South East Asia (Yon, 1999).  Hence, an alternative 
acceptable measurement of Total Asset (sum of the book value of equity, debt, 
and preferred shares) is used to replace this information (Chung & Pruitt, 1994).   
 
5.2.2 Independent variables 
The independent variables can be distinguished into two main categories - the 
level of controlling shareholder variables and control firm-specific variables that 
impact dividend payout and M&A. Firm-specific variables include growth or 
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investment opportunities (sales growth), debt, size using the logarithm of total 
book value of assets and performance. The analysis uses 17 industry dummies 
according to Guidelines for Classification of Listed Companies issued by the 
Fama and French classification (Fama & French, 2011) system which corresponds 
to the Thomson Financial with the Standard Industry Classification system (SIC) 
listed in Appendix 2. 
 
5.2.2.1  Large, controlling shareholders (ownership variables)  
The ownership variable is found by taking two ways of measurement to test for 
expropriation of PP conflicts. The first way is by applying the largest shareholder 
as a continuous variable for the actual percentage of voting shares held from 5% 
or more (Claessens, et al., 2002; Faccio & Lang, 2002; Holderness & Sheehan, 
1988; R. La Porta, et al., 1999). This variable is also squared in subsequent 
models to take into the consideration the non-linear relationship of large 
shareholder and PP conflicts. The main explanatory variable for investigation is 
the large shareholder collected in period t-2 because the decision to M&A will be 
made before the announcement period (indicated at t-1) (Song,2007b). 
 
Previous research suggests the cut off point for control at various points such as 
10% (C. Maury & Pajuste, 2002; Yen & Andre, 2007), 15-25% (Loh, 1996) and 
20% (Berle & Means, 1932; Claessens, Djankov, Joseph, et al., 1999) and up to 
50%, as it not only dominates but this threshold also allows the shareholder to 
legally control the company (Becht & Röell, 1999; Faccio & Lang, 2002).  
Chapter 2 explains the various definitions of concentration control in Indonesia 
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(25%)
6
, Malaysia (33%), Singapore (25%)
7
, Philippines (35%) and Thailand 
(25%).   
 
The second way to measure is to classify the coding methods in order to capture 
large shareholder at different large shareholder stakes, similar to research done by 
Faccio and Lang (2002) and Yen and Andre (2007). The acquirer’s ownership 
variables include five dummy variables at different thresholds of voting shares by 
the largest shareholder. These thresholds are set at Concen10 (concentrated 
ownership at 10% threshold), Concen20 (concentrated ownership at 20% 
threshold), Concen30 (concentrated ownership at 30% threshold), Concen40 
(concentrated ownership at 40% threshold) and Concen50 (concentrated 
ownership at 50% threshold). 
 
5.2.2.2  Profitability variables 
The econometric model incorporates profitability variable as the variable may 
impact the dividend payouts. Operating cash flows and return on earnings are 
used in this analysis (Aivazian & Booth, 2003). Consistent with other 
performance measurement studies, operating cash flow returns are computed for 
each of the three years before and after M&A. The performance measurement 
chosen for operating cash flows (OCF) is unaffected by the method of accounting 
for the merger (purchase or pooling accounting) and the method of financing 
(cash, debt or equity). Furthermore, it is also unbiased towards differences of 
                                                 
6
 Prior to 2008 
7
 Prior to 2005 
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account methods, tax policy or the type of financing used to fund the acquisitions 
(Healy, et al., 1992; Song, 2007b; Yen & Andre, 2007).  
 
5.2.2.3  Lag variables 
Ownership and dividend payout may be endogenous to the company (Jensen et 
al., 1992). This relationship has been conceptualised by Demsetz and Lehn (1985) 
and adapted by Truong & Heaney (2007). In addition, the model requires for the 
lag of profitability to remove any endogeneity effect to the dividend payouts 
which will be discussed in Section 5.3.5. As explained earlier, this study 
incorporates the endogeneity issue by identifying this in the regression model by 
utilising Hausman-Taylor and dynamic Tobit analysis.  
 
The analysis includes several countries and consistent with the work of 
comparative studies by Schulze et al. (2003; 2001), other financial and industry 
variables are being controlled in the model. Corporate profitability may also have 
an impact to the dividend payouts. Some of the earlier dividend studies do not 
incorporate this variable but in light of conservative accounting information, 
alternative measures of profitability are used. Other control variables that relate to 
the merger and acquisition performance (which may affect dividend payouts) are 
included in the model. This is important because other sources of uncertainty that 
may arise from cross-country variations can also be controlled (Albuquerue & 
Wang, 2008). 
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5.2.2.4  Other firm-specific variables 
Other firm-specific variables are included in the analyses to control for other 
factors that might have a systematic effect on dividends. Beta represents business 
risk, a mathematical measure of the sensitivity of the rates of return on the 
company’s share, compared with the rates of return on the market as a whole (G. 
R. Jensen, et al., 1992; Moh'd, et al., 1995; Rozeff, 1982).  
 
Leverage measured by using the ratio of debt to assets, is recognised in the 
literature as a substitute for dividends. Not only  does that leverage act as a control 
variable, it is also the next option after cash flow to fund operations costs of 
M&As (S. C. Myers & Majluf, 1984). The regression analysis is added by using 
the proxy for debt being financial leverage ratio as defined as ratio of short term 
debt and long term debt to total shareholders’ equity (DER) and ratio of financial 
debt to net assets (D/A) (Faccio, et al., 2001b).  
 
The size and growth of the company are indicated by natural logarithm of total 
assets and growth rate of sales (Deshmukh, 2003; La Porta, et al., 1999).This is 
because large and fast growing companies tend to pay large dividends to reduce 
agency costs in mature markets (Faccio, et al., 2001b; Jeon, et al., 2010). 
 
Age is measured based on the number of years a business is in existence 
(Chrisman, Chua, & Litz, 2004). To determine age, the company’s stated date of 
formation is subtracted from the year of effective M&A.  To adjust for skewness 
in the distribution of size and age, natural logarithm is also being calculated.  
 
     
122 
 
Several variables that capture M&A deal characteristics are also examined. 
Following Officer (2003), the natural logarithm (transaction value) is applied to 
calculate deal premium. Another important M&A control variable is Related Deal 
where it is a dummy variable equal to 1 if an acquirer and a target share the same 
primary two-digit SIC code and 0, otherwise (Al-Kuwari, 2009). 
 
5.2.2.5  M&A variables 
Most M&A studies incorporate payment methods in their analyses. They 
hypothesise that managers of acquiring companies who assume control instigate 
cash as a method of payment rather than using shares. This is because a M&A 
using shares dilutes the managers’ ownership (including shareholders themselves) 
in the combined companies (Amihud, et al., 1990; Jeon, et al., 2010). Payment 
using cash, shares or a mixture are denoted with dummy variable equal to 1 while 
0, otherwise. 
5.2.2.6  Industry and country control variables 
Dividend ratios are much more likely to differ across different industries. Hence, 
because of the variety of industries in the sample, it is imperative to control for 
industry-specific effects to ensure reliability of the results (Renneboog & 
Trojanowski, 2007). And finally, the year dummy must be included to control for 
the year of effective M&A of each company in the sample.  
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Table 6: List of dependent and independent variables 
 
VARIA
BLE 
ACRON
YM 
DESCRIPTION 
 
(TI: Time 
Invariant, 
TV: 
Time 
variant) 
PP 
conflicts 
Div/cf Dividend to cash flow ratio. Dividends are total cash 
dividends paid to common and preference shares. 
Source: Worldscope 
TV 
Div/earn Dividends as percentage of earnings TV 
Div/sales Dividends as percentage of total net sales.  TV 
Div/mcap Dividends as percentage of market value of equity at 
the end of year.  
TV 
Tobin’s q Market value of the acquirer’s equity as of the 
calendar year-end prior/post to M&A transaction plus 
the book value of debt and preferred shares from the 
most recent financial statement prior/post to the 
M&A year divided by the sum of the book value of 
equity, debt, and preferred shares as of the same date. 
 
 
 
TV 
PA 
conflicts 
Efficiency 
ratio 
Ratio of total sales to total assets TV 
Owners
hip 
concentr
ation  
“OWN” 
(taken a 
year  
before 
announc
ement 
of 
M&A) 
Lship The percentage of voting shares held by the largest 
shareholder 
TI 
Lshipsq The square of the percentage of voting shares held by 
the largest shareholder 
TI 
L2ndship The percentage of voting shares held by the second 
largest shareholder 
TI 
Concen5 Dummy variable 1 if a shareholder owns more than 
5% of voting share of the acquiring company 
TI 
Concen10 Dummy variable1 if a shareholder owns more than 
10% of voting share of the acquiring company 
TI 
Concen20 Dummy variable 1 if a shareholder owns more than 
20% of voting share of the acquiring company 
TI 
 
 
Concen30 Dummy variable 1 if a shareholder owns more than 
30% of voting share of the acquiring company 
TI 
Concen40 Dummy variable 1 if a shareholder owns more than 
40% of voting share of the acquiring company 
TI 
Concen50 Dummy variable 1 if a shareholder owns more than 
50% of voting share of the acquiring company 
TI 
Profitab
ility 
CF/TA Ratio of cash flow to total assets  TV 
CF/Sales Ratio of cash flow to total net sales TV 
Growth 
opportu
nities 
GSales Growth in sales over the prior year TV 
Firm 
size 
lgTA Log of book value of total assets and reported in US 
dollars 
Local currencies are converted to US dollars at the 
exchange rates in effect at the end of 2004 
TV 
Debt 
capacity 
TD/TA Ratio of total debt to total assets 
 
TV 
LTD/TC Ratio of long term debt to total capital TV 
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Risk 
 
Beta 
 
A measure of market risk which shows the 
relationship between the volatility of the stock and 
the volatility of the market. This coefficient is based 
on between 23 and 35 consecutive month end price 
percent changes and theirrelativity to a local market 
index. Source: Worldscope 
TV 
Related 
Dummy 
Related Dummy variable1 if the target industry is related, 0 if 
otherwise 
TI 
Age of 
incorpor
ation 
 
Age Years of company’s incorporation until the time of 
effective M&A 
TI 
Toehold Toehold Dummy variable 1 if the acquiring company owns 
any target shares before transaction 
TI 
Value of 
Transact
ion 
ValTran Value Transaction paid for M&A (US$mil) Total value of 
consideration paid by the acquirer, excluding 
fees and expenses. The dollar value includes the 
amount paid for all common stock, common 
stock equivalents, preferred stock, debt, options, 
assets, warrants, and stake purchases made 
within six months of the announcement date of 
the transaction. Liabilities assumed are included 
in the value if they are publicly disclosed. 
Preferred stock is only included if it is being 
acquired as part of a 100% acquisition. If a 
portion of the consideration paid by the acquirer 
is common stock, the stock is valued using the 
closing price on the last full trading day prior to 
the announcement of the terms of the stock 
swap. If the exchange ratio of shares offered 
changes, the stock is valued based on its closing 
price on the last full trading date prior to the date 
of the exchange ratio change. (Based on the 
definition by Thomson SDC database) 
 
            
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
        TI 
Method 
payment 
for the 
M&A 
PayCash Dummy variable 1 if method of payment is cash, 0 if 
otherwise 
2 share, 3 hybrid (mixed) and 4 unknown 
TI 
PayShare Dummy variable 1 if method of payment share, 0 if 
otherwise 
TI 
Country 
variable
s 
Indonesia Dummy variable 1 if acquiring company nation is 
Indonesia, 0 if otherwise 
 
Malaysia Dummy variable 1 if acquiring company nation is 
Malaysia, 0 if otherwise 
 
Thailand Dummy variable 1 if acquiring company nation is 
Thailand, 0 if otherwise 
 
Singapore Dummy variable 1 if acquiring company nation is 
Singapore, 0 if otherwise 
 
Philippine
s 
Dummy variable1 if acquiring company nation is 
Philippines, 0 if otherwise 
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EffYear Effective 
Year 
1 of the M&A effective year; 0 if otherwise 
 
 
Industry AcqSIC1 Dummy variable 1 if the industry of the Acquirer is 
in Food, 0 if otherwise 
 
 AcqSIC2 Dummy variable 1 if the industry of the Acquirer is 
in Mining and Minerals, 0 if otherwise 
 
 AcqSIC3 Dummy variable 1 if the industry of the Acquirer is 
in Oil & Petroleum Products, 0 if otherwise 
 
 AcqSIC4 Dummy variable 1 if the industry of the Acquirer is 
in Textiles, apparel and footwear, 0 if otherwise 
 
 AcqSIC5 Dummy variable 1 if the industry of the Acquirer is 
in Consumer Durables, 0 if otherwise 
 
 AcqSIC6 Dummy variable 1 if the industry of the Acquirer is 
in Chemicals, 0 if otherwise 
 
 AcqSIC7 Dummy variable 1 if the industry of the Acquirer is 
in Drugs, Soap, Perfumes & Tobacco, 0 if otherwise 
 
 AcqSIC8 Dummy variable 1 if the industry of the Acquirer is 
in Construction and Construction Materials, 0 if 
otherwise 
 
 AcqSIC9 Dummy variable 1 if the industry of the Acquirer is 
in Steel Works, 0 if otherwise 
 
 AcqSIC10 Dummy variable 1 if the industry of the Acquirer is 
in Fabricated Products, 0 if otherwise 
 
 AcqSIC11 Dummy variable 1 if the industry of the Acquirer is 
in Machinery and Business Equipment, 0 if otherwise 
 
 AcqSIC12 Dummy variable 1 if the industry of the Acquirer is 
in Automobiles, 0 if otherwise 
 
 AcqSIC13 Dummy variable 1 if the industry of the Acquirer is 
in Transportation, 0 if otherwise 
 
 AcqSIC14 Dummy variable 1 if the industry of the Acquirer is 
in Retail Stores, 0 if otherwise 
 
 AcqSIC15 Dummy variable 1 if the industry of the Acquirer is 
in Other supplies and services, 0 if otherwise 
 
 
 
5.3  Methodology 
 
This section describes the models assumptions and its diagnostic procedure, 
followed by the model specifications. The main contribution from this section is 
the application of recent but powerful regression analysis that involves the 
inclusion of time-variant and time-invariant variables in the models. Figure 6 
below presents the concept map of methodology.  
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Figure 6: Concept map of the methodology 
 
 
5.3.1 Testing for data assumptions 
Before any results are drawn from statistical analysis, a partial plot was drawn to 
conclude that a linear model was appropriate for describing the relationship 
between PP conflicts and the explanatory variables. Furthermore, it is also 
necessary to identify any possible outliers that may distort the final results.  For 
this data, outliers are determined by checking the skewness or heavy tails. Box 
plots and Jarque-Bera (skewness-kurtosis) test are constructed for normality tests. 
However, the data set of this thesis is considered large (when observations are 
Normality test 
Specification Tests 
Autocorrelation Test 
Test for joint signification 
Multicollinearity Test 
     
127 
 
more than 30) and hence, the sampling distribution more closely resembles a 
normal distribution (Selvanathan, Selvanathan, Keller, & Warrack, 2004) 
 
The above tests show that the dependent variables are strongly skewed (except for 
Efficiency Ratio) and some independent variables. This is normal as found in 
other socioeconomic data research (Mukherjee, White, & Wuyts, 1998).  
Logarithmic transformation was done to some variables data (sales, cash flows 
and total assets) to shrink the skewed tail to render it more symmetrical. Another 
method is by winsorizing or taking out extreme data in both tails to reduce 
influential bias. Problems pertaining to outliers are addressed by using Huber’s 
M-estimator
8
 with k=1.28 to estimate the  
measure of location and detect the outliers (Douma, George, & Kabir, 2006; Yen 
& Andre, 2007).  It is also advised that it is preferable to use a robust estimator 
which is the median instead of the mean to estimate the centre of distribution 
when there are deviations from normality.  
 
5.3.2 Pairwise Correlation  
The next analysis to be done is to check the pair wise analysis to understand the 
correlation between the variables. The correlation coefficient, sometimes also 
called the cross-correlation coefficient, is a quantity that gives the quality of a 
                                                 
8
 M-estimator has been broadly applied by using K=1.28 (Huber, 1964). For the M-estimators is trimming 
ratio is introduced by Equation 1 where any observed value X is declared an outlier based on the sample 
median, M and the median absolute deviation, MAD. 
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least square fitting to the original data. Least square is a mathematical procedure 
for finding the best-fitting curve to a given set of points by minimizing the sum of 
the squares of the offsets ("the residuals") of the points from the curve.  
 
The sum of the squares of the offsets is used instead of the offset absolute values 
because of Gauss-Markov Theorem
9
 and also this allows the residuals to be 
treated as a continuous differentiable quantity. However, because squares of the 
offsets are used, outlying points can have a disproportionate effect on the fit, a 
property which may or may not be desirable depending on the problem at hand 
(Weisstein). 
 
 Known as R or r, the pairwise correlation measures the strength and direction of 
the linear relationship between two variables that is defined in terms of the 
(sample) covariance of the variables divided by their (sample) standard 
deviations. The strength of the correlation coefficients of the association between 
two variables varies from -1 (perfectly negative correlation, meaning that high 
values of one variable are always associated with low values of the other) via 0 
(no correlation) to +1 (perfectly positive correlation, meaning  that high values of 
one variable are always associated with high values of the other).  
 
                                                 
9 “The Gauss-Markov theorem states that in a linear model in which the errors have an expectation of zero 
and are uncorrelated and have equal variance; the best linear unbiased estimators of the coefficients; normal 
distribution, with a mean equal to the true value and with variance given.” (Jirina&Jirina, 2008, p10) 
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5.3.3 T-test and Wilcoxon signed-rank test: Analysis of dividend changes 
around M&A 
The analysis for changes in mean or median are constructed utilising parametric 
and non-parametric testing. Paired t-test and Wilcoxon test are both done to the 
dependent variables to investigate the changes in the dependent variables pre- and 
post-M&A. However, the central limit theorem suggests that the larger the sample 
size (when observations are more than 30), the more closely the sampling 
distribution resembles a normal distribution (Selvanathan, et al., 2004). Hence, 
parametric tests are already robust to deviations from normality because of the 
large sample in this thesis.  
 
The first hypothesis relates to changes in PP conflicts associated with M&A.  The 
comparison of two variables pre and post an M&A event are considered as paired 
analysis as they have not independently occurred (Selvanathan, et al., 2004).  
Accordingly, a one-tailed paired t test, where the sample mean post-dividend 
differs significantly from the mean pre-dividend after Year 0 (effective M&A) 
takes the form: 
    (1) 
 
where the D denotes the groups, (XD) is the average of each group, (sD) is the 
standard deviation of those differences, μ0 is the constant at non-zero whether the 
average of the difference is significantly different from μ0, and n the sample.  
 
A few assumptions must be addressed before drawing any conclusions from this 
test according to Park (2005). First, the type of variable should be either interval 
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or ratio. Second, the normality assumptions should also be met. If the assumption 
is violated, non-parametric methods can be used instead. However, the data set of 
this thesis is considered large (when observations are more than 30) and hence, 
the sampling distribution more closely resembles a normal distribution 
(Selvanathan, et al., 2004). 
 
In this thesis, data that are tested for pre- and post-M&A are in ratios and this 
satisfies the first assumption. The second assumption has been explained in 
Section 5.3.1 which was to apply logarithmic transformation and winsorising to 
exclude extreme outliers. It also indicates that both parametric and non-parametric 
tests are conducted. The null hypothesis is that the true mean difference of the two 
variables is assumed to be zero unless explicitly specified.  
 
The Wilcoxon rank-sum test is a nonparametric alternative to the two sample t-
test which is based solely on the order in which the observations from the two 
samples fall. The objective is to compare two populations by ranking the data 
instead of using the variables’ means. (In Stata, the command signrank 
postdiv=prediv is used). The Wilcoxon test is still valid for data from any 
distribution, regardless of whether the data is normal or not, and is much less 
sensitive to outliers than the two-sample t-test (Wild & Seber, 1999). The results 
for these tests are reported later in Table 10, which verifies that a similar 
conclusion is derived if the data are assumed to be normally distributed using t-
test of     .  
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5.3.4 Panel data Regressions 
T-test and signed-ranked test are limited for explaining relationships when more 
than one parameter in the models is being conducted. The tests only allow for 
testing of value of one parameter at a time. Therefore, regressions analysis must 
be conducted to enable for testing of hypotheses with multiple parameters in the 
models.  
 
The analysis for this study uses panel data that refers to the pooling of 
observations on a cross-section of companies over several time periods. It is the 
most efficient statistical method, widely used in econometrics and social science 
(Madalla, 2001). One of the main advantages of using panel data is that individual 
heterogeneity can be controlled since panel data suggests that individuals, firms, 
or countries are heterogeneous. Pure time-series and pure cross-section studies 
may produce bias results by not controlling those factors (Bhagat & Jefferies, 
2002).  
 
Another advantage is that panel data gives more “informative data, more 
variability, less collinearity among the variables, more degrees of freedom and 
more efficiency” as compared to non-panel data (Baltagi, 2005, p. 5). Panel data 
also allows a better understanding of changes in adjustments for which this study 
hopes to accomplish by looking at one point of time to other changes at another 
point of time, or two time periods. This calls for using dummy variables to 
establish for possible significant changes. The panel data estimation models are 
carried out utilising ordinary least square (OLS), weighted least square (WLS) and 
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Hausman-Taylor estimator (HT). The basis for using these methods will be 
elaborated further.   
 
This thesis incorporates the basic regression dividend expropriation models from 
previous research (Faccio, et al., 2001b;  La Porta, et al., 2000a). However, the 
main limitation for these papers is that their results are based upon the restricted 
cross-sectional ordinary least square (OLS) regressions method. This thesis 
endeavours to add to the empirical knowledge by utilising robust panel 
regressions, as discussed earlier.  
 
A basic empirically testable dividend model was developed by Andres, Betzer, 
Goergen, & Renneboog Andres et al. (2009)
10
, based on the Lintner (1956) 
dividend model of adjustment of the current dividend as a function on the 
dividends of the previous year and earnings. This model has been claimed by 
some authors as being the best and most commonly used to set dividends (T. 
Khan, 2006).  
 
                                                                       
where  
      and         = Dividend per share company i pays in year t and t-1 
respectively,( t=effective year of M&A) 
       = Published profits in year t or Cash Flow per share at time t for firm i 
                                                 
10 Lintner (1956) partial adjustment model:              (E=Earnings). It is rewritten to                   
                         . Upon using Fama and Babiak (1968) extended partial adjustment model by including a 
lagged earnings variable:                             where      is a serially uncorrelated error term. After 
arrangement to the full adjustment of dividends to the expected earnings change          , and partial adjustment to the 
remainder:                    (                )                            (Andres, et al., 2009). 
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     = with t=1,…T are time dummies that control for the impact of effective 
year/time on the dividend behaviour of all sample companies 
     = is a firm-specific effect to allow for unobserved influences on the dividend 
behaviour of each company and is assumed to remain constant over time 
    = disturbance term 
 
5.3.4.1  Application of model and challenges to current study 
The model in this thesis is the estimation for PP conflicts with dividend ratios and 
its independent variables from the period 1997 to 2010 using fixed effect 
specification for controlling firm effect. Therefore, the analysis should be 
extended to control for the effect with ownership concentration. In another effort 
to emphasize robustness in this study, Himmelberg et al.(1999) proposes that firm 
characteristics and fixed firm effects be controlled to correct any exogenous 
effects of ownership on dependant values. These variables include debt and total 
assets as studied by Faccio et al. (2001a), growth in sales by La Porta et al. 
(2000). Therefore Equation (3) is transformed by extending Equation (2) into the 
following, which forms the base model for this thesis: 
 
                                                        
                                                                      (3) 
where   
      represents PP conflicts, i refers to acquiring companies and t represents the 
time period of effective deals. The parameter    represents the impact of large 
shareholders (described in Table 6) on PP conflicts.     is unobserved firm-
specific effect and ε is the disturbance term. It is assumed that ε has a zero mean, 
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and is serially uncorrelated and independently distributed across firms but no 
restrictions on heteroskedasticity across time and across firms.  
 
M&A are referred to by economists as non-contemporaneous events because they 
do not occur on the same day across all entities (de Grassa & Masson, 2012). In 
an aggregate analysis, a regression model is appropriate to run to ascertain the 
effects of explanatory variables on the dependent variable. However, in a multiple 
event window setting, the aggregate analysis cannot be applied unless the event 
windows are at the same time for all companies.  
 
Therefore, to indicate the changes of M&A impacts upon the dependent proxies, 
dummy variables are created to include pre and post years. M&A control 
variables discussed in literature include company size, risk, the age of 
incorporation, toehold (whether the acquirer has any ownership prior to M&A), 
related industry to the target and payment methods (cash, shares or mixed). 
Industry and country variables are also included to form Equation 4 as below. 
 
                                                              
                                                           
                     (4) 
                 
where   
      represents PP conflicts, i refers to acquiring companies and t represents the 
time period of effective deals. The parameter represents     as unobserved firm-
specific effect and ε is the disturbance term. The PP conflicts-large shareholder 
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relationship has quite a number of control variables    as described in Table 6 
(List of dependent and independent variables). Country and industry variables are 
also included in the model as indicator parameters. It is assumed that ε has a zero 
mean, and is serially uncorrelated and independently distributed across firms but 
no restrictions on heteroskedasticity across time and across firms.  
 
The dataset for the analysis does have random missing observations which cause 
the panel to be unbalanced or incomplete. Some of the reasons for the imbalance 
in the data occur because of non-availability of data in the database as explained 
in Section 5.1. The appropriate analysis would be to apply the unbalanced panel 
data models.  
 
In this thesis however, because cross-section variations in the data are used, the 
coefficients of individual-invariant regressors, such as large shareholder, M&A 
control variables, ownership concentration dummies, country and time dummies, 
cannot be quantifiable. This is because the fixed effects estimator does not 
estimate the parameters that describe the individual-level heterogeneity. 
Therefore, any estimator that is time-invariant will be eliminated from the model. 
Hence, fixed effect or within estimator is unfeasible to provide answers to the 
research questions posed in this thesis. 
 
Furthermore, all studies on relationships with dividend with corporate valuation 
and ownership variables contain high possibilities for endogeneity problems 
(Jensen et al., 1992, Pindado & Chabela, 2006). Past dividends and earnings used 
as regressors may also have an impact on the dividend paid in the relevant year. 
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Besides, all the M&A control variables may be endogenous variables since these 
regressors are not randomly determined (Faccio & Masulis, 2005).  
 
This endogeneity issues will produce spurious correlation between dividend ratios 
and the right-hand independent variables. It will be determined that the OLS 
method may also be subjected to omitted variable bias because a lagged 
dependent variable may be correlated with firm-specific effects (Bond, Elston, 
Mairesse, & Mulkay, 2003).  
 
5.3.4.2  Instrument variables (IV) estimator  
Instrumental variable (IV) estimators can be used to eliminate the endogeneity 
effects explained above. One of the common ways used by researcher is two-stage 
least squares (2SLS) estimators (Collins, Dutta, & Wansley, 2009). This method 
have its limitation where it is a must to specify the condition that the IV used must 
be correlated with the endogenous variable but uncorrelated with the error terms. 
Without abiding to this condition, the weak instrument may cause serious 
misinterpretation of coefficients (Keane & Runkle, 1992). Furthermore, the 
presence of heteroskedasticity may hinder the consistency in the standard IV 
estimates of the standard errors preventing valid inference.  
 
Hence, without the worry of investigating valid IV, the usual and valid approach 
to address endogeneity and heteroskedasticity of unknown IV as suggested by  
Baum, Schaffer & Stillman (2003) is to use the dynamic model called Generalised 
Method of Moment (GMM) introduced by Hansen (1982) for the panel data 
analysis. The model just requires using lag data of independent variables as IV 
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estimators. With GMM, it is equivalent to the linear regression case and more 
general estimator that will construct consistent and efficient estimates in the 
presence of both endogeneity and heteroskedasticity.  
 
However, the GMM framework requires the model to have sufficient time-
varying variables. This is again unfeasible for this thesis because the inclusion of 
event study element for year 0 to indicate effective M&A. The goal of obtaining a 
consistent estimate of the coefficient large shareholder will fail since Fixed Effect 
(FE) regression method will drop time-invariant estimators from the regression, 
while non-random M&A control variables also will not enable the analysis to 
proceed with Random Effect (RE) regression method. 
 
Another dynamic method suggested by Verbeek (2008) and Cameron & Trivedi 
(2009) is to use the Hausman-Taylor (HT) estimator introduced by Hausman and 
Taylor (1981). HT also takes into consideration the fixed effect estimator by 
allowing the estimation of the effect of time-invariant variables, even though they 
are correlated with    . The HT estimator maintains the benefit of both the fixed 
effect estimator (correlation between individual effects and regressors) and also 
the random effect estimator (taking into account the time-invariant regressors).  
 
5.3.5 Alternative panel regression: Hausman-Taylor (HT) estimator 
The HT estimator has been advocated in various economic settings, especially to 
assess the impact of some of the time-invariant variables and policy-intervention 
in a non-random fashion (Kramer & Lensink, 2012; McPherson & Trumbull, 
2008). 
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Verbeek (2008) states the there is no need to restrict attention to the fixed and 
random effects assumptions by deriving IV estimators that can be considered to 
be between a fixed and random effects approach. The important step in HT is to 
distinguish the regressors which are uncorrelated with the fixed effect and those 
potentially correlated with the fixed effect (or between time-varying and time-
invariant regressors). A linear model with groups of variables is given as below 
(Hausman and Taylor, 1981): 
 
            =            +                         +      (5) 
 
Where regressors    and    are specified to be uncorrelated    and regressors 
with    and    are specified to be correlated with    . w denotes time-invariant 
regressors, and x denotes time-varying regressors. These characteristics for each 
variables is described in Table 6. All regressors are assumed to be uncorrelated 
with     . Under this assumption, the fixed effect estimator would be consistent for 
   and    but would not recognise the time-invariant variables.  
 
Herewith, Hausman and Taylor (1981) suggest that equation (5) is estimated by 
using IV using the following variables as instruments:          and         , 
where the variables serve as their own instruments. (     is instrumented by its 
deviation from individual means (as in fixed effects approach and     is 
instrumented by the individual average of     ) (Verbeek, 2008, p. 370). 
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Hausman and Taylor (1981) also suggest that because “the only component of the 
disturbance which is correlated with an explanatory variable is time invariant, 
then any vector orthogonal to a time-invariant vector can be used as an 
instrument.”  (p.1384). This can also mean that any other variable can be included 
in as the exogenous variables for which the authors further explain that for 
conventional simultaneous equations (eg OLS, GLS), these variables will be 
excluded from the model.  
 
The variables that can be identified as endogenous have been identified as large 
shareholders (Jensen et al., 1992, Pindado & Chabela, 2006), past dividends and 
earnings that may also have an impact on the dividend paid in the relevant year. 
(Faccio & Masulis, 2005). All the M&A control variables may also be treated as 
instruments for exogenous variables (Hausman & Taylor, 1981) since these 
regressors are not randomly determined.  
 
Further check using Durbin-Watson-Hausman (DWH) test shown in Table 13, 
confirms that the endogenous variables include large shareholder and the lag data.  
 
In Stata, the command xthtaylor (Hamilton 2009) is used to construct the 
regression analysis by identifying these variables as endogenous and exogenous in 
the model. 
 
5.3.6 Testing the appropriateness of OLS, HT: Durbin-Wu-Hausman Test 
A special test to determine which model is best to use in the case of endogeneity 
(past dividend and ownership) is called a Durbin-Wu-Hausman (DWH) test. Both 
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resulting coefficients in the OLS and HT models are compared for the null 
hypothesis that the OLS estimator is consistent and fully efficient.  
 
Davidson and MacKinnon (1993) suggest Durbin-Wu-Hausman test (DWH test) 
to check for endogeneity among regressors. Herewith, this test is conducted by 
including the residuals of each endogenous right-hand side variable, as a function 
of all exogenous variables, in a regression of the original OLS model to check for 
evidence of endogeneity between PP and PA conflicts’ proxies and other 
variables.  
 
The DWH test takes the quadratic form (Baum, 2006) of  
  ( ̂      ̂   )
 
   ( ̂      ̂   )
 
     (6) 
And thus     D= Var[  ̂   ]         ̂     
 
“Where  ̂   the estimator is consistent under both the null and the alternative 
hypothesis, and by  ̂   the estimator that is fully efficient but inconsistent if the 
null is not true (Baum, 2006, pg. 211)”  
 
The test reported in Section 7.2.2 confirms not to accept the null hypothesis and 
that HT estimation is appropriate to be used. However, the approach requires that 
the endogenous and exogenous variables be distinguished in applying economic 
intuition suggested by Hausman and Taylor (1981). The instruments in the 
procedure must also be uncorrelated with the errors and the unit effects, while 
correlated with the endogenous regressors. Again, like using an instrument 
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variable procedure, the identifying of these instruments may be a very challenging 
task especially when the unit effects are unobserved (Plümper & Troeger, 2007). 
  
Fortunately, the related problems and strict limitation of estimating time-invariant 
in fixed effect models with unit effects has been resolved by a recent remedy that 
is actually more efficient than the fixed effect model and Hausman-Taylor model 
(Akhter & Daly, 2009; Breusch, Ward, Nguyen, & Kompas, 2010; Thomas 
Plümper & Vera E.Troeger, 2011). Plümper & Troeger (2007) call it ‘‘fixed 
effects vector decomposition’’ or FEVD model as superior because the estimator 
decomposes the unit FE into unexplained parts and a part is explained by the 
time-invariant or a rarely changing variable. This fits the characteristics of the 
ownership variable in this model as it has both characteristics of time invariant 
and also rarely-changing variant. (rarely changing because large shareholders 
seldom change in their percentage holdings).  
 
5.3.7 Alternative panel regression for robust study: Fixed-effects vector 
decomposition (FEVD)
11
 
The fixed-effects vector decomposition (FEVD) technique is suitable for a robust 
alternative analysis because most of the variables have very limited within 
variance and as such fit the traditional panel data estimators (Akhter & Daly, 
2009). The model is specified with the PP proxy and is explained by a set of time-
varying, time-invariant and rarely changing variables. Specifically also, there is a 
condition of time element at t=0 that must be addressed in the variable to denote 
mergers and acquisition. 
                                                 
11
 This section largely draws from Plümper & Troeger (2007; 2011) and Akhter & Daly 
(2009) 
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There are three steps in the FEVD technique:  
Step 1: the procedure estimates the unit FE by running a normal FE estimate of 
the baseline model 
Step 2: the procedure splits the unit effects into an explained and an unexplained 
part by regressing the unit effects on the time invariant explanatory variables of 
the original model and, finally,  
Step 3: the procedure involves running a pooled-OLS estimation of the baseline 
model by including all explanatory time-invariant variables, time-invariant 
variables and the unexplained part of the FE vector. At this stage, a correct 
standard errors for the coefficients of the time-invariant variables is able to be 
computed and adjustments made for serial correlation of errors. 
A panel data model with time-invariant variables can be defined as: 
 
            =     ∑   
 
         + ∑       
 
     
   
 
+         (7) 
 
Where the x variables are time-varying and the z variables are time invariant 
(including and/or rarely changing),  
 
 denotes the (N-1) unit-specified fixed 
effects (FE) of ownership and M&A variables,     is the independent and 
identically distributed error term, α is the intercept of the base unit, and β and γ 
are the parameters to be estimated. 
 
The first step of FEVD is estimating the standard FE model. This FE 
transformation can be obtained by first averaging Equation (7) over the time 
period T: 
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 ̅  =     ∑   
 
    ̅     + ∑       
 
     
   
 
+  ̅        (8) 
 
where   ̅  =
 
 
∑    
 
     ̅    
 
 
 ∑      ̅ 
 
   
  
  
 
 
 ∑    
 
     and e stands  for the 
residual of the estimated model. Then equation 8 is subtracted from Equation 7, 
which removes the unobservable individual specific-effects  
 
 and the time 
invariant variables z. Hence, the following is derived to obtain estimates of the 
unit effect  ̂  : 
 
    -  ̅  =   ∑        
 
    ̅          ∑           
 
     
       ̅   
 ( 
 
  
 
)          (9) 
                     
Hence, then    ̂     ̅   - ∑    
  
 
 
     ̅   -   ̅       (10)  
 
where  ̂   includes all time-invariant variables, the overall constant term and the 
mean effects of the time varying variables.  
 
In the second step, the  ̂   in step 1 is regressed on the observed time-invariant, z 
variables to obtain the unexplained part    as below (the residual from regressing 
the unit-specific effect on the z variables): 
 
 ̂   =  ∑    
 
          +                 (11) 
The unexplained part    is then obtained by computing the residuals from 
Equation (11) 
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   =  ̂    ∑    
 
                (12)  
 
The importance of this stage is to decompose the unit effects into unexplained 
parts and a part that can be explained by the time-invariant variables. And finally 
in step 3, the full model is rerun without the unit effects but includes in the 
unexplained part     of the decomposed unit FE obtained in step 2 into pooled 
OLS below: 
 
   =     ∑   
 
         + ∑       
 
     
       +       (13)  
 
FEVD procedure in step 3 has few strong advantages. One is that the procedure 
allows for the correct standard errors (SEs) to be obtained. This is because by not 
correcting degrees of freedom may lead to serious underestimation of SEs and 
overconfidence in the results. The other advantage is that it allows for the 
dynamics of time-invariant variables such as the ownership, country, M&A and 
the acquirers’ industry to be dealt with. Because of these time invariant issues, the 
popular dynamic Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) procedure that 
eliminates heteroscedasticity and serial correlation can be gained by using FEVD.  
For empirical investigation, the basic model is recapitulated and redefined as 
follows: 
 
                                                                     
                                                                      
                                                (14) 
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Clearly, the time invariant variables in this model are year, M&A control 
variables, country and industry variables.   
 
 denotes the individual specific 
effects while     stands  for the residual of the estimated model. 
 
However it is worth noted that there are serious limitation from the FEVD method 
as discussed by the critics, Greene (2010) and Breusch, Ward, Nguyen and 
Kompas (2010). These authors claim that the standard errors from the third stage 
are incorrect, in fact too small. This renders for the results derived from FEVD 
analysis to be not credible.  
 
Nevertheless, FEVD technique is worthy to be used as an alternative robustness 
check to test the significance between large shareholder and dependent variable; 
especially in having the challenging data set of time-varying, time-invariant and 
rarely changing variables in a model. In another article, Plümper & Troeger 
(2011), respond to their critics’ points above where they have a lengthy 
demonstration in their current paper that FEVD is more efficient and less biased 
than the fixed effects (FE), pooled ordinary least square (OLS) and random-
effects (RE) for endogenous time-varying variables.  
 
In fact, in the case of small standard errors derived from their previous paper 
(Plümper & Troeger 2007), they claim that  
..the variance equations that Greene and BWNK suggest in their articles and 
we demonstrate that our variant of FEVD’s variance equation computes SEs 
(standard errors) [sic] that are closer to the true sampling variance than the 
alternative suggestions of both Greene and Breusch et al. [sic]. (Plümper & 
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Troeger 2011, p.148). 
 
5.3.8 Alternative panel regression for robust study: Tobit model 
For the next analysis, models using Tobit with endogenous regressor to 
specifically adjust for the endogeneity problem are used. This method will 
subsequently account for any endogeneity (Green, 1993) problem  in the dividend 
(PP conflicts) and shareholding and  adjusts for potential biases because of the 
presence of zero-dividend observations in the sample (Heckman, 1979). 
 
The non-metric scale of the dependant variable requires differences in the 
estimation, for which the basic assumptions of regression are also applied. 
Logistic regression models can accommodate both types of independent variables 
(both metric and non-metric) and thus do not require the assumption of 
multivariate normality (Hair, Black, Babin, Anderson, & Tatham, 2005, p. 19).  
 
A remedy to the problem of censoring at 0 was first proposed by Tobin (Tobin, 
1958) which is known as “Tobin’s probit” or the Tobit model. Censoring is when 
a response variable is set to an arbitrary value when the variable is beyond the 
censoring point where in this study is set at 0 for zero-dividend observations. 
This model can be written as such
12
: 
  
         
       {
         
    
         
    
                                       (15) 
                                                 
12
 This section draws from Baum (2006, p. 263) and Chang (2011). 
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Where    contains either zeros for dividend or a positive amount for corporations 
in Asean 5 countries. The limitation of the panel data model is that the estimation 
of limited dependent variable models are characterised by the lagged dependent 
variables and serially correlated errors. To solve this, a dynamic Tobit model is 
applied by incorporating the time-invariant, time-varying and time-dummy 
(Chang, 2011). 
 
Hence, the dynamic panel data framework in the Tobit model with lagged latent 
dependent variable is described as follows: 
 
  
              
                                                      (16) 
 
   =      
   ,    t = 1,…..T, i = 1,……N  
    is an unobserved individual specific random disturbance which is constant over 
time, and  
  
 is an idiosyncratic error which varies across time and individuals.  
 
The general model incorporating the non-continuous dependent model is as 
follows ( Fama & French, 2001; Truong & Heaney, 2007):  
 
                                                                 
                                                                    
                                                                                                     (17)                     
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5.4 Specification tests and model diagnostics 
5.4.1 Estimation of standard errors 
Reliable forecast values are measured by the closest predicted values of dependent 
variables Y (estimated line) from the true values of Y (true line). This means the 
smaller the variance of the residuals, the better the forecast will be.  
 
There are two types of residual errors that may occur in a panel data set: time-
series dependence and cross-sectional dependence (Wooldridge, 2007). In the first 
type of error the residuals of a given company may be correlated across years or 
unobserved company, or alternatively, the residuals of a given year may be 
correlated across different companies.  
 
Analyses using HT and FEVD estimators take into consideration the fixed effect 
estimator by allowing the estimation effect of time-invariant variables, even 
though they are correlated with    . The HT estimator maintains the benefit of 
both the fixed effect estimator (correlation between individual effects and 
regressors) and also the random effect estimator (taking into account the time-
invariant regressors).  
 
5.4.2 Testing several coefficients jointly (the Wald test) 
The most common test to decide on the adequacy of a model or the joint 
significance of several regression coefficients is a Wald-test approach (Cameron 
& Trivedi, 2009). Wald test is an alternative way of testing a multivariate 
hypothesis, other than an F test. Sometimes it has the advantage over F-test 
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because of its ability to estimate one model, the unrestricted model (the 
hypothesis does not impose any mathematical restriction to the model) such as in 
this thesis. 
The following is the Wald statistic: 
 
                                  (18) 
Where the maximum likelihood estimate (MLE) of   of the parameter(s) of 
interest  is compared with the proposed value , with the assumption that the 
difference between the two will be approximately normally distributed. In 
statistics, maximum-likelihood estimation (MLE) is a method of estimating the 
parameters of a statistical model. When applied to a data set and given a statistical 
model, maximum-likelihood estimation provides estimates for the model's 
parameters. 
 
Herewith, the square of the difference is then compared to a chi-squared 
distribution. In probability  statistics, the chi-squared distribution (also chi-square 
or χ² distribution) with k degrees of freedom is the distribution of a sum of the 
squares of k independent standard normal random variables. By the central limit 
theorem, because the chi-squared distribution is the sum of k independent random 
variables with finite mean and variance, it converges to a normal distribution for 
large k. For many practical purposes, for k > 50 the distribution is sufficiently 
close to a normal distribution for the difference to be ignored (Box, Hunter, & 
Hunter, 2006, p. 46).   
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If the results of the Wald test are significant, this will indicate that the group of 
explanatory variables (in this study, these are large shareholder, second large 
shareholder, M&A and financial control variables) have parameters that are not 
zero.  Therefore, all the explanatory variables can be included in the models.  If 
the Wald test is not significant then the model formulation needs to be redesigned, 
excluding variables with zero parameters. Results from the corresponding Wald 
tests will be reported for each analysis in the empirical result sections. 
 
5.4.3 Multicollinearity test 
When there is a perfect linear relationship between the explanatory variables, 
called multicollinearity, the estimates for a regression model cannot be computed. 
In this condition, as the degree of multicollinearity increases, the regression model 
estimates become more unstable and the standard errors for the coefficient 
becomes uncontrollably inflated.  
 
This multicollinearity problem  in post regression can be detected by applying 
Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) statistics (Hamilton, 2009). VIF can indicate 
whether a predictor has a strong linear relationship with the other predictor in the 
regression model
13
.  
 
There will be two results produced from this procedure; VIF and 1/VIF. The 
latter, called tolerance statistic, gives values equal (1-R
2
) that generates the 
proportion of an x variable’s variance independent of all the other x variables. 
From these values, guidelines suggested by Chatterjee, Hadi & Price (2000) to 
                                                 
13 In Stata, the command estat vif is used.  
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detect the presence of multicollinearity are for VIF value greater than 10 or when 
the mean of VIF is larger than 1. To test for multicollinearity among predictor 
variables, both VIF and tolerance statistic will be calculated. 
 
5.4.4 Autocorrelation/Serial correlation test 
Serial correlation occurs in cases where covariances between error terms are not 
equal to zero, which means that residuals appear to be correlated with each other. 
Command xtserial in Stata implements a test for serial correlation in the 
idiosyncratic errors of a linear panel-data model discussed by Drukker (2003). An 
equivalent Wald test of this hypothesis will produce under the null of no serial the 
residuals from the regression of the first-differenced variables should have an 
autocorrelation of -.5. This issue happens quite often in time-series data where the 
regression results remain unbiased but become inefficient and the standard errors 
are estimated in the wrong way (Verbeek, 2008).  
 
5.5  Summary 
This chapter has outlined the methodology used for analysis to test the hypotheses 
in Chapter 4 of this study. It has highlighted the variables and measurement to be 
used in the study, including the challenges faced during the exercise. Sample 
selection criteria have also been discussed. The methods and tests that were used 
to verify the postulated hypotheses and model specifications have also been 
outlined.  
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Methods used for analysis include fixed effects in OLS and panel Tobit to analyse 
the dependent model of dummy variables. Alternative regression models; 
Hausman-Taylor (HT) and Fixed Effect Decomposition Vector (FEVD) have 
been discussed thoroughly. These methods are necessary for the analysis, as 
opposed to OLS, because of the availability of time-invariant variables and 
endogeneity problems that could distort the OLS results. The sample 
characteristics of sample results of the regression analyses and findings are 
presented in the next chapter.   
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CHAPTER 6: FINDINGS FOR PP CONFLICTS IN ASEAN 5 
M&A: UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS 
 
6.0  Introduction  
The previous chapter discussed the methodology used and the sample selection 
criteria in the study. This chapter continues with the analysis and the results of the 
empirical study of PP conflicts and the variables in Asean 5 M&A.  
 
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 6.1 provides descriptive statistics for 
the sample data, with detailed analysis of year and country. This is followed by 
presentation of pair wise correlation results of variables in Section 6.2. Section 6.3 
provides changes in proxies for PP conflicts and PA conflicts by year and country. 
Section 6.4 summarises the main findings from this chapter.   
 
6.1 Description of final sample 
Table 7 is a summary of deals in the final sample when compared with the actual 
effective deals and values of M&A in Asean 5 region that was shown in Table 2. 
Meanwhile, the pie chart in Figure 7 depicts the percentages of effective deals in 
the final sample taken for consideration in the analysis.  
 
Column A of Table 7 presents the actual effective deals in Asean 5 from the year 
2000 to 2008 taken from SDC database, Column B shows the effective deals of 
the sample taken to conduct the analyses for this study and Column C is the total 
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percentage of the final sample collected out of the actual number of effective 
deals in the region.  
 
Table 7 : Percentage of deals in sample from the effective deals 
in Asean 5 for the period of Year 2000-2008 
 
Nation 
A B C 
1 2 3 4 5 
Actual 
number of 
effective deals  
 
Percent 
Effective 
deals in 
final 
sample 
Percent 
Percentage of 
final sample 
from the actual 
effective deals 
(B/A) 
Indonesia 144 3% 21 2% 15% 
Malaysia 2,196 52% 595 59% 27% 
Philippines 187 4% 18 2% 10% 
Singapore 1,333 31% 313 31% 23% 
Thailand 393 9% 66 7% 17% 
Total  4,253 100% 1,013 100% 24% 
 
Note: Thomson Reuters. (n.d.).  
Retrieved from SDC Thomson Database. 
 
Column B shows that Malaysia has the highest percentage available for this study 
at 59%, while Singapore is at 31%. The total effective deals that are available in 
the sample for Indonesia (2%) and Philippines (2%) show that these figures are a 
concern as they are lower than the minimum required for statistical analysis of 30. 
This will be further addressed in the method section by either combining the two 
countries or dropping them out of the equation to produce some comparable 
results for analysis.  
 
Column C shows that the percentage of the final sample collected for the study is 
24% out of the total actual effective deals in Asean 5. The highest numbers and 
percentage of effective deals taken in the sample are from Malaysia (27%) and 
     
155 
 
Singapore (24%), which also had the highest number of actual effective deals 
during that period, as shown in Column A2 at 52% (Malaysia) and 31% 
(Singapore). After elimination, the lowest number of effective deals available for 
sampling is from Philippines (10%). 
 
In addition, Column C shows that even though figures in some countries in 
Column B seem to be relatively low, they are still comparable with the percentage 
of actual number of effective deals shown in Column A that accounts for overall 
M&As in Asean 5 countries. Hence, the weightings of the sample and actual for 
the analysis to be derived from this thesis should be able to generalise the 
outcome for Asean 5.   
 
 
Figure 7: Percentage of effective deals in the final sample in Asean 5 (2000-2008) 
 
6.2 Descriptive results: Characteristics of the bidding firms  
The sample consists of 807 company acquirers and up to 6,400 observations of 
panel data within the period 2000 to 2008. Three main characteristics of the 
Indonesia 
2% 
Malaysia 
59% 
Philippines 
2% 
Singapore 
31% 
Thailand 
6% 
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acquirers are discussed in this section. The first characteristic of the overall 
sample is discussed shown in Table 8. The table depicts the number of 
observations, mean, standard deviation, median, minimum and maximum value of 
each variable. For most data, including dividend ratios used in this research, the 
top and bottom 10% percentile of ratios are cross-checked manually with 
published annual reports to establish correct figures.  
 
There are three categories for independent variables: the first category is the 
largest shareholders variable (also known as controlling shareholders), the second 
category is control variables and the third category is M&A control variables. The 
second discussion is about characteristics by country (Appendix 3); and the third 
characteristic, by year, is shown in Table 9.  
 
Table 8: Descriptive statistics of dependent and independent variables 
 
Variables Obs  Mean Std. Dev. Median Min Max 
 
Dependent variables 
Div/cf 6283 17.375 33.221 8.952 -206.160 417.205 
Div/earn 6362 0.145 0.598 0.070 -13.070 13.020 
Div/sales 6399 0.655 2.401 0.009 0.000 19.219 
Div/mcap 6411 0.246 0.025 0.014 0.000 1.127 
Efficiency Ratio 6400 0.871 0.685 0.748 0.000 13.685 
Tobin’s q 6131 0.963 0.967 0.710 -.0612 10.9455 
 
Independent variables 
Ownership variables 
Largest shareholder (%) 912 32.015 18.598 27.645 5.000 87.700 
Second large shareholder 
(%) 
926 10.578 7.833 8.560 1.000 36.710 
Concen 5 1013 0.049 0.217 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Concen 10 1013 0.221 0.415 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Concen 20 1013 0.213 0.410 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Concen 30 1013 0.140 0.347 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Concen 40 1013 0.120 0.326 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Concen 50 1013 0.227 0.419 0.000 0.000 1.000 
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Variables Obs  Mean Std. Dev. Median Min Max 
 
 
Control variables 
 
  
CF/Sales 6385 81532 2332811 778346 -50692 124000000 
1 yearGrowthSales 6155 18.165 60.48 10 -100 928.49 
LnTotalAssets 6417 18.507 1.67 18.24 3.275 24.86686 
Ln Total Sales 6525 18.066 1.76 17.93 8.38 24.87 
Total Debt/Total Assets 6415 24 30 20 0 1027 
Long Term Dept/Capital 6190 15 47 8 0 373 
Risk (Beta) 5465 1.0061 0.8047 0.9400 -2.3074 5.8476 
Age 6793 19 15 15 1 109 
 
M&A Variables 
 
      
Value of Transactions 3039 1.265 1.97 0.757 0.523 3.164 
PaymentCash 406 0.414 0.493 0.000 0.000 1.000 
PaymentShare 325 0.331 0.471 0.000 0.000 1.000 
PaymentMixed 203 0.207 0.405 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Related SIC Dummy 
(Toehold) 
130 0.128 0.335 0.000  0.000 1.000 
dToehold(5%) 1013 0.768 0.422 1.000 0.000 1.000 
dToehold(10%) 1013 0.003 0.054 0.000 0.000 1.000 
dToehold(20%) 1013 0.007 0.083 0.000 0.000 1.000 
dToehold(30%) 1013 0.016 0.125 0.000 0.000 1.000 
dToehold(40%) 1013 0.016 0.125 0.000 0.000 1.000 
dToehold(50%) 1013 0.191 0.393 0.000 0.000 1.000 
 
Industry dummies       
SIC 1 (Food) 1013 0.115 0.318 0.000 0.000 1.000 
SIC 2 (Mining 
&Minerals) 
1013 0.006 0.077 0.000 0.000 1.000 
SIC 3(Oil&Petroleum) 1013 0.023 0.149 0.000 0.000 1.000 
SIC 4(Textiles) 1013 0.029 0.167 0.000 0.000 1.000 
SIC 
5(ConsumerDurables) 
1013 0.048 0.215 0.000 0.000 1.000 
SIC 6(Chemicals) 1013 0.045 0.208 0.000 0.000 1.000 
SIC 7 (Drugs,Soap, 
Perfumes&Tobacco) 
1013 0.026 0.158 0.000 0.000 1.000 
SIC 8(Construction 
&Cons.Materials) 
1013 0.110 0.312 0.000 0.000 1.000 
SIC 9(Steel) 1013 0.047 0.212 0.000 0.000 1.000 
SIC 10(Fabricated       
Products) 
1013 0.012 0.108 0.000 0.000 1.000 
SIC 11(Machinery& 
BusEquipment)) 
1013 0.086 0.280 0.000 0.000 1.000 
SIC 12(Automobiles) 1013 0.032 0.175 0.000 0.000 1.000 
SIC 13(Transportation) 1013 0.077 0.267 0.000 0.000 1.000 
SIC 14(Retail Stores) 1013 0.028 0.164 0.000 0.000 1.000 
SIC 15(OtherSupplies) 1013 0.318 0.466 0.000 0.000 1.000 
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6.2.1 Dividend
 
At the beginning stage, both parametric (one way t test) and non-parametric 
(kruskal-wallis test) are done to check whether the sample means and medians of 
dependent and independent variables differ from year to year pre- and post-M&A 
as shown in Appendix 4. There are significant changes in the differences for each 
variable (chi-square probability at 1% level).  
 
The most striking result is that the overall minimum dividend cash flow is at 
negative USD206 while the maximum is USD417 per cash flow with a standard 
deviation of 33.2. Appendix 3 (by country) points out that the minimum payout 
per earnings is in Malaysia while the highest is in Singapore. The average 
dividend per cash flow in Asean 5 is at USD17 per dollar of cash flow. Malaysia 
and Singapore record the highest average at a ratio of 8.8 and 6.4 consecutively.  
 
For dividend per earnings ratio, the average of dividend earnings ratio is recorded 
at 14.5% of earnings. The minimum is at negative USD13 per dollar of earnings 
while the maximum is at a similar degree of positive USD13. Similar to dividend 
per cash flow, Malaysia holds the least payout per earnings while Singapore the 
most. Overall in Asean 5, the small variation for earnings as indicated by the 
standard deviation of 0.6 shows that companies in Asean 5 pay relatively similar 
dividends out of their companies’ earnings. 
 
Both ratios using dividend to sales and to market capitalisation present almost 
similar values with minimum at 0 payouts. Companies on average pay about 
USD0.66 to USD0.25 per dollar in sales and market capitalisation. Singapore 
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being the most developed of the five nations pays the highest dividend at USD19 
per $1 of sale and USD1 per market capitalisation.  
 
There are high numbers of non-dividend paying companies similar to other 
studies on dividend payouts (Bahng, Lee, & Jeong, 2011). It is expected that low 
profitability companies are less inclined to pay dividends, which needs further 
investigation.  
 
6.2.2 Asset utilisation ratio (Efficiency ratio) 
The mean efficiency ratio (ratio of total sales to total assets) is 0.9 for overall 
companies. A ratio of higher than 1 depicts efficient use of the companies’ total 
invested asset. This implies that companies in Asean 5 are relatively less efficient 
in running their assets. The maximum is at 13.7 while the minimum is 0. By 
analysing the ratio in different countries, as shown in Appendix 3, the highest 
ratio goes to Singapore (13.7) and second to Malaysian companies (7.9). The 
lowest efficiency ratio is Indonesian companies at 2.6.   
 
6.2.3 Performance ratio (Tobin’s q) 
The overall Tobin’s q mean value is 0.95.  This is much closer to value 1.0, and 
indicates public limited companies in Asean 5 create value for their shareholders.  
The maximum q is 10.946 while the minimum is -0.06. Table 9 shows that when 
compared yearly, the performance slightly dropped from the average of 1 before 
M&A to 0.94 after M&A.  
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Further analysis of Tobin’s q by individual country, presented in Appendix 3, 
shows that the highest average Tobin’s q is a Malaysian company (0.53) and the 
lowest Tobin’s q is in a Philippines (0.01) company.  
 
6.2.4 Large, controlling shareholdings 
Overall, Table 8 shows that the average largest shareholding is 32% while the 
second largest shareholder is 11%. This average figure answers the first research 
question in this study. The maximum percentage of shares owned by one entity of 
shareholder is 88% and the second shareholder is 37%. This picture confirms that 
shareholding in Asean 5 countries is highly concentrated consistent with other 
studies (Claessens, et al., 2000b; Faccio, et al., 2001b).  
 
Appendix 3 shows that the percentage of large shareholders is highest in 
Singapore (87.7%), second is Indonesia (87.3%), and third is in Philippines 
(81.3%), followed by Thailand (79.7%) and Malaysia (79%). The concentration 
dummies also portray that about 68% (standard deviation: 21%+14%+12%+21%) 
of companies contain 20% or more control of the shares.  
 
Looking at the concentration dummies, the highest number of concentrations is 
for 50% and above that has the average of 22.7% of the total sample taken. This 
reiterates the highly concentrated phenomena among companies in Asia. The 
second most concentrated threshold is at 10% and above shareholdings.  
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6.2.5 Company size 
As part of a control variable, the size of companies measured in total assets must 
be added in the analysis. In this sample, the overall average logs for total assets 
are at 18 (USD560 million).By analysing the companies’ size by year, Table 9 
reveals that the average size before the M&A on average is USD447 million with 
the maximum at USD21 billion in total assets. After M&A, sizes of the companies 
are increased to USD646 million. Total sales also show similar a pattern with 
average sales increasing from USD315 million to USD525 million. This shows 
that companies do grow in size; one of the main reasons to embark on M&A. 
 
6.2.6 Cash flows 
There are negative cash flows reported in some of the companies. The average 
cash flow per total asset and total sales are USD5.9 million and USD0.82million 
respectively. The existence of huge variations in cash flows is an interesting point 
for further investigation as financial analysts do refer to cash flow standings of a 
company to evaluate investment projects (Smart & Megginson, 2008). 
 
When compared by year, as depicted in Table 9, it is noted that the average cash 
flows of companies fall from USD132.9 million to USD61.3million after M&A. 
Table 9 also reports that there is a large sum of cash flows in the second year 
before M&A (mean of USD310 million), where it drops dramatically a year 
before M&A to USD48.3million.  
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6.2.7 Leverage 
Total debt per total asset ratio of companies in the sample is, on average, 24 
overall. This is a little bit higher than the value reported by G7 countries at an 
average of 20 (Rajan & Zingales, 1995).  The minimum value of debt to assets 
ratio is zero, indicating there is existence of total equity companies in the listed 
companies in Asean 5 countries. This is quite common in some other developing 
markets (Wellalage, 2012) There also seems to be on average an increase in 
leverage post-M&A as shown in Table 9 (from 24.71 to 25.60). Further 
investigation in t-test analysis will discover whether these changes are significant 
or otherwise.  
 
6.2.8 Growth 
The average growth among the companies is at the rate of 3.66% with the lowest 
at a negative 100%. With this large variation, again it is interesting to know 
whether differences in growth have any impact before and after M&A, which 
calls for further testing. When compared with the yearly growth, Table 9 shows 
that the average growth decreased from 18.79% to 15.62% after M&A. 
Nevertheless, the highest growth is depicted in the first year after the M&A at 
increased sales of 22.17%.  
 
6.2.9 Age 
The average age of incorporation for the companies until the effective year of 
M&A is 19 years with a median of 15 years. The youngest company is one year 
old while the oldest is 109.  
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6.2.10 M&A: Payment methods and related targets 
There are 41% of companies paying cash for their M&A, 33% using shares and 
20% using a mix of both cash and share payments. It is also noted that only 13% 
of the companies are industry-related to their target companies. 
 
6.2.11 M&A: Toehold 
It is interesting to note that out of 1,013 sample, 77% of the acquirers have 
already owned 5% or more of the target companies. And about 19% of the 
acquirers do actually own more than 50% of the target companies before M&A. 
This may indicate that the acquirers have already built a close relationship with 
the target companies before acquiring at a higher percentage.  
 
6.2.12  M&A: Value of transactions 
The average value of transactions for the M&A companies in Asean 5 is reported 
at USD1.3million at a standard deviation of 2. The minimum total recorded for a 
transaction is USD0.8 million and the highest is USD3.16 million in value. When 
compared with the individual countries in Appendix 3, it is reported that the 
lowest total value is in Malaysia at USD1 million and highest is Singapore at 
USD3.2million. 
 
6.2.13 Industries 
Fifteen industries represent all industries in Asean 5 (except for the financial 
sector): The highest percentage of participation in M&A is from other supplies 
(31.8%) which includes services industries, followed by food (11.5%) and 
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construction (11%).This is in line with what was reported by Metwalli & Tang 
(2002), that manufacturing (including food and construction) and services account 
for 50% of the total M&A industries in Asean 5 countries. 
 
Table 9: Descriptive statistics of companies by year 
 
  N Mean Median Minimum Maximum Skewness 
Performance (Tobin’s q) 
tobin~_3 786 0.98 0.71 - 0.06 9.32 4.267 
tobin~_2 872 1.02 0.75 0.00 10.61 3.903 
tobin~_1 929 1.01 0.71 0.00 10.62 4.062 
Average 
 
1.00 0.72 - 0.02 10.18 4.08 
tobinsq1 950 0.91 0.72 0.08 9.66 5.015 
tobinsq2 929 0.93 0.69 0.12 10.95 5.564 
tobinsq3 721 0.99 0.68 0.00 10.60 4.302 
Average 
 
0.94 0.70 0.07 10.40 4.96 
Company Size (Total Assets) 
ta_3 618 413,000,000 77,200,000 264,600 15,800,000,000 7.94 
ta_2 619 440,000,000 80,000,000 163,915 20,800,000,000 9.38 
ta_1 603 488,000,000 89,500,000 586,823 26,500,000,000 10.21 
Average 
 
447,000,000 82,233,333 338,446 21,033,333,333 9.18 
ta1 555 602,000,000 94,600,000 2,376,337 29,200,000,000 8.96 
ta2 592 635,000,000 110,000,000 2,754,904 32,800,000,000 9.15 
ta3 609 702,000,000 116,000,000 3,440,847 40,900,000,000 10.44 
Average 
 
646,333,333 106,866,667 2,857,363 34,300,000,000 9.52 
Company Size (Total Sales) 
sales_3 821 280000000 49400000 43092 16600000000 10.054 
sales_2 910 310000000 49800000 31972 22700000000 11.151 
sales_1 957 355000000 50700000 6842 33600000000 13.650 
Average 
 
315000000 49966667 27302 24300000000 11.62 
sales1 973 457000000 63800000 58007 57500000000 17.768 
sales2 960 519000000 73300000 33082 47600000000 13.037 
sales3 932 599000000 79900000 4354 63000000000 14.321 
Average 
 
525000000 72333333 31814 56033333333 15.04 
Cash Flows 
cf_3 821 40,400,000 3,868,239 -    361,000,000 4,150,000,000 13.104 
cf_2 910 310,000,000 49,800,000 31,972 22,700,000,000 11.151 
cf_1 958 48,300,000 4,587,964 -    112,000,000 3,810,000,000 11.292 
Average 
 
132,900,000 19,418,734 -     157,656,009 10,220,000,000 11.85 
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cf1 970 55,300,000 5,206,713 -    171,000,000 4,250,000,000 10.212 
cf2 959 64,300,000 5,980,479 -    201,000,000 3,410,000,000 8.599 
cf3 921 64,300,000 6,285,809 - 5,270,000,000 4,460,000,000 2.404 
Average 
 
61,300,000 5,824,334 - 1,880,666,667 4,040,000,000 7.07 
Leverage (Total debt to Total Assets) 
tdta_3 741 24.66 22.22 0.00 163.47 1.249 
tdta_2 806 24.75 20.67 0.01 367.08 5.268 
tdta_1 862 24.72 20.85 0.00 963.55 18.870 
Average 
 
24.71 21.25 0.01 498.03 8.46 
tdta1 916 24.88 22.40 0.00 314.68 4.835 
tdta2 918 25.49 22.13 0.01 307.18 3.701 
tdta3 891 26.44 22.65 0.04 612.53 11.217 
Average 
 
25.60 22.39 0.01 411.46 6.58 
Growth (sales growth) 
SalesGrt_3 701 19.38 8.28 -100 870.59 5.31 
SalesGrt_2 807 15.57 8.47 -100 499.07 3.36 
SalesGrt_1 890 21.42 10.36 -100 928.49 6.38 
Average 
 
18.79 9.03 -  100.00 766.05 5.02 
SalesGrt1 945 22.17 11.17 -96.45 716.39 4.72 
SalesGrt2 947 14.17 8.11 -98.48 443.06 3.33 
SalesGrt3 924 10.52 7.84 -100 481.17 3.06 
Average 
 
15.62 9.04 - 98.31 546.88 3.71 
 
6.3 Pair wise correlation results 
A pair wise correlation matrix between the dependent and independent variables 
in the study is shown in Table 10. The highest correlation is 51.14% between 
dividend to cash flow and dividend to market capitalisation ratios. All the 
dividend ratios and efficiency ratios are shown to be significantly correlated with 
each other, which illustrates their tendency to vary together.  
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Going down the table, PP proxies for dividend (except for dividend to sales ratio) 
show positive and significant correlation coefficients with concentrated ownership 
consisting of large shareholders, large shareholder square and second large 
shareholders. This may offer strong support to the preliminary hypothesis that 
there is evidence of PP conflicts when there are large shareholdings within 
companies in Asean 5 during M&A.  
 
However, ratios of dividend to sales perform differently and do not significantly 
correlate with the concentrated shareholders’ variable. Performance measurement 
using Tobin’s q is only significantly correlated with the large shareholders square 
variable. The asset utilisation ratio to proxy PA agency cost is also not correlated 
as expected with the large shareholder variables. Further tests need to be done to 
understand these relationships. 
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Table 10: Pair-wise Correlation Matrix 
 
  AssetUtil Div/cf Div/earn Div/sales Div/mcap Tobin’s q 
AssetUtil 1.0000           
              
Div/cf 0.0251** 1.0000         
  (-0.048)           
Div/earn 0.0033 0.2861*** 1.0000       
  (-0.7917) (0.0000)         
Div/sales -0.0583* 0.1446*** 0.1168*** 1.0000     
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)       
Div/mcap 0.0653* 0.5114*** 0.3592*** 0.2490*** 1.0000   
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)     
Tobin’s q 0.0150 0.0579*** 0.0157 0.0317** -0.0179 1.0000 
  (0.2490) (0.0000) (0.2305) (0.0153) (0.1695)   
Lag Divcflow 0.0099 0.2676*** 0.1276*** 0.0305** 0.1796*** 0.0066 
  (0.4453) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0188) (0.0000) (0.6157) 
Lag Divearn 0.0042 0.1340*** 0.1092*** 0.0030 0.1058*** 0.0293* 
  (0.7467) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.8154) (0.0000) (0.0272) 
Lag Divsales -0.0630*** 0.1182*** 0.0512*** 0.0360*** 0.1250*** -0.0061 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0052) (0.0000) (0.6485) 
Lag DivMcap 0.0628*** 0.1761*** 0.1299*** 0.0260** 0.2300*** 0.0129 
  (0.0000) (0.0000 (0.0000) (0.0432) (0.0000) (0.3323) 
LargeShareholder 0.0158 0.0653** 0.0736*** 0.0042 0.0647** 0.0260 
  (0.4310) (0.0011 (0.0002) (0.8331) (0.0011) (0.1967) 
SecondLarge 0.0203 0.0576** 0.0530** 0.0248 0.0646** -0.0061 
  (0.3074) (0.0038 (0.0077) (0.2097) (0.0011) (0.7599) 
Lshipsquare 0.0226 0.0935*** 0.0687*** -0.0001 0.0561*** 0.0531* 
  (0.2359) (0.0000) (0.0003) (0.9972) (0.0029) (0.0054) 
L2nshipSquare 0.0114 0.0105 0.0156 0.0157 0.0311* 0.0818* 
  (0.5488) (0.5800) (0.4128) (0.4071) (0.0990) (0.0000) 
Profitability -0.0203 0.0498*** 0.0117 0.0126 0.0561*** 0.0583* 
  (0.1078) (0.0001) (0.3554) (0.3202) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
LagProfitability -0.0193 0.0606*** 0.0128 0.0182 0.0606*** 0.0649* 
  (0.1359) (0.0000) (0.3213) (0.1586) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
cashtota -0.0574*** -0.0042 0.0050 0.0371* -0.0075 -0.0022 
  (0.0000) (0.7552) (0.7143) (0.0060) (0.5758) (0.8735) 
cftosales -0.0003 -0.0022 -0.0018 -0.0029 -0.0127 0.0542* 
  (0.9817) (0.8645) (0.8843) (0.8186) (0.3141) (0.0000) 
tdta -0.0248** -0.1142*** -0.0485*** -0.0446*** -0.0719*** 0.0175 
  (0.0476) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0004) (0.0000) (0.1779) 
lnTA -0.0261*** 0.0514*** 0.0133 0.0142 0.0533*** 0.0206 
  (0.0370) (0.0001) (0.2916) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.1124) 
lnsale 0.2205***  0.1426***   0.0677*** 0.0012  0.1514***   0.0216* 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.3488) (0.9269) (0.0002) (0.0994) 
Taxrate -0.0067 -0.0143 0.0395** -0.0062 0.0510*** -0.0302* 
  (0.6478) (0.3370) (0.0076) (0.6751) (0.0006) (0.0462) 
sales1yrgrth -0.0142 -0.0009 -0.0029 -0.0010 -0.0099 -0.0076 
  (0.2736) (0.9432) (0.8251) (0.9375) (0.4466) (0.5706) 
lnAge -0.0682*** 0.1047*** 0.0625*** 0.0492*** 0.1007*** -0.0331*** 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0004) (0.0000) (0.0208) 
lnValueTrans -0.1077*** -0.0149 -0.0048 0.0916*** 0.0520** -0.0331* 
  (0.0000) (0.5434) (0.8443) (0.0002) (0.0321) (0.0208) 
PayMethod1 -0.0104 -0.0842*** -0.0392** -0.0078 -0.0830*** -0.0333* 
  (0.5935) (0.0000) (0.0430) (0.6832) (0.0000) (0.0859) 
PayMethod2 0.0002 0.0524* 0.0473** -0.0091 0.0588** 0.0312 
  (0.9928) (0.0067) (0.0146) (0.6353) (0.0022) (0.1078) 
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PayMethod3 0.0710* 0.0033 0.0302 0.0265 0.0100 -0.0544** 
  (0.0004) (0.8713) (0.1350) (0.1937) (0.6064) (0.0048) 
RelatedInd1 0.0232 -0.0173 -0.0049 -0.0040 0.0101 0.0372* 
  (0.2238) (0.3624) (0.7967) (0.8339) (0.5912) (0.0515) 
Toehold 0.0013 0.0282 0.0325* -0.0108 0.0479* -0.0268 
  (0.9477) (0.1383) (0.0880) (0.5673) (0.0110) (0.1599) 
dY_3 -0.0042 -0.0186 0.0037 -0.0107 -0.0390** 0.0055 
  (0.7395) (0.1408) (0.7663) (0.3935) (0.0018) (0.6667) 
dY_2 -0.0038 -0.0165 -0.0203 0.0162 -0.0427*** 0.0217* 
  (0.7619) (0.1919) (0.1057) (0.1944) (0.0006) (0.0891) 
dY_1 0.0183 -0.0132 -0.0261** -0.0071 -0.0320** 0.0205 
  (0.1440) (0.2954) (0.0375) (0.5724) (0.0103) (0.1079) 
dY0 -0.0037 0.0069 0.0031 0.0182 0.021* -0.0191 
  (0.7663) (0.5861) (0.8074) (0.1449) (0.0922) (0.1339) 
dY1 0.0060 0.0219* 0.0264** -0.0067 0.0307** -0.0234* 
  (0.6321) (0.0832) (0.0354) (0.5945) (0.0141) (0.0669) 
dY2 -0.0066 0.0076 0.0012 -0.0049 0.0182 -0.0136 
  (0.5975) (0.5458) (0.9264) (0.6965) (0.1453) (0.2885) 
dY3 -0.0063 0.0101 0.0113 -0.0057 0.0409** 0.0107 
  (0.6131) (0.4221) (0.3669) (0.6487) (0.0011) (0.4013) 
dConc5 -0.0093 -0.0366* -0.0259 -0.0134 -0.0463* 0.0191 
  (0.6248) (0.0541) (0.1731) (0.4783) (0.0140) (0.3173) 
dConc102 -0.0287 -0.0298 -0.0384** -0.0170 -0.0512** -0.0293 
  (0.1324) (0.1174) (0.0437 (0.3695) (0.0067) (0.1247) 
dConc202 -0.0029 -0.0471** -0.0379** 0.0377** 0.0174 -0.0545* 
  (0.8809) (0.0132) (0.0464) (0.0460) (0.3567) (0.0043) 
dConc302 0.0391** 0.0125 0.0430* -0.0061 0.0236 0.0082 
  (0.0406) (0.5116) (0.0240) (0.7452) (0.2104) (0.6665) 
dConc402 -0.0095 0.0272 0.0398** -0.0054 0.0301 -0.0094 
  (0.6201) (0.1534) (0.0364) (0.7743) (0.1110) (0.6217) 
dConc502 0.0161 0.0767**** 0.0320* -0.0006 0.0256 0.0766* 
  (0.3998) (0.0001) (0.0929) (0.9748) (0.1755) (0.0001) 
dToehold1 0.0025 -0.0383** -0.0453** 0.0102 -0.0559*** 0.0315* 
  (0.8969 (0.0442) (0.0172) (0.5886) (0.0031) (0.0987) 
dToehold2 -0.0072 -0.0047 0.0101 -0.0012 0.0193 -0.0300 
  (0.7060) (0.8062) (0.5954) (0.9498) (0.3057) (0.1165) 
dToehold3 -0.0142 0.0368** 0.0345* 0.0006 -0.0040 -0.0234 
  (0.4584) (0.0531) (0.0701) (0.9736) (0.8306) (0.2201) 
dToehold4 -0.0026 0.0450** 0.0657*** 0.0030 0.0621*** 0.0208 
  (0.8928) (0.0179) (0.0006) (0.8754) (0.0010) (0.2761) 
dToehold5 -0.0091 0.0177 0.0058 -0.0048 0.0117 -0.0322* 
  (0.6330) (0.3534) (0.7605) (0.7980) (0.5356) (0.0914) 
dToehold6 0.0051 0.0138 0.0175 -0.0104 0.0351** -0.0207 
  (0.7889) (0.4668) (0.3585) (0.5839) (0.0628) (0.2775) 
AcqNat1 0.0163 0.0222** -0.0017 0.0017 0.0216** 0.1028*** 
  (0.1930) (0.0787) (0.8899) (0.8950) (0.0836) (0.0000) 
AcqNat2 -0.0864*** -0.0766*** -0.0521*** -0.0360*** -0.0986*** -0.0771*** 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0040) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
AcqNat3 -0.0004 -0.0333* 0.0106 0.0015 0.0158 -0.0095 
  (0.9745) (0.0083) (0.3960) (0.9066) (0.2047) (0.4560) 
AcqNat4 0.0784*** 0.0633*** 0.0406*** 0.0330** 0.0675*** 0.0474*** 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0012) (0.0084) (0.0000) (0.0002) 
AcqNat5 0.0155 0.0370** 0.0229** 0.0082 0.0478*** 0.0075 
  (0.2155) (0.0034) (0.0683) (0.5139) (0.0001) (0.5591) 
AcqSIC1 0.0219* 0.0399** -0.0025 -0.0044 -0.0082 0.0226* 
  (0.0800) (0.0016) (0.8395) (0.7241) (0.5102) (0.0768) 
AcqSIC2 -0.0324** 0.0127 -0.0063 0.0082 -0.0153 0.0025 
  (0.0095) (0.3128) (0.6132) (0.5128) (0.2202) (0.8432) 
AcqSIC3 -0.0245** -0.0195 -0.0105 -0.0073 -0.0330** -0.0171 
  (0.0501) (0.1230) (0.4033) (0.5601) (0.0082) (0.1808) 
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AcqSIC4 0.0133 -0.0078 -0.0056 -0.0109 -0.0093 -0.0130 
  (0.2859) (0.5382) (0.6547) (0.3854) (0.4571) (0.3090) 
AcqSIC5 0.0313** -0.0262** -0.0073 -0.0156 0.0066 -0.0673* 
  (0.0123) (0.0382) (0.5626) (0.2123) (0.5995) (0.0000) 
AcqSIC6 0.0254** 0.0271** 0.0242** 0.0022 0.0110 -0.0046 
  (0.0418) (0.0319) (0.0541) (0.8611) (0.3778) (0.7190) 
AcqSIC7 0.0154 -0.0092 -0.0128 -0.0098 -0.0153 0.0106 
  (0.2176) (0.4673) (0.3067) (0.4348) (0.2208) (0.4082) 
AcqSIC8 -0.0134 -0.0086 0.0111 -0.0093 0.0157 -0.0735*** 
  (0.2845) (0.4932) (0.3745) (0.4559) (0.2100) (0.0000) 
AcqSIC9 0.0049 -0.0219** 0.0091 -0.0086 0.0350** -0.0304* 
  (0.6971) (0.0831) (0.4695) (0.4929) (0.0050) (0.0172) 
AcqSIC10 -0.0038 0.0171 0.0012 -0.0019 0.0070 -0.0265* 
  (0.7595) (0.1759) (0.9265) (0.8781) (0.5774) (0.0379) 
AcqSIC11 0.0453*** 0.0075 -0.0276** -0.0148 0.0107 0.0191 
  (0.0003) (0.5542) (0.0276) (0.2372) (0.3908) (0.1350) 
AcqSIC11 0.0453*** 0.0075 -0.0276** -0.0148 0.0107 -0.0365* 
  (0.0003) (0.5542) (0.0276) (0.2372) (0.3908) (0.0043) 
AcqSIC13 -0.0645*** 0.0444*** 0.0107 0.0475*** 0.0011 0.0303* 
  (0.0000) (0.0004) (0.3917) (0.0001) (0.9302) (0.0175) 
AcqSIC14 0.0745*** -0.0168 -0.0161 -0.0135 -0.0224**    0.0199 
  (0.0000) (0.1819) (0.1996) (0.2801) (0.0728) (0.1199) 
AcqSIC15 -0.0476*** -0.0214** 0.0151 0.0196 -0.0042 0.0718*** 
  (0.0001) (0.0898) (0.2290) (0.1162) (0.7391) (0.0000) 
 
Pair wise correlations where the symbols ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 
6.4  Analysis of PP and PP conflicts changes associated with 
M&A
14
 
 
This univariate analysis section endeavours to answer Hypotheses 1a and 1b, as 
well as Hypotheses 14a and 14b whether dividends and asset utilisation ratios of 
acquiring companies differ before and after M&A.  Before a t-test analysis can be 
conducted, data in ratio or interval format must be checked in order to satisfy the 
assumptions of normality. In this thesis, data that are being tested for pre- and 
post-M&A are in ratio format and this has met the first assumption. The second 
                                                 
14
 Previous version of this paper was presented at the Multinational Finance Society in Krakow, 
Poland on the 26 June 2012. The authors would like to thank conference participants and an 
anonymous referee for many valuable comments and suggestions. 
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assumption has been explained in Section 5.3.3 which concludes for both 
parametric and non-parametric tests to be explored. Results for parametric and 
non-parametric tests were wholly compatible and hence it is comfortable to use 
parametric test for discussion.  
 
Table 11 reports both the parametric (paired t test) and non-parametric (Wilcoxon 
test) of whether mean and median differ from year to year pre- and post-M&A. 
Year 0 is set as when the M&A deals are effective and completed. To avoid 
drawing conclusions from one set of changes, tests were done for changes in 
different set of years up to three years. In Panel A,  pre-M&A constitutes  minus 1 
to minus 1 year before the M&A while post-M&A denotes plus 1 to plus 1 year 
after M&A. Panel B is for two years pre-and post- M&A, and panel C is for three 
years pre- and post-M&A. 
 
The null hypothesis is that the true mean difference of the two variables is 
assumed to be zero. As for the Wilcoxon signed-rank test, the objective is to 
compare two populations by ranking the data instead of using the variables’ 
means. The results for these tests reported in Table 11 support similar conclusions 
to those obtained with the t-test analysis.  
 
The results in Panel A show that the mean for one-year averages of each variable 
(except for dividend to market capitalisation) had increased ratios but are not 
significant in both tests. This is not surprising since most financial aspects can 
only be materialised usually after one year after consummation of any large 
investment projects.  
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This can be projected in the second year of projection. As can be seen in Panel B, 
the changes show positive significance levels for average of mean ratios for 
dividend to cash flow from 5.62 to 4.65, dividend to earnings from 0.04 to 0.03. 
Dividend to market capitalisation ratio remains positively significant, 
incrementing from 0.73 to 1.16 in the second year of M&A.  
   
Panel C presents the results for mean averages for three years. Dividend to cash 
flows ratio of the acquirer increases significantly from 6.595 to 8.044, dividend to 
earnings from 0.0049 to 0.073 and dividend to market capitalisation from 0.997 to 
1.7222 (the t-and z-statistics are between 3.06 and 5.17). Leverage ratio also 
indicates significant increase from 9.279 to 10.871. However, even though 
dividend to sales ratio and asset utilisation ratio record increased proportion, they 
are not significant in the t-test analysis.  
 
Post-M&A dividend increments after two years show that companies choose to 
pay out more dividends. These increases may occur because of increases in cash 
flows, earnings or the companies’ market capitalisations. Further examinations for 
these data using one-way sample by year reveal that all the said denominators are 
also significantly increasing. It is noted that the Kruskal-Wallis test is a 
nonparametric alternative to the one-way analysis of variance F-test. The results 
are shown in Appendix 4.   
 
These one-sample tests may indicate that companies choose to pay out more 
dividends to shareholders after M&A. No change in dividends one year after 
M&A is rational since the companies have been using their resources to subsidise 
     
172 
 
the M&A. Increased leverage is only revealed after the third year of M&A. This is 
consistent with findings by Ghosh & Jain (2000) who suggest that M&A 
companies may be taking on additional long term debt as an outcome of their 
activities.  
 
Different results for ratio of dividend to sales specify a need for further attention 
to this variable. However, when dividend to net sales is used as a proxy in the 
regression models, the results confirm insignificant results (but with positive 
signs) with the main explanatory variables. This could be because net sales are 
imputed after deduction of liabilities (includes liabilities from target companies). 
Furthermore, unlike studies undertaken in mature markets, the asset utilisation 
ratio or total sales-total asset ratio (proxy for PA conflicts) does not show a 
significant change pre- and post-M&A in all three panels. This supports the view 
so far, that principal-agent conflicts may not be the agency problem in Asean 5, 
particularly in an M&A setting that calls for further investigation. 
 
6.5 Summary 
This chapter provides an empirical investigation into the descriptive and changes 
of proxies for PP and PA conflicts in Asean 5 companies associated with M&A.  
This study employs a final sample of 807 public listed, acquiring companies that 
had completed at least one M&A exercise from years of 2000 to 2008. By 
comparing each country, Malaysia and Singapore have the most active M&A 
markets. The companies in these two countries also seem to perform relatively 
better than the other three countries; Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines.   
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It is argued that these proxy variables may reflect the agency conflicts that arise 
from the large, controlling shareholders or PP utilising M&A as a way to 
expropriate the minority shareholders. So far, univariate analyses indicate that 
three measures of dividend payout ratios of the sample companies vary noticeably 
in the second year after the M&A becomes effective. Hence, Hypotheses 1a and 
1b can be accepted that conclude significant changes in dividends occur before 
and after Asean 5 M&A which compels further advanced regression analysis to be 
conducted. 
 
On the other hand, PA conflicts tested in univariate analysis, do not show any 
significant changes yearly or even pre- and post-M&A. This may indicate that PA 
conflict is less of a concern in companies with concentrated ownership structures 
as indicated by emerging market research. Therefore, Hypotheses 14a and 14b 
cannot be accepted whereby no changes occur for asset utilisation ratios before 
and after M&A for acquiring companies in Asean 5.   
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Table 11:  PP conflicts and PA conflicts changes associated with M&A 
Testing for: Hypotheses 1a and 1b, 14a and 14b whether dividends and asset utilisation ratios of acquiring companies differ before and after M&A.  
Paired t-test  
     
Wilcoxon signed-rank test 
     
Mean Values Div/CF 
Div/Ear
n 
Div/Sal
es 
Div/Mca
p 
Asset 
Util TD/TA Sum ranks Div/CF 
Div/Ear
n 
Div/Sal
es 
Div/Mca
p 
Asset 
Util TD/TA 
Panel A: 1-year averages before and after M&A   
Averages for period -1 2.4557 0.016026 0.558 0.316 0.137 3.321 Negatives for period -1 581 579 583 572 925 862 
Averages for period 1 2.920907 0.027718 0.666 0.641 0.136 3.552 Positives for period 1 616 614 628 624 965 916 
Increase/Decrease 0.465 0.012 0.109 0.324 -0.001 0.231  Adjusted variance 9.7 9.95 1.02 1.01 1.42 1.36 
Test statistics (t-stat) not sig not sig not sig (3.12)*** not sig not sig 
Test statistics (z-
stat) not sig not sig not sig not sig not sig 
not sig 
Panel B: 2-year averages before and after M&A   
Averages for period -
2 to 0 4.650536 0.031184 1.107 0.731 0.254 
6.431 
Negatives for period 
-2 to 0 1110 1069 1115 1087 1787 
1668 
Averages for period 2 
to 0 5.623891 0.049587 1.41 1.161 0.266 
7.199 
Positives for period 
2 to 0 1216 1221 1236 1232 1925 
1834 
Increase/Decrease 0.973 0.018 0.303 0.43 0.012 0.768  Adjusted variance 1.55 1.6 1.63 1.63 2.02 1.98 
Test statistics (t-
stat) (2.62)*** (2.92)*** not sig 
(2.94)**
* not sig 
not sig 
Test statistics (z-
stat) (2.45)** (2.81)** (2.65)** (3.90)** not sig 
(3.08)** 
Panel C: 3-year averages before and after M&A   
Averages for period -
3 to 0 6.595 0.049 1.544 0.997 0.362 
9.279 
Negatives for period 
-3 to 0 1603 1583 1623 1578 2573 
2409 
Averages for period 3 
to 0 8.044 0.073 1.971 1.722 0.393 10.871 
Positives for period 
3 to 0 1759 1769 1779 1776 2857 
2725 
Increase/Decrease 1.448 0.024 0.426 0.725 0.031 1.592 Adjusted variance  1.86 1.92 1.96 1.96 2.18 2.18 
Test statistics (t-
stat) (3.32)*** (3.17)*** not sig (4.25)*** not sig 
(3.74)**
* 
 Test statistics (z-
stat) (3.20)** (3.69)** (3.06)** (5.17)** (4.13)** 
(4.65)*
* 
Tests for statistically significant differences between the years and dependent variables are from t-tests (for means) and Wilcoxon rank-sum (i.e. Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon) 
tests for each of the four measures of differences in dividends (PP proxy) and asset utilisation (PA proxy).  The Wilcoxon tests are technically for the equality of the 
distributions rather than medians per se.  The symbols ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively 
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CHAPTER 7: FINDINGS FOR PP CONFLICTS IN ASEAN 5 
M&A: MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter presents the results for the multivariate analyses of PP and PA 
conflicts with ownership, financial performance and M&A variables in Asean 5 
acquiring companies.  These evaluations are to test for Hypotheses 2a to 14c of 
Chapter 4 in this study. This chapter is organised as follows. Section 7.2 shows 
the specification test results to confirm the appropriateness of the models being 
used for discussion. Section 7.3 provides discussion using various regression 
analysis including Ordinary Least Square (OLS) and Hausman-Taylor (HT), 
Section 7.4 provides Tobit regression test results and discussion. Section 7.5 then 
discusses other robust analysis using fixed-effects vector decomposition (FEVD) 
analysis and finally, Section 7.6 concludes the chapter. 
 
7.2 Specification test results  
7.2.1 Multicollinearity test using VIF values 
The results for Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) values are presented in Table 12. 
The mean values for independent variables for each dependent proxy is 1.59 
which is much lower than the threshold of 10. Furthermore, VIF values for each 
independent variable are also very low. This indicates that the explanatory 
variables included in the model are not substantially correlated with each other. 
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Table 12: Variance inflation factor (VIF) values for dependent and  
independent variables  
 
Dependent 
variables 
Div/Cashflow Div/Earn Div/Sales Div/MktCap Asset/Util 
Independent 
variables 
VIF 1/VIF 1/VIF 1/VIF VIF 1/VIF VIF 1/VIF VIF 1/VIF 
                      
Lagearnasset 3.77 0.2649 3.76 0.2657 3.77 0.2655 3.76 0.2659 3.76 0.2658 
Earnasset 3.75 0.2669 3.76 0.2661 3.75 0.2668 3.74 0.2670 3.74 0.2671 
Lncashflow 1.97 0.5077 1.95 0.5132 1.96 0.5107 1.96 0.5097 1.97 0.5080 
lnTotalAssets 1.69 0.5920 1.7 0.5899 1.68 0.5936 1.69 0.5914 1.68 0.5943 
Year0 1.34 0.7455 1.35 0.7434 1.35 0.7417 1.34 0.7467 1.34 0.7490 
LagValTrans 1.32 0.7575 1.32 0.7577 1.33 0.7533 1.32 0.7572 1.32 0.7555 
Age 1.1 0.9075 1.1 0.9102 1.11 0.9049 1.1 0.9051 1.11 0.8988 
RelatedInd1 1.07 0.9378 1.07 0.9378 1.07 0.9371 1.07 0.9376 1.07 0.9367 
PayMethod2 1.07 0.9389 1.05 0.9537 1.05 0.9508 1.05 0.9542 1.05 0.9538 
PayMethod1 1.05 0.9534 1.07 0.9355 1.07 0.9385 1.06 0.9415 1.06 0.9402 
Large Share 1.05 0.9551 1.03 0.9665 1.03 0.9669 1.04 0.9597 1.04 0.9627 
sales1yrgrth 1.03 0.9731 1.03 0.9733 1.03 0.9735 1.03 0.9719 1.03 0.9663 
Tdta 1.03 0.9709 1.03 0.9738 1.04 0.9606 1.03 0.9702 1.04 0.9650 
LagDivCFlow 1.04 0.9634                 
LagDivEbitda     1.03 0.9723             
LagDivSales         1.05 0.9491         
LagDivMktCa
p             1.04 0.96535     
LagAssetUtil                 1.05 0.9533 
Mean VIF 1.59   1.59   1.59   1.59   1.59   
Note: The mean values for independent variables for each dependent proxy is 1.59<10: 
explanatory variables are not substantially correlated with each other. 
 
7.2.2  Durbin-Watson-Hausman (DWH) Test 
The possible endogeneity between ownership and dividend as proxies for PP 
conflicts is tested using a DWH test. The coefficient results are shown in Table 13 
and confirm that variables (denoted by*) and company variable proxies have 
significant endogeneity problems, suggesting a need to address the issue of 
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potential endogeneity. These variables include large shareholder, lag dividend and 
lag profitability.   
 
Table 13: DWH test for endogeneity 
 
 Div/cflow Div/Earns Div/Sales Divi/Mcap Tobin’sQ AssetUtil 
LargeShareholder 2.180155** 0.016687** 0.011466* 0.002502** -0.002952 0.000894 
LagDivCFlow 5.100339*      
Earnasset -0.000000*  -0.000000 -0.000000 -0.000000 0.000000 
LagEarnasset 0.000000  -0.000000 0.000000 0.000000* -0.000000 
LagDivEbitda  -0.007553**     
LagDivSales   -0.001226    
Lagdivmcap    0.117222** 0.130201 1.069433** 
The coefficient results are shown in Table 13 and confirm that variables (denoted by*) 
and company variable proxies have significant endogeneity problems 
 
Hence, to overcome these endogeneity problems, previous studies used a two 
stage least square (2SLS) method (Bena & Hanousek, 2008; Reddy, 2010; Rubin 
& Smith, 2009). However, 2SLS requires the identification of instruments or IV 
that are correlated with endogenous variables and uncorrelated with the error term 
of the model. Table 13 also shows that most lag dividend variables have 
endogeneity effects on the dependent variables that will not enable for 
identification of instruments variable to be suitable. Furthermore, it has been 
discussed at length how this study also involves time-invariant variables that 
would hamper the possibilities of using 2SLS method. The outcome of continuing 
with 2SLS will result in misinterpretation of coefficients.  
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7.3 Findings from multivariate analyses 
7.3.1 Principal-principal conflicts and large shareholders 
In order to address these challenges of endogeneity and identification of 
appropriate IV, Hausman-Taylor (HT) analysis is used instead. HT takes into 
consideration the fixed effect estimator by allowing for the estimation effect of 
time-invariant variables, even though they are correlated with    . Furthermore HT 
estimator maintains the benefit of both the fixed effect estimator (correlation 
between individual effects and regressors) and the random effect estimator (taking 
into account the time-invariant regressors).  
 
The positive coefficients denote a positive relationship between explanatory 
variables and dependent variables, and negative coefficients denote a negative 
relationship between the explanatory variables with the PP/PA conflict proxies. 
The appropriateness of using Hausman-Taylor (HT) techniques was discussed in 
Section 5.3.5. Time-variant and time-invariant variables are included in the 
model, which compromise the suitability of using other methods such as FE or RE 
that will result in bias coefficients for each variable. Furthermore, all time-
invariant variables such as large shareholders and M&A control variables in 
columns 2, 8 and 14 are omitted from the FE analysis because of its fixed-time 
nature.  
 
Table 14 presents the results for the Hausman-Taylor regression analysis relating 
to principal-principal conflicts. Columns 1-6 in Panel A of the table show PP 
conflicts using ratio of dividend to cash flows, columns 7-12 in Panel B with the 
ratio of dividend to earnings, and columns 13 to 18 in Panel C with the ratio of 
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dividends to market capitalisation. A dummy variable of t = 0 is set for the year 
M&A and is effective.  
 
Each regression also reports the joint significance in Wald test shown in the 
regression summary statistics. These tests are structured so that the null 
hypothesis is not rejected. It can be concluded that the model performs rather 
poorly, alternatively if the test does reject the null, then the model is good, valid 
or the best (Verbeek, 2008).   
 
All the models in Table 14 with the different regression analysis show similar 
results, especially in testing the main ownership variable of large shareholder. The 
Wald test significance of each model shows that the slopes of coefficients are 
jointly zero; that the models successfully describe y as the regression alternative. 
This means that a significant model would reject the null hypothesis and assume 
that independent variables are consistent and have an effect on the dependent 
variable.  The last three columns in Panels A, B and C are using HT analysis that 
include large shareholder as endogenous variable.  
 
The results generated in all three panels show that there are positively significant 
relationships between the PP proxies with large shareholder in each model. The 
results are also significant even after controlling for country and industry effects 
(columns 5, 6, 11, 12, 17 and 18). More dividends are allocated for payouts with 
higher shareholdings by the largest shareholder. These results are in accord with 
Hypothesis 2a that PP conflicts increased with large shareholders with M&A 
control variables in the model.  
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The results are consistent with other developed market studies that state larger 
shareholders do influence the dividend ratio policy (Faccio, et al., 2001b; 
Thomsen, 2005; Truong & Heaney, 2007). However, as explained in the 
literature, instead of saying the expropriation is lower with higher dividend; this 
thesis argues that the higher payout of dividend after M&A indicates higher 
expropriation. This has been proven inclusively so far, in both the univariate 
(Chapter 6) and these multivariate analyses.    
 
7.3.2 PP conflicts and other financial variables 
Lags of dividends (t-1) are incorporated in the model as explained in Section 
5.2.2.3. This is important as the lags are usually included as the control 
determinants of the dividend ratio policy to be implemented in the current year. 
These positively significant relationships are manifested across Panels B and C 
for dividends to earnings and dividends to market capitalisation.  
 
This supports studies on payout ratio of listed companies in a fast-growing market 
where the current dividends are affected by their pasts and their future prospects 
(Abdulrahman, 2007). However, insignificant relationships for past dividend to 
cash flows may indicate that the dividend ratio policies may be based on 
published earnings rather from cash flows (Andres, et al., 2009). The insignificant 
correlation between dividend and cash flows shown in Table 10 (correlation 
matrix) may affirm this speculation.  
 
The hypothesised negative relationship between PP conflicts with leverage 
(Hypothesis 6) and sales growth (Hypothesis 7); however only dividend to 
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earnings are significant. Size of company (ln total assets) (Hypothesis 8) is 
negatively significant (dividend to earnings) in its relationship on PP conflicts 
associated with M&A. 
 
These results support findings by Abdulrahman (2007) who states that within the 
limited study on emerging market age, leverage nor growth (negative but also 
insignificant) have no impact on the amount paid in dividend. The negative 
relationship with PP conflicts and leverage may also inconclusively explain why 
large shareholders having the incentive to expropriate wealth from debtholders by 
investing in risky and high expected return projects (Myers, 1977).  
 
Positive coefficients (though insignificant) for the age of incorporation (ln Age) 
support Hypotheses 9 that state a positive relationship between PP conflicts. This 
shows that while controlling for a number of factors, older companies in Asean 5 
seem to pay higher dividends. This is in line with findings by Al-Malkawi (2007) 
who states that older and more stable companies usually pay higher dividends as 
compared to the younger companies. 
 
The significant negative finding indicates that the main reason for M&A in Asean 
5 may not be that these acquiring companies are bigger. In fact, some of the South 
East Asian companies, family-owned companies which are predominant in East 
Asia, remain small even at their maturity stage and are not so keen to create large 
business groups (Nam, 2001). 
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7.3.3 PP conflicts and M&A control variables 
The year of M&A as denoted at t=0 shows a significant relationship, showing that 
there is an increase in PP conflicts in the year concerned. However, there are no 
significant relationships with the other M&A control variables: method of 
payments, relatedness of acquisition and toehold with the amount of PP conflicts. 
 
Even though insignificant, the negative signs for related acquisition signify that 
PP conflicts may confirm suggestions by Bae et al. (2002) and Holmen and Knopf 
(2004) that expropriation is more likely when acquirer and target are from the 
different industries.  
 
7.3.4 PP conflicts and country and industry variables 
This section discusses the comparative results of PP conflicts between countries in 
Asean 5 and among the 15 industries. Appendix 5 reveals significant positive 
signs on the dummy variable, Malaysia, in the HT regressions (except dividend to 
market capitalisation). This may indicate that Malaysian companies with large 
shareholders pay higher dividend rates than the other four countries. The first 
proxy using dividend to cashflow also shows the dummy coefficients in Thailand 
and Singapore are positive and significant.  
 
In contrast, the dummy variables for Indonesia and Philippines show negative but 
insignificant signs with PP conflicts. This is however, uncertain because these two 
countries only represent 2% of the overall sample in this analysis (as explained in 
Table 7 in Section 6.1 Table 7 which summarises the number and percentage of 
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effective deals in the final sample when compared with the actual effective deals 
and values of M&A in Asean 5 region).  
 
In terms of PP conflicts impact by industry, some of the dummy indicators do 
show some significant results. Four industries, food, clothes, transportation and 
retail stores seem to be unanimously significant in bringing about PP conflicts. 
Other industry that may have an impact, based on using two out of the three proxy 
specifications, is the steel industry. These results support Michel’s (1979) 
conjecture, that industry is the determinant of dividend but not company size.        
 
In summary, the main variables used in the model appear to be significant shown 
in the results showing differences to the intercepts of the PP conflicts’ model 
across these indicators. Furthermore, these variables remain significant even after 
controlling for other explanatory variables to control for unobservable industry 
and country effects. This underlines the interpretation of substantial relationships 
between PP conflicts using dividends and other explanatory variables.  
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Table 14: Panel data OLS, fixed effects, Hausman-Taylor (HT) regression results for principal-principal conflicts (large shareholders) 
(Testing for: Hypotheses 2a, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11a, 11b, 12 and 13) 
 
 
Panel A:  Ratio of dividend to cashflow Panel B: Ratio of dividend to earnings 
 
Panel C: Ratio of dividend to market 
capitalisation 
Method 
OLS FE RE HT HT 
(ctry) 
HT(ind) OLS FE RE HT 
HT 
(ctry) 
HT(ind) OLS FE RE HT 
HT 
(ctry) 
HT(ind) 
Columns 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
Large 
Shareholder 
0.3084 
(4.43)*** 
  
  
0.3079 
(4.12)*** 
2.0432 
(2.27)** 
1.7549 
(2.1)* 
2.0922 
(3.33)*** 
0.0037 
(2.94)*** 
  
  
0.0040 
(3.08)*** 
0.0585 
(3.34)*** 
0.0596 
(4.10)*** 
0.0598 
(3.97)*** 
0.0003 
(2.42)*** 
  
  
0.0003 
(2.42)*** 
0.0060 
(2.49)** 
0.0051 
(1.93)* 
0.0062 
(1.94)* 
LagDivCFlow 
9.3200 
(4.14)*** 
-0.4441 
(0.1500) 
7.9713 
(3.57)** 
-0.1050 
(0.0300) 
-0.1072 
(0.0400) 
-0.0202 
(0.0100) 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
LagDivEbitda 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
0.0756 
(1.6200) 
-0.4599 
(8.63)*** 
0.1001 
(2.13)** 
-0.4386 
(9.32)*** 
-0.4308 
(8.77)*** 
-0.4338 
(8.94)*** 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
LagDivMcap 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
  
  
0.0905 
(2.13)** 
-0.3030 
(5.48)*** 
0.0905 
(2.13)** 
-0.2804 
(5.69)*** 
-0.2838 
(6.15)*** 
-0.2911 
(6.20)*** 
Profitability 
  
0.0000 
(0.9800) 
0.0000 
(0.3700) 
0.0000 
(1.0300) 
0.0000 
(1.4000) 
0.0000 
(1.3400) 
0.0000 
(0.4200) 
0.0046 
(0.1400) 
0.0665 
(0.9400) 
  
  
0.0095 
(0.1800) 
-0.0135 
(0.2600) 
-0.0061 
(0.1200) 
0.0000 
(0.3400) 
0.0000 
(0.2800) 
0.0000 
(0.3400) 
0.0000 
(0.7300) 
0.0000 
(0.5400) 
0.0000 
(0.4200) 
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LagProfitabitliy 
  
0.0000 
(0.4900) 
0.0000 
(0.8700) 
0.0000 
(0.5600) 
0.0000 
(0.1800) 
5.7800 
(1.5600) 
0.0000 
(0.5800) 
0.3585 
(3.31)*** 
0.2703 
(2.08)** 
  
  
0.2570 
(2.26)** 
0.2455 
(2.08)** 
0.2489 
(2.13)** 
0.0000 
(0.3600) 
0.0000 
(0.3600) 
0.0000 
(0.3600) 
0.0000 
(0.2200) 
0.0000 
(0.4000) 
0.0000 
(0.4700) 
TDTA 
  
-0.2374 
(3.84)*** 
-0.0120 
(0.1100) 
-0.2204 
(3.49)*** 
-0.1165 
(1.3100) 
-0.0464 
(1.2800) 
-0.0770 
(0.9100) 
-0.0019 
(1.65)* 
0.0038 
-1.1700 
-0.0008 
(1.3900) 
0.0013 
(0.5700) 
0.0003 
(0.1500) 
0.0006 
(0.2800) 
-0.0002 
(2.31)** 
0.0001 
(0.6100) 
-0.0002 
(2.31)** 
0.0001 
(0.7700) 
0.0001 
(0.3100) 
0.0001 
(0.3900) 
lnTotalAssets 
  
0.1871 
(0.8100) 
0.0933 
(0.2500 
0.1682 
(0.7500) 
0.1136 
(0.3700) 
4.5822 
(1.2100) 
0.1329 
(0.4600) 
-0.0206 
(2.80)*** 
-0.0171 
(2.01)** 
-0.0006 
(0.1700) 
-0.0195 
(2.66)*** 
-0.0201 
(2.64)*** 
-0.0199 
(2.64)*** 
0.0000 
(0.0200) 
-0.0002 
(0.2300) 
0.0000 
(0.0200) 
-0.0003 
(0.4800) 
-0.0002 
(0.3800) 
 
-0.0002 
(0.2700) 
 
Sales1YrGrth 
  
-0.0426 
(1.3500) 
-0.0465 
(1.0600) 
-0.0422 
(1.3600) 
-0.0449 
(1.1700) 
-0.0512 
(1.4600) 
-0.0464 
(1.2800) 
-0.0009 
(1.5400) 
-0.0015 
(2.02)** 
-0.0006 
(1.0400) 
-0.0013 
(2.16)** 
-0.0013 
(2.09)** 
-0.0013 
(2.10)** 
-0.0001 
(1.7000) 
-0.0001 
(0.9900) 
-0.0001 
(1.7000) 
-0.0001 
(1.1600) 
-0.0001 
(1.2500) 
-0.0001 
    
(1.2400)  
Beta 
0.1315 
(0.0700) 
  
  
-0.0260 
(0.0100) 
6.6197 
(1.4600) 
5.8034 
(1.1800) 
6.8900 
(1.5200) 
0.0481 
(1.4500) 
  
  
0.0425 
(1.2600) 
0.2257 
(1.6300) 
0.2774 
(2.26)** 
0.2509 
(2.00)** 
-0.0008 
(0.2300) 
   
-0.0008 
(0.2300) 
0.0177 
(1.1600) 
0.0174 
(0.9600) 
0.0192 
(0.9100) 
Ln Age 
  
5.0338 
(2.57)** 
1.1860 
0.0600 
5.0357 
(2.43)** 
4.8198 
(1.5300) 
0.1175 
(0.7400) 
4.5822 
(1.2100) 
0.0732 
(2.13)** 
-0.0416 
(0.1100) 
0.0702 
(2.00)** 
0.0489 
(0.4100) 
0.0214 
(0.2000) 
0.0321 
(0.2900) 
0.0120 
(3.22)*** 
-0.0072 
-0.1900 
0.0120 
(3.22)** 
0.0127 
-1.0800 
0.0099 
-0.7600 
0.0100 
-0.6700 
dY0 
  
5.5357 
(1.77)* 
5.9176 
-1.9400 
5.5970 
1.88* 
5.4472 
-1.6400 
5.4647 
(1.90)* 
5.5622 
(1.93)* 
0.4089 
(3.67)*** 
0.3821 
(3.00)*** 
0.0950 
-1.6500 
0.3702 
(3.32)*** 
0.3578 
(3.08)*** 
0.3611 
(3.14)*** 
0.0108 
(1.82)* 
0.0140 
(2.35)** 
0.0108 
(1.82)* 
0.0137 
(2.56)** 
0.0137 
(2.75)*** 
0.0137 
(2.70)*** 
lnValueTransacton 
  
-0.4313 
(0.6400) 
  
  
-0.3362 
(0.4700) 
-0.8327 
(0.7200) 
-0.6561 
(0.5200) 
-1.1584 
(0.6800) 
0.0097 
(0.8800) 
  
  
0.0106 
(0.8800) 
-0.0361 
(0.8000) 
-0.0332 
(0.8700) 
-0.0364 
(0.9100) 
0.0019 
(1.5200) 
  
  
0.0019 
(1.5200) 
0.0006 
(0.1300) 
0.0009 
(0.1700) 
-0.0006 
(0.1000) 
PaymentCash 13.3434   11.9187 35.7930 30.0879 32.5396 0.0102   0.0545 0.7582 0.6204 0.6118 0.0083   0.0083 0.0812 0.0601 0.0889 
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  (1.2000)   (1.0100) (1.6300) (1.3600) (1.3900) (0.0500)   (0.2700) (0.9500) (0.9200) (0.8800) (0.3900)   (0.3900) (1.0000) (0.6800) (0.8400) 
PaymentShares 
  
-2.9095 
(0.5100) 
  
  
-2.8100 
(0.4600) 
5.1839 
(0.5400) 
5.3155 
(0.5200) 
5.8844 
(0.5100) 
0.0693 
(0.7200) 
  
  
0.0788 
(0.8000) 
0.2882 
(0.7700) 
0.2286 
(0.7200) 
0.2571 
(0.7700) 
0.0049 
(0.4500) 
  
  
0.0049 
(0.4500) 
0.0219 
(0.5800) 
0.0153 
(0.3700) 
0.0075 
(0.1500) 
PaymentMixed 
  
-4.4706 
(0.7600) 
  
  
-4.6216 
(0.7400) 
1.3271 
(0.1400) 
5.8600 
(0.5300) 
7.5014 
(0.6100) 
0.0643 
(0.6500) 
  
  
0.0665 
(0.6600) 
0.1819 
(0.4800) 
0.3042 
(0.9000) 
0.3351 
(0.9400) 
0.0012 
(0.1100) 
  
  
0.0012 
(0.1100) 
0.0137 
(0.3600) 
0.0188 
(0.4200) 
0.0085 
(0.1600) 
RelatedInd 
  
0.0868 
(0.0200)) 
  
  
-0.0683 
(0.0100) 
5.8387 
(0.7500) 
3.5162 
(0.4300) 
4.7053 
(0.5200) 
-0.0086 
(0.1100) 
  
  
-0.0331 
(0.4200) 
0.2426 
(0.8000) 
0.2262 
(0.8800) 
0.2488 
(0.9300) 
-0.0126 
(1.5200) 
  
  
-0.0126 
(1.5200) 
0.0038 
(0.1200) 
-0.0006 
(0.0200) 
-0.0005 
(0.0100) 
Toehold 
  
0.0144 
(0.2100) 
  
  
0.0184 
(0.2500) 
-0.0570 
(0.4700) 
-0.0295 
(0.2300) 
-0.0723 
(0.4900) 
0.0009 
(0.7500) 
  
  
0.0010 
(0.7900) 
-0.0020 
(0.4000) 
-0.0005 
(0.1300) 
-0.0016 
(0.3600) 
0.0000 
(0.2400) 
  
  
0.0000 
(0.2400) 
-0.0002 
(0.3900) 
0.0000 
(0.0900) 
0.0000 
(0.0700) 
Country control         Included Included         Included Included         Included Included 
Industry Control           Included           Included           Included 
Constant -44.770 -27.399 -43.609 
-
112.511 
-
131.151 
-
152.2564 
-0.2534 0.2314 -0.2982 -2.2045 -2.3657 -2.7449 0.007011 0.114052 0.007011 
-
0.152397 
-
0.13613 
-0.254316 
  (2.64)*** -0.4100 (2.46)*** (2.89)** (2.66)*** (2.91)** (1.75)* -0.2200 (2.04)** (2.87)*** (2.42)** (2.46)** -0.22 -0.86 -0.22 -1.4 -0.93 -0.92 
Observations 669 669 669 669 669 669.0000 746 746 732 746 746 746 683 683 683 683 683 683 
R-squared/RHO 0.1400 0.0200 0.2345 0.3847 0.5576 0.6326 0.0600 0.1528 0.1886 0.8900 0.8397 0.8541 0.0683 0.4604   0.8672 0.9049 0.9234 
F-Stat/Wald Chi 6.15*** 0.8400 87.51*** 28.47* 28.18* 33.38* 2.89*** 10.21***   102.4*** 95.3*** 97.73*** 2.87*** 4.42***   49.89*** 53.55*** 53.93** 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses (* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%) 
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7.3.5 Principal-principal conflicts and large shareholder square 
The probability that the relationship between PP conflicts and large shareholders 
is not strictly linear but rather curvilinear is explored. Evidence such a 
relationship exists is argued by Gugler & Yurtoglu (2003) and Maury & Pajuste  
(2002) where they affirm that dividend ratio is lower at minor level of 
shareholding but increases as the percentage in shareholdings grows. This affirms 
and do not reject Hypotheses 3a and 3b. 
 
The question of whether PP and large shareholders experience a non-linear 
relationship is tested in the next models. Table 15 presents regression results using 
HT analysis by testing PP proxy with large shareholder square as one of the 
explanatory variables to identify this relationship. The Wald chi-square test 
indicates that all specifications as a whole are statistically significant.  
 
The estimated coefficients for large shareholders remain generally positive and 
statistically significant in all analysis of different dividend ratios. When the 
additional variable of large shareholder squared is introduced in the model, the 
estimated coefficients, albeit small are negative and statistically significant across 
models (except for dividend to cash flow for column 1 in Panel A).  
 
This is a notable finding that may suggest a concave relationship, where, as the 
shareholder becomes larger, the dividend payout ratios lessen. This relationship 
contradicts typical studies involving dividend policies and concentrated 
ownership where the researchers predict a convex or U-shaped relation (Allen & 
Michaely, 2002; Truong & Heaney, 2007). This is another situation that explains 
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further how the relationships attained in mature markets are the opposite of what 
can be found in these Asean 5 markets.   
  
This outcome could also possibly be caused by tax. Due to higher costs of 
dividends because of higher tax payments, large shareholders may deter from 
allowing more dividends to be paid out (La Porta, et al., 2000a). However, no 
empirical evidence in research can confirm the effect that tax has on corporate 
dividend policies because of the pronounced difference in the portfolios of high-
to-low tax. For example, certain clauses allow for companies, such as Thailand, to 
be exempted from paying tax. However, the full amount may be excluded from 
taxable income if the recipient is a company listed in the Stock Exchange of 
Thailand or the recipient owns at least 25% of the distributing company's capital 
interest. (Kalay & Michaeley, 2000). Nevertheless, to investigate this relationship, 
further analysis will include tax-advantage of retained earnings as a control 
variable using calculation method by La Porta et al. (2000a). 
 
Appendix 7 presents the results controlling for dividend tax advantage as one of 
the explanatory variables. The predicted insignificant coefficient results for all 
specifications confirm the notion that tax payments do not influence dividend 
policy. This is supported and interpreted by La Porta et al. (2000a) that tax 
payment has already been capitalised in the value of the company.  
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Table 15: Panel data Hausman-Taylor (HT) regression results for principal-
principal conflicts with large shareholder square 
(Testing: Hypotheses 3a and 3b) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 Panel A:  Ratio of dividend to 
cashflow 
Panel A:  Ratio of dividend to earnings Panel A:  Ratio of dividend to market 
capitalisation 
Large Shareholder 3.636683 
(1.67)* 
3.697277 
(2.34)** 
3.702824 
(2.20)** 
0.120343 
(1.97)* 
0.134626 
(2.08)* 
0.040345 
(1.75)** 
0.019501 
(2.81)*** 
0.017442 
(2.80)*** 
0.018342 
(2.95)*** 
Large Shareholder 
Square 
-0.028112 
(1.43) 
-0.029592 
(2.08)** 
-0.029823 
(1.93)* 
-0.001045 
(1.84)* 
-0.001142 
(1.92)* 
-0.001192 
(2.01)** 
-0.000176 
(2.75)*** 
-0.000155 
(2.74)*** 
-0.000163 
(2.89)*** 
LagDivCFlow 1.819004 
(0.60) 
5.025639 
(1.52)* 
5.270719 
(1.55)* 
      
LagDivEarn    -0.307874 
(3.95)*** 
-0.137732 
(2.75)** 
-4.128836 
(2.02)** 
LagDivMCap    -0.389851 
(4.23)*** 
-0.405148 
(5.40)*** 
-0.394815 
(4.60)*** 
Profitability -0.000000 
(0.97) 
-1.262901 
(0.48) 
-1.285536 
(0.49) 
-0.026770 
(0.41) 
-0.035145 
(0.98) 
-0.019023 
(0.28) 
-0.000000 
(0.22) 
-0.000000 
(0.38) 
-0.000000 
(0.39) 
LagProfitability 0.000000 
(0.53) 
7.923617 
(1.01) 
8.532346 
(1.05) 
0.258552 
(1.39) 
0.289559 
(2.67)** 
0.250491 
(1.42) 
0.000000 
(0.20) 
0.000000 
(0.12) 
0.000000 
(0.09) 
TDTA -0.077554 
(0.79) 
-0.118912 
(1.19) 
-0.130409 
(1.29) 
0.000036 
(0.01) 
0.000157 
(0.06) 
0.000317 
(0.11) 
-0.000041 
(0.36) 
-0.000029 
(0.31) 
-0.000033 
(0.31) 
lnTotalAssets 0.234187 
(0.72) 
-0.690645 
(1.36) 
-0.735150 
(1.40) 
-0.020218 
(1.68)** 
-0.020064 
(1.87) 
-0.020035 
(1.77)* 
0.000496 
(0.76) 
0.000517 
(0.97) 
0.000504 
(0.83) 
Sales1YrGrth -0.046263 
(1.14) 
-0.026250 
(0.65) 
-0.024848 
(0.60) 
-0.001088 
(1.13)** 
-0.001255 
(1.42) 
-0.001206 
(1.29) 
-0.000073 
(0.60) 
-0.000078 
(0.78) 
-0.000071 
(0.63) 
LnAge 10.068023 
(1.92)* 
10.506288 
(2.58)** 
10.608973 
(2.47)** 
0.229592 
(1.80)** 
0.218945 
(1.57)* 
0.239534 
(1.66)* 
0.034707 
(2.08)** 
0.031094 
(1.99)** 
0.034687 
(2.16)** 
dY0 5.370828 
(1.63) 
11.726737 
(1.50) 
12.377924 
(1.54)** 
0.361724 
(1.96)*** 
0.357806 
(2.18)* 
0.358102 
(2.07)** 
0.006957 
(0.71) 
0.007636 
(0.96) 
0.007150 
(0.79) 
Beta 6.041867 
(1.12) 
4.085513 
(0.99) 
4.311341 
(1.09) 
0.210417 
(1.71)* 
0.251796 
(1.76)* 
0.232185 
(1.67)* 
0.016491 
(0.97) 
0.013698 
(0.84) 
0.011934 
(0.75) 
LnValueTransaction -1.722687 
(1.00) 
-1.221588 
(0.89) 
-1.371188 
(0.97) 
-0.047250 
(1.07) 
-0.053150 
(1.08) 
-0.060142 
(1.18) 
-0.007016 
(1.11) 
-0.005387 
(0.92) 
-0.006281 
(1.06) 
PaymentCash 33.713433 
(1.24) 
30.403227 
(1.40) 
31.715154 
(1.46) 
0.660868 
(1.01) 
0.681548 
(0.91) 
0.697104 
(0.93) 
0.096703 
(1.02) 
0.083720 
(0.92) 
0.084458 
(0.94) 
PaymentShares 1.426504 
(0.12) 
2.852244 
(0.29) 
2.640850 
(0.27) 
0.120323 
(0.43) 
0.104670 
(0.31) 
0.130988 
(0.39) 
-0.001898 
(0.04) 
-0.000113 
(0.00) 
0.001588 
(0.04) 
PaymentMixed 5.887040 
(0.44) 
11.491620 
(1.03) 
8.540938 
(0.81) 
0.300946 
(0.99) 
0.405807 
(1.08) 
0.448606 
(1.16) 
0.039668 
(0.87) 
0.041932 
(0.92) 
0.047161 
(1.03) 
Related Industry -2.624365 
(0.28) 
-6.417905 
(0.81) 
-5.346184 
(0.69) 
-0.069517 
(0.31) 
-0.078409 
(0.29) 
-0.052572 
(0.20) 
-0.032251 
(0.92) 
-0.031513 
(0.92) 
-0.029220 
(0.87) 
Toehold -0.006795 
(0.05) 
-0.029305 
(0.23) 
-0.013460 
(0.11) 
0.000331 
(0.09) 
0.000654 
(0.15) 
-0.000593 
(0.13) 
0.000060 
(0.11) 
0.000039 
(0.07) 
-0.000131 
(0.24) 
Country variable  Included Included  Included Included  Included Included 
Industry variable   Included   Included   Included 
Constant -142.6080 
(2.18)** 
-88.38581 
(2.12)* 
-80.04977 
(1.86)* 
-2.889265 
(2.08)* 
-3.262754 
(2.07)* 
-1.138122 
(1.48) 
-0.424181 
(2.69)** 
-0.337665 
(2.20)** 
-0.384276 
(2.39)** 
Observations 669 741 741 746 746 688 743 743 743 
R square/Rho 0.58230 0.38344 0.332812 0.544525 .71812124    0.695423 0.68665 0.7685966 0.703215 
F-stat/Wald chi 25.81* 32.5** 32.87** 24.97* 39.27*** 35.02* 25.19** 37.8*** 29.54* 
 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses (* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%) 
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Another observation that can be derived from the analysis is that the coefficients 
of age of incorporation become positive and statistically significant across all 
models. Research in M&A suggests that the more mature companies with 
experience are more likely to acquire (Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999). Older 
companies with higher concentration of large shareholder seem to have higher 
dividend payout ratios and this is also especially so when concentration of large 
shareholders increases. 
 
7.3.6 Principal-principal conflicts and concentrated shareholders at different 
concentration threshold 
 
Further investigation is done to test Hypothesis 4, at which of the concentration 
threshold PP conflicts actually begin. In summary, the breakdown of 
concentration threshold is divided into five main groups; large shareholder at 10% 
or more, at 20% or more, 30% or more, 40% or more and 50% or more.  
  
Table 16 of the regression summarises these results, again using Hausman-Taylor 
to control for endogeneity for principal-principal conflicts proxies. Columns 1-3 
uses dividend to cashflows as a proxy for PP conflicts, Columns 4-6 uses dividend 
to earnings and Columns 7-9 uses dividend to market capitalisations.  Regression 
analysis incorporating country and industry control variables are shown in 
Columns 2-3, 5-6 and 8-9 of each panel. The Wald chi-square of the models are 
significant and rhos are between 31% to 44%.  Looking at the coefficient of the 
largest shareholder, these results confirm their positive and significant 
relationship with all the PP conflict proxies.  
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The coefficients of dummy concentration show that the no significant relationship 
is attained for concentration at 10% to 19.99%.  Andre et al. (2007) have a similar 
result for large shareholder for more than 10% having no impact on the 
performance of M&A in their study. It is only at concentration of more than 20% 
that the improvement is shown. In this thesis, the same occurrence is recorded 
when the coefficient of the largest shareholder is at 20% or more, which may 
suggest increase in dividend ratio policy, also in line with Faccio et al. (2001). 
This just affirms that PP conflicts increase after this point. 
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Table 16: Hausman-Taylor regression results for principal-principal conflicts and 
breakdown of concentration threshold 
(Testing: H4) 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Dependent 
Variable 
DividendtoCashFlow DividendtoEarnings DividendtoMarketCapitalisation 
Largest 
Shareholder 
 
2.7269 
(2.49)** 
2.9251 
(2.66)**
* 
2.7822 
(2.50)** 
0.0895 
(3.02)**
* 
0.0956 
(3.10)**
* 
0.0896 
(3.01)**
* 
0.0153 
(3.42)**
* 
0.0159 
(3.37)**
* 
0.0155 
(3.39)**
* 
Conc10 
  
0.5465 
-0.0500 
-1.7677 
-0.1600 
0.7636 
-0.0700 
-0.1420 
-0.4700 
-0.1532 
-0.4400 
-0.1354 
-0.4500 
-0.0290 
-0.5800 
-0.0236 
-0.4400 
-0.0281 
-0.5600 
Conc20 
  
34.7019 
(2.15)** 
33.6565 
(2.13)** 
36.3558 
(2.22)** 
0.8329 
(2.03)** 
0.8239 
(1.81)* 
0.8453 
(2.06)** 
0.1258 
(1.86)* 
0.1316 
(1.82)* 
0.1306 
(1.89)* 
Conc30 
  
52.0372 
(2.15)** 
52.9764 
(2.24)** 
54.1523 
(2.20)** 
1.5462 
(2.46)** 
1.5549 
(2.34)** 
1.5569 
(2.46)** 
0.2671 
(2.68)**
* 
0.2763 
(2.62)**
* 
0.2735 
(2.69)**
* 
Conc40 
  
72.8251 
(2.05)** 
76.9656 
(2.18)** 
76.4235 
(2.11)** 
2.2421 
(2.41)** 
2.3596 
(2.37)** 
2.2648 
(2.41)** 
0.4112 
(2.84)**
* 
0.4318 
(2.79)**
* 
0.4214 
(2.83)**
* 
Conc50 
  
80.1199 
(2.13)** 
82.8863 
(2.28)** 
82.8439 
(2.17)** 
2.6809 
(2.72)**
* 
2.6993 
(2.66)**
* 
2.6945 
(2.71)**
* 
0.4709 
(3.10)**
* 
0.4797 
(3.03)**
* 
0.4796 
(3.08)**
* 
LagDivCFlow 
  
4.6748 
-1.4400 
4.3335 
-1.2800 
4.7020 
-1.4400 
         
LagDivEarn 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
-0.2930 
(4.08)** 
-0.3572 
(5.47)** 
-0.2896 
(4.01)** 
  
  
  
  
  
LagDivMcap 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
-0.3704 
(3.76)** 
-0.3900 
(4.14)** 
-0.3701 
(3.71)** 
Profitability 
  
0.0073 
-0.7200 
0.0081 
-0.7600 
0.0085 
-0.8300 
-0.0584 
-0.9800 
-0.0581 
-0.9800 
-0.0609 
-1.0100 
0.0001 
(2.61)**
* 
0.0001 
(2.71)**
* 
0.0001 
(2.63)**
* 
LagProfitability 
  
0.0680 
-0.8700 
0.0686 
-0.8500 
0.0704 
-0.8900 
0.2652 
-1.5700 
0.2480 
-1.5900 
0.2642 
-1.5500 
0.0000 
-0.0500 
0.0000 
-0.0100 
0.0000 
-0.0300 
TDTA 
  
-0.0648 
-1.5100 
-0.0625 
-1.4100 
-0.0704 
-1.6200 
-0.0013 
-0.5800 
-0.0015 
-0.6400 
-0.0014 
-0.6200 
-0.0001 
-0.5100 
-0.0001 
-0.5900 
-0.0001 
-0.5700 
lnTotalAssets 
  
-0.1989 
-0.8600 
-0.1981 
-0.8300 
-0.2000 
-0.8600 
-0.0229 
(2.08)** 
-0.0223 
(2.22)** 
-0.0229 
(2.06)** 
0.0004 
-0.6000 
0.0005 
-0.6800 
0.0004 
-0.5900 
Sales1YrGrth 
  
-0.0010 
-0.0200 
-0.0023 
-0.0500 
-0.0004 
-0.0100 
-0.0008 
-0.9600 
-0.0010 
-1.2800 
-0.0009 
-0.9600 
-0.0001 
-0.4500 
-0.0001 
-0.5200 
-0.0001 
-0.4400 
LnAge 
  
9.6671 
(2.39)** 
9.3025 
(2.34)** 
9.0767 
(2.24)** 
0.2042 
(2.11)** 
0.1807 
-1.7200 
0.2020 
(2.10)** 
0.0381 
(2.32)** 
0.0350 
(2.07)** 
0.0371 
(2.24)** 
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dY0 
  
5.1173 
-1.4600 
4.9936 
-1.3800 
5.1326 
-1.4600 
0.3702 
(2.20)** 
0.3564 
(2.32)** 
0.3692 
(2.18)** 
0.0085 
-0.7900 
0.0084 
-0.8300 
0.0085 
-0.7800 
Beta 
  
1.0277 
-0.3000 
1.3727 
-0.3800 
1.8312 
-0.5200 
0.1343 
-1.6000 
0.1736 
(1.78)* 
0.1408 
-1.6400 
0.0104 
-0.7400 
0.0141 
-0.9300 
0.0121 
-0.8300 
LnValueTransacto
n 
  
-0.9122 
-0.7800 
-0.9240 
-0.7700 
-0.8649 
-0.7400 
-0.0340 
-1.0800 
-0.0385 
-1.1000 
-0.0333 
-1.0600 
-0.0054 
-1.1200 
-0.0059 
-1.1500 
-0.0054 
-1.1000 
PaymentCash 
  
38.1592 
-1.8200 
39.2091 
(1.85)* 
39.2963 
-1.8600 
0.8554 
-1.5400 
0.8360 
-1.3800 
0.8567 
-1.5400 
0.1622 
(1.87)* 
0.1642 
(1.8)* 
0.1652 
-1.8700 
PaymentShares 
  8.5629 
-0.8900 
9.7072 
-0.9800 
8.4042 
-0.8700 
0.2858 
-1.1900 
0.2690 
-1.0000 
0.2797 
-1.1700 
0.0543 
-1.3800 
0.0571 
-1.3700 
0.0543 
-1.3700 
PaymentMixed 
  
6.1775 
-0.6300 
9.7625 
-0.9300 
6.0481 
-0.6100 
0.2428 
-0.9900 
0.3184 
-1.1000 
0.2388 
-0.9700 
0.0531 
-1.3100 
0.0656 
-1.4600 
0.0531 
-1.2900 
RelatedInd 
  
-5.7989 
-0.8200 
-6.2840 
-0.8600 
-6.6776 
-0.9300 
-0.0292 
-0.1600 
-0.0206 
-0.1000 
-0.0371 
-0.2000 
-0.0153 
-0.5200 
-0.0163 
-0.5200 
-0.0171 
-0.5700 
Toehold 
  
-0.0831 
-0.6800 
-0.0940 
-0.7500 
-0.0531 
-0.4300 
-0.0014 
-0.4600 
-0.0008 
-0.2400 
-0.0012 
-0.3700 
-0.0004 
-0.7500 
-0.0003 
-0.6400 
-0.0003 
-0.6200 
Country control   Yes     Yes     Yes   
Industry Control     Yes     Yes     Yes 
Constant 
-
294.220
4 
-
335.1769 
-
296.253
6 
-9.2888 -9.6421 -9.2814 -1.6359 -1.6808 -1.6516 
  (2.20)** (2.42)** (2.19)** 
(2.69)**
* 
(2.51)** 
(2.69)**
* 
(3.00)**
* 
(2.87)**
* 
(2.98)**
* 
Observations 688 688 688 746 746 746 702 702 702 
RHO 0.3336 0.3301 0.3326 0.4740 0.6268 0.4664 0.5445 0.6095 0.5352 
Wald Chi 32.9** 34.09* 33.69* 31.74* 44.53*** 31.16* 31.07* 33.54* 32.34* 
 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses (* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%) 
 
 
7.3.7 Principal-principal conflicts and second large shareholder 
Some studies in the developed market claim that the presence of the second 
largest shareholder may act to curb expropriation from the controlling shareholder 
(Barclay & Holderness, 1989). The role of second large shareholder in Asean 5 is 
then tested in the following models shown in Table 17 to determine the 
relationship with the largest shareholder for Hypothesis 5.  
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The results for large shareholder remain positive and significant upon addition of 
the variable, second large shareholder, in the HT analysis. However, its positive 
but insignificant coefficients indicate that there is no relationship between both 
variables and support the null hypothesis. This is aligned with the notion that 
second largest shareholders have no impact on dividend ratio policy in East Asian 
companies (Claessens et al. 2000a) and that holds true during M&A. The second 
shareholder role is regarded as insignificant in the emerging economy, 
contradictory to Anglo-Saxon studies where the second largest shareholder 
usually curbs agency conflicts.  
 
The variable, dY0 that denotes the year of effective M&A stays significant in 
these analyses.  The coefficients of sales growth and total assets, indicating 
company’s growth and size, are negative and significant only for the dependent 
variable using dividends to earnings. The expropriation may be exacerbated 
through higher dividend payouts but to the detriment of lowering the company’s 
prospects to grow. Nonetheless, this negative relationship remains unconfirmed 
because of the insignificant results with the other PP proxies.  
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Table 17: Hausman-Taylor results for principal-principal conflicts and  
second large shareholder 
(Testing Hypothesis 5) 
 Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
9 
 
Dependent 
Variable 
DividendtoCashFlow DividendtoEarnings 
 
DividendtoMarketCapi
talisation 
Large 
Shareholder 
2.1214 
(3.48)*
** 
1.9167 
(3.67)*** 
1.9475 
(3.69)*** 
0.0604 
(3.63)*
** 
0.0606 
(4.26)*** 
0.0645 
(4.40)*** 
0.0050 
(2.05)*
* 
0.0040 
(1.79)* 
0.0051 
(1.97)** 
Large 
Second 
Shareholder 
0.6461 
(1.50) 
0.6033 
(1.54) 
0.6135 
(1.54) 
0.0204 
(1.54) 
0.017129 
(1.48) 
0.0176 
(1.50) 
0.0019 
(1.33) 
0.0017 
(1.25) 
0.0017 
(1.16) 
LagDivCFl
ow 
  
-1.798 
(0.72) 
-1.4699 
(0.60) 
-1.5937 
(0.65) 
 
LagDivEar
n 
  
 -0.440 
(8.75)*
** 
-0.4316 
(8.25)** 
-0.4369 
(8.12)*** 
 
LagDivMca
p 
  
 -0.281 
(5.81)*
** 
-0.277 
(5.85)*
** 
-0.2828 
(5.77)**
* 
Profitability 
  
-0.000 
(1.65) 
-0.0000 
(1.54) 
-0.0000 
(1.53) 
-0.012 
(0.00) 
-0.0248 
(0.47) 
-0.0266 
(0.48) 
-0.000 
(0.68) 
-0.000 
(0.70) 
-0.0000 
(0.59) 
LagProfitab
ility 
  
0.0000 
(1.83)* 
0.0000 
(1.91)* 
0.0000 
(1.92)* 
0.2737 
(2.11)* 
0.2555 
(1.89)* 
0.2534 
(1.83)* 
0.0000 
(0.89) 
0.000 
(0.89) 
0.000 
(0.87) 
TDTA 
  
-0.032 
(0.41) 
-0.0450 
(0.57) 
-0.0396 
(0.50) 
0.0010 
(0.43) 
-0.0000 
(0.02) 
-0.0001 
(0.04) 
0.0000 
(0.39) 
0.0000 
(0.30) 
0.0000 
(0.32) 
lnTotalAsse
ts 
0.1270 
(0.44) 
0.14827 
(0.52) 
0.1464 
(0.51) 
-0.022 
(2.68)*
** 
-0.0223 
(2.62)*** 
-0.0222 
(2.54)** 
-0.000 
(0.36) 
-0.000 
(0.31) 
-0.0001 
(0.18) 
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Sales1YrGr
th 
-0.056 
(1.55) 
-0.0565 
(1.58) 
-0.0560 
(1.56) 
-0.001 
(2.00)*
* 
-0.0014 
(1.95)* 
-0.0014 
(1.97)* 
-0.000 
(1.28) 
-0.000 
(1.32) 
-0.0001 
(1.36) 
LnAge 
6.5070 
(1.58) 
6.3901 
(1.66)* 
6.6364 
(1.70)* 
0.0638 
(0.52) 
0.0387 
(0.35) 
0.0699 
(0.62) 
0.0152 
(1.12) 
0.0151 
(1.15) 
0.0155 
(1.10) 
dY0 
  
5.0160 
(1.86)* 
4.9342 
(1.83)* 
4.9562 
(1.84)* 
0.3846 
(3.05)*
** 
0.3662 
(2.80)*** 
0.3654 
(2.72)** 
0.0134 
(2.48)*
* 
0.0134 
(2.53)*
* 
0.0133 
(2.43)**
* 
Beta 4.8581 
(1.16) 
5.0966 
(1.27) 
4.6273 
(1.16) 
0.1699 
(1.35) 
0.2243 
(1.96)* 
0.2155 
(1.85)* 
0.0087 
(0.59) 
0.0081 
(0.55) 
0.0074 
(0.47) 
LnValueTra
nsacton 
-1.631 
(1.07) 
-1.4664 
(1.05) 
-1.5612 
(1.09) 
-0.046 
(1.06) 
-0.0452 
(1.17) 
-0.0609 
(1.50) 
-0.000 
(0.07) 
0.0006 
(0.12) 
-0.0014 
(0.27) 
PaymentCa
sh 
32.276 
(1.32) 
28.2573 
(1.28) 
28.1738 
(1.26) 
0.6401 
(0.87) 
0.5270 
(0.82) 
0.6088 
(0.91) 
0.0579 
(0.68) 
0.0423 
(0.53) 
0.0598 
(0.69) 
PaymentSh
ares 
2.9191 
(0.24) 
2.4111 
(0.22) 
3.1265 
(0.28) 
0.1530 
(0.42) 
0.0985 
(0.31) 
-0.0527 
(0.16) 
0.0087 
(0.21) 
0.0080 
(0.20) 
-0.0045 
(0.11) 
PaymentMi
xed 
  
0.0371 
(0.00) 
4.5933 
(0.39) 
5.5339 
(0.45) 
0.1143 
(0.30) 
0.2101 
(0.62) 
0.0043 
(0.01) 
0.0093 
(0.22) 
0.0162 
(0.38) 
0.0014 
(0.03) 
RelatedInd 4.9492 
(0.49) 
4.4007 
(0.47) 
4.5953 
(0.48) 
0.2888 
(0.94) 
0.3148 
(1.16) 
0.3687 
(1.32) 
0.0018 
(0.05) 
-0.001 
(0.02) 
0.0016 
(0.05) 
Toehold 
  
0.0382 
(0.26) 
0.0283 
(0.20) 
0.0053 
(0.04) 
0.0018 
(0.39) 
0.0029 
(0.72) 
0.0059 
(1.35) 
0.0000 
(0.17) 
0.0001 
(0.22) 
0.0002 
(0.41) 
Country 
control 
  Included Included    Included Included    Included 
 
Included 
Industry 
Control 
    Included     Included     Included 
 
Constant 
-118.2 
(2.84)*
** 
-133.59 
(2.91)*** 
-139.00 
(2.91)*** 
-2.334 
(3.12)*
** 
-2.356 
(2.80)*** 
-5.926 
(2.47)** 
-0.129 
(1.09) 
-0.124 
(0.81) 
-0.34334 
(1.02) 
 
Obs  
612 
 
612 
 
612 
 
681 
 
681 
 
681 
 
626 
 
626 
 
626 
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RHO 0.7112 0.66518 0.67714 0.8573 0.80488 0.79552 0.8888 0.8827 0.88521 
 
Wald Chi 26.44*
* 
32.98** 33.32** 92.64*
** 
87.33*** 87.38*** 50.09*
** 
50.97*
** 
49.96** 
 
 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses (* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%) 
 
 
 
7.3.8 Principal-principal conflicts using performance measurement (Tobin’s 
q) 
As a robust analysis and to test Hypothesis 2b, performance measurement 
utilising Tobin’s q as proxy for PP conflicts has also being analysed in an HT 
regression method. Table 18 reports the HT result that also consists of regression 
analysis with large shareholder square (Model 4-6).  
 
Models 1-3 in Table 18 show HT regression with Tobin’s q as the dependent 
variable with the large shareholder and other control variables. It is observed that 
the coefficients of large shareholders are negative, but then they are insignificant. 
Only the year control dY0 shows significant coefficient across all models. This 
may show that there as large shareholders increase, company performance tends 
to deteriorate. However, this remains inconclusive due to the insignificant p-
values. It is also noted that the relationships between Tobin’s q, cash flow and 
company growth are found to be negative but insignificant coefficients.  
 
Upon checking that the model may not be linear, the large shareholder square 
variable is incorporated into the analysis. Models 4-6 in Table 18 show that the 
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relationship between Tobin’s q and large shareholder becomes positive, but the 
large shareholder square variable is negatively related. The coefficients of the 
variables however, remain insignificant.   
 
Table 18: Hausman-Taylor results for principal-principal conflicts using Tobin’s q 
(performance measurement) 
(Testing: Hypothesis 2b) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Tobin'sq Tobin'sq Tobin'sq Tobin'sq Tobin'sq Tobin'sq 
Lship -0.027707 -0.048222 -0.040557 0.037277 0.043921 0.030356 
 (0.63) (0.68) (0.65) (0.32) (0.36) (0.29) 
Lshipsquare    -0.000278 -0.000372 -0.000249 
    (0.26) (0.33) (0.27) 
TDTA -0.000140 0.000122 0.000094 0.000344 0.000381 0.000398 
 (0.13) (0.10) (0.08) (0.28) (0.31) (0.34) 
lnTotalAssets 0.001112 0.001120 0.001123 0.001211 0.001207 0.001213 
 (0.40) (0.41) (0.42) (0.47) (0.47) (0.47) 
CashtoTA -0.000791 -0.000808 -0.000761 -0.000416 -0.000393 -0.000362 
 (0.79) (0.75) (0.73) (0.47) (0.45) (0.43) 
Sales1YrGrth -0.000428 -0.000441 -0.000442 -0.000518 -0.000516 -0.000511 
 (0.80) (0.81) (0.83) (1.02) (1.01) (1.00) 
LnAge -0.017414 0.049166 0.038532 0.078047 0.105767 0.087180 
 (0.16) (0.38) (0.31) (0.39) (0.52) (0.46) 
dY0 -0.089397 -0.087664 -0.087626 -0.087441 -0.087099 -0.087280 
 (2.17)* (2.14)* (2.17)* (2.29)* (2.26)* (2.27)* 
Beta -0.046153 -0.181605 -0.134644 0.125402 0.104788 0.078222 
 (0.23) (0.53) (0.47) (0.51) (0.41) (0.37) 
LnValueTran
sacton 
0.070327 0.086045 0.081584 0.024888 0.025773 0.030585 
 (1.31) (1.16) (1.17) (0.33) (0.34) (0.44) 
PaymentCash -0.430581 -0.580869 -0.456511 0.350751 0.419635 0.327232 
 (0.42) (0.44) (0.38) (0.27) (0.32) (0.28) 
PaymentShar
es 
0.168866 0.138078 0.157031 0.333805 0.351949 0.353310 
 (0.41) (0.27) (0.32) (0.61) (0.67) (0.72) 
PaymentMixe
d 
0.104961 -0.161364 -0.121782 0.332904 0.329725 0.292302 
 (0.26) (0.24) (0.19) (0.53) (0.48) (0.46) 
RelatedInd 0.081688 -0.002332 0.024727 0.245425 0.216378 0.231714 
 (0.24) (0.01) (0.06) (0.60) (0.54) (0.64) 
Toehold 0.001346 0.000400 0.000683 -0.000844 -0.001505 -0.001728 
 (0.28) (0.07) (0.12) (0.13) (0.23) (0.28) 
Country  Included Included  Included Included 
Industry   Include   Included 
Constant 1.742883 2.693747 2.425652 -0.481802 -0.972671 -0.658661 
 (0.94) (0.75) (0.73) (0.18) (0.25) (0.19) 
Observations 713 713 713 713 713 713 
Number of 
IDCODE 
272 272 272 272 272 272 
 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses (* significant at 10%** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%) 
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7.4 Robust study: Panel Tobit regression of PP conflicts and 
explanatory variables: Decision whether or not to pay dividends 
 
The preceding HT regression results show large shareholders are positively 
related to dividend ratios which may indicate PP conflicts are exacerbated during 
M&A. However, there are companies in the sample that do not pay out dividends. 
Tobit regression analysis can be used to test whether or not large shareholders 
also play a part in the decision to pay or not to pay dividends in Asean 5 acquiring 
companies.  
 
The Tobit model is a censored model and is appropriate because the dividend 
distribution is censored from below zero. In fact, there are 2,867 out of 6,400 
observations (out of 807 companies for seven years of data) in this sample that 
have zero dividends.  OLS or other regression estimates of coefficients might be 
inconsistent and biased towards zero. Control for endogeneity on the large 
shareholder variable must also be taken into account in the following Tobit 
regression.  
 
Table 19 reports the Tobit regression results regarding the three alternative 
definitions of PP conflicts in M&A. Wald-chi square test indicates that all 
specifications of each model are statistically significant as a whole. Country and 
industry dummies (not reported but are jointly significant) are included for 
columns 3-4 (dividend to cash flow), 7-8 (dividend to earnings) and 11-12 
(dividend to market capitalisation). As usual, year dummy t = 0 representing the 
effective year of M&A is included. 
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7.4.1  PP conflicts and large shareholder 
It is indicated from the coefficient results on large shareholders that they are 
positive and significant across all models. This again supports the notion that 
large shareholders of acquiring companies in Asean 5 play a main role in deciding 
to pay out dividends, reconfirming Hypothesis 2a. While Fama and French (2001) 
suggest that the companies are likely to pay out dividends with lower levels of 
investment, this result proves otherwise.  
 
7.4.2  PP conflicts and other financial controls 
The coefficients of leverage (TDTA) exert the expected negative and statistically 
significant sign across all definitions and specifications of dividend ratios and 
support the conclusions of Mancinelli and Ozkan ((2006). This may also mean 
that the negative relationship suggests the reduction in debt associated with the 
decision to pay out dividend is evident even during M&A.  
 
The level of company risk as measured by beta is shown to have positive and 
statistically significant coefficients across all models. This indicates that riskier 
acquiring companies prefer to pay out dividends.  
 
Size (ln Total Assets), age of company and growth (sales growth) all document 
negative but insignificant relationships with PP conflicts. These results are in line 
with Gugler and Yurtoglu (2003) who find negative but insignificant relationships 
for company dividend behaviour with size, leverage and investment opportunities. 
Although these are inconclusive, the results possibly suggest that smaller, younger 
and slower growing acquiring companies are more likely to pay out dividends.  
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7.4.3 PP conflicts and M&A controls 
Columns 2-4, 6-8 and 10-12 for each specification of ratios are analysed by 
incorporating the M&A variables into the Tobit regression analysis. As can be 
seen from the results, all coefficients for M&A payments using cash are positive 
and significantly related to PP conflicts. Other variables remain insignificant.  
 
7.4.4  PP conflicts and country variables 
One of the main limitations of this thesis is the lack of reliable data available for 
many developing countries, in this case, Indonesia and Philippines (2% and 6.5% 
respectively) out of the overall sample explained in Table 7 in Section 6.1). 
Conducting Tobit analysis in Stata software has indicated that these  dummy 
regressors are collinear  with other independent regressors and these two countries 
are dropped from the model to avoid numerical instability (Cameron & Trivedi, 
2009). 
 
A simple OLS regression can be employed to check which other regressor(s) that 
is/are in perfect collinearity with the two countries as dependent variable; 
AcqNat1 (Indonesia) and AcqNat5 (Thailand). The estimation results presented in 
Appendix 6 indicate that they are significantly related and dependable with all the 
other three countries denoted by AcqNat2 (Malaysia), AcqNat3 (Philippines) and 
AcqNat4 (Singapore). Hence, it is sufficient to use these three countries as control 
variables (Hardin, 1996). 
 
The acquirer nation that has a positive and statistically significant relationship 
with PP conflicts, as shown in Table 19, is Malaysia. This may imply that more 
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acquiring companies in Malaysia pay out dividends as opposed to the other 
countries in Asean 5. Further tests need to be carried out to ensure that the 
inclusion of dummy variable Malaysia will not bias the coefficient of large 
shareholder and the overall regression estimation conducted earlier.  
 
Table 20 confirms that this is not the case. The table reports Tobit regression 
results that exclude the variable of acquirer nation, Malaysia. The Wald-tests are 
also statistically significant. As can be seen, coefficient of large shareholder 
remains positive and significant in all the models. Similarly, the signs for leverage 
(TDTA) and risks (beta) are still showing significant results. 
 
7.4.5  PP conflicts (large shareholder square) and non-linear relationship 
A non-linear relationship is hypothesised between large shareholder and dividend 
payout which has been confirmed in the previous analysis for continuous data. 
Further analysis is made to ascertain whether this is true for discrete data (non-
paying or paying dividend companies). Negative and significant coefficients in 
some models (columns 2-3, 7-8 and 10-12) are attained but there is no conclusive 
support for a non-linear relationship, as shown in Appendix 8.  
 
Essentially this may means that the relationship between large shareholders 
increases the likelihood of payout decisions at lower levels of large shareholders 
but lessen at higher levels of shareholdings. The probability of non-linear 
hypothesis supports the study of dividend payout decisions for companies in 37 
countries by Truong (2007). However, his findings show the opposite magnitude 
or signs, where the largest shareholder is negatively related, and the likelihood of 
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paying a dividend becomes positive with large shareholder square. His conclusion 
is consistent with the view that largest shareholder act as a monitor by reducing 
the PA agency conflicts at lower level but that role shifts to entrenchment 
behaviour as the percentage of largest shareholding increases. This study argues 
that initially the largest shareholders in Asean 5 companies are already so high 
and therefore disputes the monitoring role.  
 
 
 
 
 
     
204 
 
Table 19:Robust analysis: Tobit regression results for principal-principal conflicts and large shareholders  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 Dividend to cashflow Dividend to Earnings Dividend to Market Capitalisation 
Large shareholder 0.1106 0.0687 0.0862 0.0895 0.0748 0.0571 0.0609 0.0538 0.0871 0.0610 0.0618 0.0616 
 (3.66)*** (3.97)*** (3.44)*** (3.29)*** (3.54)*** (2.98)*** (2.97)*** (3.21)*** (2.54)** (2.40)** (2.51)** (2.54)** 
LagDivCashflow 2.5194 -0.1459 3.6673 -0.2565         
 (2.30)* (2.63)** (3.05)** (3.15)**         
LagDividendEarnings     0.1497 -0.0799 3.2679 3.4265     
     (2.44)** (2.06)** (2.55)* (1.07)     
LagDivMktCapitalisation         24.4482 -0.5410 -0.4239 -0.4801 
         (2.07)* (0.49) (2.00)* (0.46) 
TDTA -0.0492 -0.00545 -0.0059 -0.0056 -0.0032 -0.0076 -0.0079 -0.00807 -0.0016 -0.0061 -0.0063 -0.0060 
 (1.84)* (1.95)* (1.84)* (1.69)* (2.17)** (3.03)*** (3.17)*** (3.48)*** (2.49)* (2.25)* (2.47)* (2.27)** 
lnTA -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 (0.83) (0.32) (0.06) (0.34) (1.02) (0.76) (0.26) (0.07) (0.96) (0.91) (0.03) (0.81) 
Beta 1.7435 0.2192 0.3671 0.3611 0.129351 0.1798 4.7004 0.2019 1.7772 3.6971 4.4475 0.2266 
 (2.63)** (2.21)** (2.49)** (2.40)** (1.86)** (1.85)* (2.15)** (2.14)** (2.57)* (3.46)** (1.77)* (3.89)** 
Sales1YrGrth -0.0000 0.0038 0.0054 0.0041 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0088 0.0069 0.0001 -0.0035 -0.0029 -0.0046 
 (0.97) (0.45) (0.23) (0.25) (0.92) (0.08) (0.53) (0.42) (1.15) (0.17) (0.75) (0.24) 
lnAge -0.1699 -0.0229 0.8144 -0.0883 1.1304 -0.0175 -0.0787 0.7738 -0.1310 -0.0583 -0.1338 1.1052 
 (1.71)* (0.23) (0.79) (0.88) (1.48) (0.03) (1.07) (1.05) (1.51) (0.78) (1.63) (1.00) 
dY0 0.0136 0.0603 0.0325 0.0283 0.0696 1.2017 1.3418 1.0461 0.0004 0.0396 1.2660 0.9837 
 (0.10) (0.53) (0.23) (0.19) (0.95) (0.76) (0.37) (0.17) (1.07) (0.79) (0.39) (0.64) 
LnValueTransaction  0.4443 0.5412 -0.0447  0.4230 -0.0378 0.7057  -0.0165 0.5126 -0.0320 
  (1.25) (1.20) (1.68)  (1.17) (1.46) (1.72)  (0.62) (1.45) (1.10) 
PaymentCash  1.4409 1.4946 1.5065  1.3534 1.2736 1.2372  1.2241 1.1477 1.2012 
  (2.82)*** (2.48)** (2.42)***  (2.15)*** (2.79)*** (3.02)***  (2.40)** (2.41)** (2.11)* 
PaymentShare  -1.8913 -0.8989 -1.2957  0.3495 0.2890 0.1519  0.2510 -0.0087 0.1220 
  (0.61) (1.18) (0.43)  (0.65) (1.41) (0.81)  (1.16) (1.11) (0.52) 
PaymentMixed  -0.4001 0.4285 -2.5212  0.2180 -2.2114 0.1230  0.3424 0.3260 0.6544 
  (0.13) (0.67) (0.81)  (1.06) (0.71) (0.29)  (0.77) (1.48) (0.20) 
Related Target  -3.5775 -3.2027 0.2760  -3.9393 -3.6120 0.1783  -3.7322 -3.3300 -2.5184 
  (1.56) (1.17) (1.52)  (1.70) (1.63) (1.27)  (1.25) (1.19) (1.10) 
Toehold  0.0355 -0.0011 0.0327  0.0430 0.0003 0.0017  -0.0014 0.0230 0.0142 
  (0.96) (0.58) (0.91)  (1.16) (0.12) (0.76)  (1.03) (0.63) (0.38) 
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o. acquirornation==Indonesia    0.0000    0.0000    0.0000 
   (.) (.)   (.) (.)   (.) (.) 
acquirornation==Malaysia   0.8106 0.8038   0.7991 0.7809   -6.3736 0.58247 
   (1.96)* (1.88)*   (2.42)* (2.64)**   (1.87)* (1.83)* 
acquirornation==Philippines   0.5356 0.4111   -7.2495 -10.1763   0.4168 -6.3858 
   (0.92) (0.69)   (1.19) (2.09)*   (0.92) (0.94) 
acquirornation==Singapore   -0.2619 4.7665   0.0235 0.0809   -0.1575 6.6376 
   (0.70) (1.21)   (0.85) (1.00)   (1.31) (0.51) 
o. acquirornation==Thailand   0.0000 0.0000   0.0000 0.0000   0.0000 0.0000 
   (.) (.)   (.) (.)     
Industry    Included    Included    Included 
             
Constant -0.6526 -0.6561 -3.3785 -0.6588 -0.0738 -0.0562 2.8796 -4.0034 13.9172 -0.0598 2.8959 -0.7113 
 (24.50)** (3.47)** (18.69)** (3.15)** (4.01)** (108.69)** (18.06)** (4.45)** (2.49)* (2.65)** (2.67)** (2.76)** 
Observations 1204 685 685 685 1201 688 688 688 1150 658 658 658 
Log pseudo-likelihood -6198.77 -3529.51 -3497.69 -3495.50 -6257.40 -3564.94 -3528.21 -3494.144 -5950.96 -3402.47 -3371.85 -3335.65 
Left censored observations 
(zero values) 
355 200 200 200 359 202 202 202 313 171 171 171 
Wald chi2 32.15*** 41.21*** 30.83** 29.07** 48.94*** 69.08*** 69.43*** 93.54*** 35.57*** 36.00** 38.2** 47.68** 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses (* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%) 
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Table 20: Tobit regression of PP conflicts (without Malaysia) 
 
Model (1) (2) (3) 
DividendCashflow DividendEarnings DividendMktCap 
Large shareholder 0.0862 
(3.44)*** 
0.0609 
(2.97)*** 
0.0618 
(2.52)** 
LagDivCashflow -0.2366 
(1.52) 
  
LagDividendEarnings  -0.1209 
(1.05) 
 
LagDivMktCapitalisat
ion 
  -0.4239 
(0.41) 
TDTA -0.0059 
(1.84)* 
-0.0079 
(3.17)*** 
-0.0063 
(2.47)* 
lnTA -0.0000 
(0.35) 
-0.0000 
(0.39) 
0.0000 
(0.63) 
Beta 0.3671 
(2.49)** 
0.2494 
(4.83)** 
-4.4476 
(4.33)** 
Sales1YrGrth 0.0003 
(0.23) 
0.0088 
(0.53) 
0.0010 
(0.15) 
lnAge -0.0957 
(0.98) 
-0.0787 
(1.07) 
1.2715 
(1.63) 
dY0 0.0325 
(0.23) 
1.3418 
(0.37) 
1.2660 
(0.39) 
LnValueTransaction -0.0406 
(1.20) 
-0.0378 
(1.57) 
-0.0260 
(1.45) 
PaymentCash 1.4947 
(2.48)** 
1.2737 
(1.91)*** 
1.1477 
(2.41)** 
PaymentShare 0.3255 
(1.18) 
-0.8928 
(1.41) 
0.2330 
(0.00) 
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PaymentMixed 0.4284 
(1.47) 
0.3273 
(0.71) 
-1.7615 
(1.48) 
Related Target 0.2555 
(1.17) 
-3.6120 
(1.63) 
0.2094 
(1.47) 
Toehold -0.0011 
(0.32) 
0.0003 
(0.60) 
0.0230 
(0.17) 
Philippines 4.0006 
(0.77) 
-0.0791 
(0.23) 
1.6598 
(0.51) 
Singapore 11.7489 
(7.99)*** 
12.4642 
(8.48)** 
11.7060 
(7.66)** 
Thailand -0.8106 
(1.96)* 
-0.7991 
(2.35)* 
-0.6087 
(1.54) 
Constant -2.5679 
(3.12)** 
-2.7927 
(4.3)** 
-1.8508 
(2.73)** 
Observations 685 688 658 
Log pseudo-
likelihood 
-3497.69 -3528.21 -3371.85 
Left censored 
observations (zero 
values) 
200 202 171 
Wald chi
2
 30.83** 69.42*** 38.20** 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses (* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%) 
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7.5 Robust analysis: Fixed-effects vector decomposition  
(FEVD) of PP conflicts and explanatory variables 
 
The apparent limitations of fixed effect (FE) models to estimate time-invariant 
variables have been thoroughly discussed in Section 5.3.4. Hausman-Taylor (HT) 
is then used in the analysis to allow for time-invariant variables (large shareholder 
and M&A variables) to be incorporated in the models which have been 
thoroughly examined and duly discussed earlier.  
 
Fixed-effects vector decomposition (FEVD) is another method recently proposed 
by Plümper and Troeger (2007) as already defined in Section 5.3.7. The authors 
reiterate that the model performs far better than pooled OLS, RE, and the 
Hausman-Taylor procedure if both time-invariant and time-varying variables are 
correlated with the unit effects. As an alternative measurement for incorporating 
time-variant and time-invariant data analysis, FEVD method is employed here to 
support the proxies for PP conflicts in this study. 
 
Table 21 presents the estimated coefficients of the dependent variable using 
dividend to cash flow and other variables obtained from FEVD (full results are 
provided in Appendix 9 to 13 for other dependent variables). As the table exhibits, 
in all FEVD models, the large shareholders explanatory variable appears as 
significant with a positive sign. The positive sign implies that dividend increases 
as the level of percentage in large shareholders grows. For instance, the first 
specification (Model 1) in Table 21 reveals that when other variables are constant, 
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a 1% increase in large shareholder will increase the current dividend by an 
average ratio of dividend to cash flow by 36.  
 
The explanatory variable for second large shareholder is included in Models 4 to 6 
of Table 21. The coefficients are found to be positive, similar to using HT 
analysis. However, this is significant when using FEVD. There is an increase of 
dividend ratio of 0.34 with an increase of 1% in the percentage of second large 
shareholder. The positive coefficients between dividend to cashflow and both 
large shareholders and second large shareholders imply a positive correlation 
between both ownership variables. This also supports the notion of collaboration 
in determining PP conflicts between large and second large shareholders during 
M&A.  
 
The control variable sales growth has negative coefficients across all models. The 
interpretation from the coefficients shows that a 100% reduction in sales growth 
will increase the dividend ratio by roughly 5% across all models.  This may imply 
that paying a higher dividend results in lower company growth (Banchit & Locke, 
2011). The dummy variable to indicate and control effective M&A also shows 
positive and significant coefficients.  
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Table 21: Robust analysis: PP conflicts (dividend to cash flows) using FEVD 
models 
 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Largest 
Shareholder 
0.3623 0.3624 0.3626 0.1579 0.1580 0.1580 
  (7.36)** (7.02)** (6.72)** (2.25)* (2.24)* (2.14)* 
Second 
large 
Shareholder 
      0.0034 0.0034 0.0034 
        (3.95)** (3.86)** (3.69)** 
LagDivCFl
ow 
-0.4612 -0.4637 -0.4654 -0.4612 -0.4639 -0.4657 
  (0.2800) (0.2800) (0.2800) (0.2800) (0.2800) (0.2800) 
lnCashFlo
w 
2.6568 2.6563 2.6545 2.6569 2.6562 2.6542 
  (3.99)** (3.97)** (3.78)** (3.98)** (3.96)** (3.75)** 
TDTA -0.0118 -0.0119 -0.0117 -0.0118 -0.0119 -0.0117 
  (0.2600) (0.2600) (0.2500) (0.2600) (0.2600) (0.2500) 
Beta -0.0145 -0.0112 -0.0119 -0.0145 -0.0111 -0.0116 
  (0.0100) (0.0100) (0.0100) (0.0100) (0.0100) (0.0100) 
lnTotalAss
ets 
0.1042 0.1041 0.1037 0.1042 0.1040 0.1036 
  (0.6400) (0.6400) (0.6200) (0.6400) (0.6400) (0.6200) 
Sales1YrG
rth 
-0.0537 -0.0537 -0.0535 -0.0537 -0.0537 -0.0535 
  (2.43)* (2.42)* (2.35)* (2.43)* (2.42)* (2.34)* 
lnAge 0.0081 0.0081 0.0086 0.0081 0.0081 0.0085 
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  (0.1200) (0.1200) (0.1200) (0.1200) (0.1200) (0.1200) 
dY0 5.9141 5.9140 5.9139 5.9141 5.9140 5.9139 
  (2.67)** (2.67)** (2.64)** (2.67)** (2.67)** (2.64)** 
lnValueTra
nsacton 
-0.0135 -0.0140 -0.0128 -0.0136 -0.0139 -0.0127 
  (0.0300) (0.0300) (0.0300) (0.0300) (0.0300) (0.0300) 
PaymentCa
sh 
0.0975 0.0965 0.0962 0.0973 0.0967 0.0974 
  (0.0100) (0.0100) (0.0100) (0.0100) (0.0100) (0.0100) 
PaymentSh
ares 
0.0513 0.0479 0.0608 0.0512 0.0481 0.0614 
  (0.0100) (0.0100) (0.0100) (0.0100) (0.0100) (0.0100) 
Toehold 0.0303 0.0246 0.0339 0.0304 0.0244 0.0339 
  (0.0100 -0.0100 -0.0100 -0.0100 -0.0100 -0.0100 
RelatedInd -0.0524 -0.0509 -0.0812 -0.0527 -0.0506 -0.0803 
  (0.0200 -0.0200 -0.0300 -0.0200 -0.0200 -0.0200 
Country 
control 
  Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
Industry 
Control 
    Yes     Yes 
Constant -35.9614 -35.8850 -35.8306 -34.9933 -34.9137 -34.8556 
  (2.97)** (2.63)** (2.45)* (2.88)** (2.54)* (2.36)* 
Observatio
ns 
669 669 669 669 669 669 
F-test 863.98**
* 
860.00*** 841.42*** 862.65*** 858.67*** 840.09*** 
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Rho 0.570 0.570 0.570 0.570 0.570 0.570 
Number of 
IDCODE 
272 272 272 272 272 272 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses(* significant at 10%; ** significant at 
5%,*** significance at 1%) 
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7.6 Principal-Agent (PA) conflicts and large shareholder 
 
The existence of PP conflicts in Asean 5 companies has been established in 
preceding empirical analysis. It is possible that PA conflicts may also be present 
in those settings where PP is present. Potentially, it is not as important as PP but it 
does warrant examination. The next hypothesis envisages there is a negative but 
insignificant relationship between PA, measured by asset utilisation ratio, and 
M&A in Asean 5 companies. If this is the case, then it implies that when 
companies are less efficient the greater the level of large shareholders in 
companies associated with M&A. 
 
Table 22 presents the outcomes of HT analysis for this hypothesis. Models 2 and 
3 are analysed by controlling for country and industry effects. Explanatory 
variables’ joint significance results using Wald chi test statistic are significant.  It 
is noteworthy that when proxy for PA conflicts is used as the dependent variable 
in Models 1 and 2, the coefficients of large shareholders are found to be negative 
and significant. The results indicate that there are decreases in every dollar of 
sales to assets of the company in response to 5% (Model 1) and 7% (Model 2) 
increases in shareholding percentage of the largest shareholder. This has an 
important implication for this study as not only are PP conflicts found to be 
rampant in Asean 5 M&A, but PA conflicts have also been indicated to be 
substantial as well.  
  
The control variables that are positive and significantly related to efficiency are 
sales growth and risk (beta). This is in accord with higher risk and higher 
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efficiency attainment within the company. On the other hand, it is shown that 
negative relationships are found for the efficiency ratio and cash to total assets 
ratio, and the relatedness of the acquirer with target companies. This may imply 
that the higher cash resource the company has, the lower the efficiency attained. 
The negative relationship between relatedness of the acquisition to the target’s 
industry may also indicate that related M&A could become more efficient instead 
by acquiring a non-related M&A.  
 
Further analysis is undertaken checking whether the regression is non-linear by 
incorporating large shareholder square into the model using the FEVD method. 
Results shown in Table 23 indicates that the relationship is insignificant, both 
implying and supporting the linear relationship between PA conflicts and large 
shareholders in Asean 5 companies. 
 
Table 22: HT regression analysis of PA conflicts (Asset utilisation ratio) and large 
shareholders 
                                                     (Testing: H15) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Asset Utilisation ratio 
Large Shareholder -0.053324 -0.070851 -0.053772 
 (1.87)* (1.71)* (1.58) 
TDTA -0.001195 -0.001074 -0.001121 
 (1.64) (1.40) (1.61) 
lnTotalAssets -0.000818 -0.000837 -0.000823 
 (0.50) (0.49) (0.54) 
Sales1YrGrth 0.001979 0.001996 0.001988 
 (6.04)*** (5.91)*** (6.54)*** 
lgage -0.061570 -0.011019 -0.033912 
 (0.77) (0.12) (0.42) 
dY0 0.002670 0.003512 0.003703 
 (0.11) (0.14) (0.16) 
CashtoTA -0.001309 -0.001285 -0.001163 
 (2.10)** (1.94)* (1.97)** 
Beta -0.228903 -0.353484 -0.250735 
 (1.71)* (1.76)* (1.58) 
LnValueTrans 0.018515 0.030714 0.020547 
 (0.49) (0.64) (0.49) 
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PaymentCash -0.838793 -0.910640 -0.665844 
 (1.24) (1.14) (0.98) 
PaymentShare -0.342917 -0.386764 -0.340778 
 (1.17) (1.13) (1.13) 
PaymentMixed -0.293719 -0.643211 -0.554052 
 (1.00) (1.52) (1.49) 
Related Target -0.447661 -0.517787 -0.457966 
 (1.84)* (1.73)* (1.75)* 
Toehold 0.001986 0.000654 0.001403 
 (0.56) (0.17) (0.39) 
Country  Included Included 
Industry    Yes 
Constant 3.379710 5.201966 4.613865 
 (2.88)** (2.54)** (2.59)** 
Observations 719 719 719 
Number of IDCODE 273 273 273 
RHO 0.930 0.944 0.941 
Wald Chi 44.22*** 43.45*** 53.74*** 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses (* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%, significant at 1%) 
 
 
Table 23: PA conflicts using FEVD analysis 
 
 (Model 1) (Model 2) 
 Asset Utilisation ratio 
Lship -0.000156 -0.000933 
 (0.41) (1.69) 
Lshipsquare  0.000013 
  (1.95) 
Profitability -0.000000 -0.000000 
 (0.63) (0.62) 
LagProfitability -0.000000 -0.000000 
 (0.44) (0.43) 
lnCashFlow 0.038853 0.037879 
 (8.02)*** (7.79)*** 
TDTA -0.002367 -0.002361 
 (6.78)*** (6.77)*** 
Beta 0.012723 0.013397 
 (1.43) (1.51) 
lnTotalAssets 0.005143 0.004989 
 (4.64)*** (4.49)*** 
Sales1YrGrth -0.000001 -0.000001 
 (0.81) (0.81) 
lnAge -0.001254 -0.001317 
 (2.56)** (2.68)*** 
Constant 0.236726 0.259131 
 (2.74)** (2.97)*** 
Observations 1195 1195 
R-squared 0.8541 0.8545 
Absolute value of t 
statistics in parentheses 
692.93*** 631.78*** 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses (* significant at 10%;  
** significant at 5%, significant at 1%) 
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7.7 Summary 
 
This chapter details the results of the research and analyses the information and 
statistical methods applied in the sample Asean 5 M&A data. PP and PA conflicts 
associated with M&A are tested using parametric and non-parametric analysis to 
check for significant changes. The relationship between PP conflicts, ownership, 
financial and M&A variables is elaborated in detail as well. There are also 
discussions about the econometric tests for endogeneity, autocorrelation and joint 
significance of the models. The controlling shareholders’ incentives to pursue 
private benefits and interfere with investment decisions under weaker investor 
protection imply a higher dividend payouts. Table 24 in the following chapter 
summarises the results indicated by each analysis described earlier.  
 
Overall, this study supports the indication that PP conflicts using three different 
measurements of dividend ratios are significant in Asean 5 acquiring companies.  
The first analysis using a univariate test support changes in dividend as PP 
conflicts proxy throughout three years before and after M&A. The significance of 
PP conflicts is generally observed during the second year after M&A becomes 
effective. The test for changes in PA conflicts, on the other hand, has shown no 
significant changes pre and post three years of M&A.  
 
HT is regarded in this thesis as the main method for discussion. This is because 
the analysis has taken the problems of endogeneity and autocorrelation, time-
invariant as well as the time-variant variables in the analysis. The implementation 
of other robust analysis such as Tobit analysis is to confirm the relationship of the 
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main estimator of large shareholder by adjusting the potential biases due to the 
presence of zero-dividend observations in the sample. The next robust analysis 
using the relatively new FEVD method is arguably by Greene (2010) as ‘illusory’ 
(p.1) because the steps are just using adjustments with ordinary least square 
(OLS) models. This will in fact produce estimators which are biased in the same 
way that OLS estimates are. However, it is worth noted to include this analysis in 
this because the strength of FEVD is that the coefficients remain consistent 
whenever HT is also consistent (Thomas Plümper & Vera E. Troeger, 2011). This 
is especially true when FE model has been shown in this chapter where the model 
drops and does not generate coefficients for time-invariant variables (for example 
large shareholder variables, other M&A variables). 
 
Results from multivariate analyses of PP conflicts proxies using both dividend 
and performance measurement also suggest that large, controlling shareholders 
seem to be expropriating minority shareholders during M&A. It is shown that at a 
concentration threshold of 20%, the controlling shareholder gains significant 
control over the company and power to divert corporate resources to his/her own 
interests.  
 
The evidence also reveals that there could be a possibility of a concave 
relationship implying a relationship opposite from the usual U-shaped relationship 
in some developed markets. At even higher concentration of shareholders, there 
seem to be a reduction in PP conflicts suggesting that large shareholders may 
regard that their wealth maximisation in the company overall outweighs their own 
private benefit.  
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Second largest controlling shareholders seem to team up with the largest 
shareholder in extracting private benefits for themselves. However, as the 
ownership percentage owned by the second large shareholder increases, this co-
operation declines. This could mean that they may to some extent provide good 
monitoring to help reduce PP conflicts in these markets.  
 
Results from multivariate analysis have also discerned that managers may also 
collaborate with large shareholders. This is shown from increased PA conflicts 
associated with M&A in Asean 5 markets when other financial and M&A 
variables are taken into account. The analysis casts some doubt that PP conflicts 
are the not the only main agency problems in these markets after all.  
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CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
8.1  Introduction  
 
This chapter provides a summary of findings of the empirical studies reported in 
Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 regarding PP conflicts in M&A activities in Asean 5. 
Section 8.2 presents recapitulation of this study which is followed by Section 8.3 
that summarizes the focus of the study. This is followed by Section 8.4 with the 
key findings as presented in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 including a summary of the 
results of pair wise correlation, changes in PP conflict, HT regression analysis, 
panel Tobit regression, FEVD, and analysis on PA conflict. Section 8.5 discusses 
contribution and implications of this study and Section 8.6 discusses the study’s 
limitations. Suggestions for future research relating to the study are presented in 
Section 8.7. This chapter ends with concluding remarks in Section 8.8 which 
focuses on contributions of the findings of the thesis to the body of knowledge in 
the area of PP conflict and M&A specifically and to the theory of finance in 
general. 
 
8.2  Recapitulation of study 
 
This study has investigated the possible PP conflicts that are caused by large 
shareholders associated with mergers and acquisitions (M&A) in Asean 5 
(Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and Philippines) acquiring companies. 
The main research objective is to determine whether large shareholders exacerbate 
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PP conflicts associated with M&A in Asean 5. The second objective is to assess 
whether second large shareholders help to exacerbate PP conflicts in Asean 5. The 
third objective is to probe the concentration threshold of expropriation level in 
Asean 5 M&A and the final objective is to investigate whether principal-agent 
(PA) conflict is a prominent problem for Asean 5 acquiring companies.  
 
In order to achieve the objectives, the following research questions were 
considered: 1) What is the percentage of large shareholders of acquirers in Asean 
5 companies? (2) Do dividend payouts change after M&A in Asean 5? (3) Do 
large shareholders exacerbate PP conflicts? If yes, at what percentage is the 
largest shareholders’ threshold that has an impact on the PP conflict? (4) Do the 
second largest shareholders exacerbate PP conflicts? (5) Is principal-agent (PA) a 
prominent problem for acquirers in Asean 5 companies? 
 
Through addressing these five questions, three major contributions to the 
understanding PP conflict can be derived from the thesis. The first contribution is 
that the thesis focuses on the major and growing phenomena of M&A activities in 
the Asean 5 economy. Secondly, this thesis addresses the empirical studies of PP 
conflict where, in contrast, most research often relies solely on agency theory and 
often the PA perspective of agency theory. Last but not least, the third 
contribution is that results have shown that PP conflicts and PA conflicts are 
found to be a major problem in Asean 5 M&A.  
 
Most Asian companies experience the unique problem (Dharwadkar, et al., 2000) 
of PP conflicts but previous research focuses mainly on the PA conflicts. Such 
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studies in developed countries usually find agency conflicts have a negative 
impact on company value. Questions remain unanswered as to how rampant is PP 
conflicts in Asean 5, especially in the context of M&As. Decision makers and 
investors, especially minority shareholders, can utilise the findings to understand 
the impact of M&A initiatives on their funds invested and the related risks and 
potential gains. Empirical models associated with this analysis will be of 
assistance for investors in the evaluation of their investment strategies. 
 
8.3  Focus of the study 
 
This study focuses on the less popular and relatively new area in finance literature 
known as PP conflicts. The motivation for this study arises from the contended 
issue that in some countries, the agency problem is probably not the infamous PA 
conflicts, which is between the shareholders and the managers, but it may be 
between the shareholders themselves, more specifically between the controlling 
shareholders and minority shareholders within the corporation itself. If it is indeed 
PP conflicts that really matter in some countries and not PA conflicts, this will 
change the landscape of corporate governance which has always focussed on PA 
conflicts with very little attention paid to PP conflicts by business, authorities, 
regulators, practitioners, and academicians. In fact, the impact of PP conflicts may 
be more detrimental than PA conflicts in some countries.  
 
PP conflicts may be evidenced and significant in a situation when a corporation 
goes through M&A activities. During M&A, controlling shareholders may have 
opportunities to expropriate income and profit of the corporation that benefit 
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themselves at the expense of minority shareholders. One of the opportunities is 
dividends, as controlling shareholders through their directorship representation on 
the board of directors, possess influence on the amount of dividends to be paid 
out. The payment of dividends via profits is designed to preserve the company’s 
capital. The dividends will be paid out of profits that need to be available at the 
time dividends are declared and not at the time of actual payment. In addition, 
payment of dividends to shareholders is a trade-off for higher retained earnings 
which are a source of low-cost funds to the corporation for future expansion. 
 
As opposed to the controlling shareholders, minority shareholders have little voice 
and influence at all in matters pertaining to dividends. Thus, M&A clearly 
represents a situation where controlling shareholders have the opportunity and 
may take that opportunity to expropriate corporation income in the form of 
dividends to benefit themselves. Obviously, minority shareholders will also 
receive dividends. However, it should be noted that controlling shareholders who 
make the decisions on dividends through their board representation may make the 
decisions that benefits them in the short term rather than for the long-term 
prospect of the corporation, which thus may not be in the best interest of the 
corporation or the minority shareholders. 
 
Asean 5 countries represent an excellent opportunity to study PP conflicts in 
M&A activities. These five countries are all neighbouring countries in South East 
Asia and are the founding members of an economic trade zone area known as 
Association of South East Asian Nation or ASEAN. Although they are closely 
related to each other, their regulatory framework, structure of capital market, and 
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stage of economic development are not at all the same. In Chapter 3, this thesis 
provides detailed explanation of the structure of capital markets in each of the 5 
countries, regulatory framework of M&A activities in each of the 5 countries, and 
regulations pertaining to shareholders protection and dividend policy in each of 
the 5 countries. The similarities and differences of these regulations and practices 
provide diversity to the study, as well as complexity. 
 
To enrich this study in terms of the methodology and modelling structure, it 
includes time-invariant and time-variant variables in the panel data model analysis 
to provide an additional confirmation of the veracity of the modelling and 
robustness analysis. The HT and FEVD techniques are employed since most of 
the variables used in this study have very limited within variance and as such does 
not fit the traditional panel data estimators. The model generated in this study is 
specified with the PP proxy and is explained by a set of time-varying, time-
invariant and rarely changing variables. Robust analysis using Tobit regression is 
also being implemented in this study.  
 
The task of collecting data was not straightforward and while appropriate to 
recognise efforts by various databases to collect and compile helpful sources, 
there remains much more work to be done in terms of manual collection of data 
from annual reports. These data are sourced from the SDC M&A Database, SDC 
Ownership database and Thomson One Banker Database. Further data have been 
collected from companies listed in the individual stock exchange markets of the 
five countries. The exercise leads to the final sample which comprises of 1,013 
deals (807 acquiring companies) from years 2000 to 2008 in various industries.  
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8.4  Summary of key findings 
 
Table 24 presents the summary of key findings for each hypothesis from this 
study. The discussion presented in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 started with 
descriptive statistics which show an uneven distribution of the number of effective 
M&A deals, and the number of M&A deals in the final sample among the five 
countries. This has been highlighted as the main limitation of this study. In some 
analysis, observations from Indonesia and Philippines have to be excluded to 
avoid numerical instability. For example, while conducting regression analysis in 
Stata software, it was discovered that the dummy regressors are collinear with 
other independent regressors and thus, it was necessary to drop the observations 
from these two countries from the model.  
 
The descriptive statistics further show the characteristics of the bidding firms with 
a list of variables being grouped into dependent variables and independent 
variables. The six dependent variables are dividend/cash flow, dividend/earnings, 
dividend/sales, dividend/market capitalization, Efficiency Ratio, and Tobin’s q. 
On the other hand, the independent variables are grouped into four groups, namely 
ownership variables, financial variables, M&A variables, and industry and 
country dummies. 
 
Descriptive results depicted in Table 8 answer the first research question and 
show that the average largest shareholding is 32% while the second largest 
shareholder is 11%. This average figure answers the first research question in this 
study. The maximum percentage of shares owned by one entity of shareholder is 
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88% and the second shareholder is 37%. This picture confirms that shareholding 
in Asean 5 countries is highly concentrated consistent with other studies 
(Claessens, et al., 2000b; Faccio, et al., 2001b).  
 
This study provides six main empirical analyses which are summarised as pair 
wise correlation results in Section 8.4.1, analysis of PP and PP conflicts changes 
associated with M&A in Section 8.4.2, panel regression empirical results in 
Section 8.4.3, panel Tobit regression of PP conflicts and explanatory variables in 
Section 8.4.4, FEVD of PP conflicts and explanatory variables in Section 8.4.5, 
and PA conflicts and large shareholders in Section 8.4.6. The summary of 
hypotheses is presented in Table 24 as below. 
 
 
Table 24: Summary of hypotheses results 
 
Hypothesis Findings  
Univariate analysis Paired t test Wilcoxon 
H1a: Acquiring companies’ dividend 
is lower before M&A 
 
 
 
H1b: Acquiring companies’ 
dividend is higher after M&A 
Fail to reject 
H1a (Pre & 
post 2 and 3 
years)  
 
 
Fail to reject 
H1b 
(Pre & post 2 
and 3 years) 
 
Fail to reject 
H1a  
(Pre & post 2 
and 3 years) 
 
 
Fail to reject 
H1b 
(Pre & post 2 
and 3 years) 
H14a: Acquiring company’s asset 
utilisation ratio is higher before 
M&A 
 
 
Reject H14a 
(insignificant) 
 
 
 
Reject H14a 
(insignificant) 
 
 
 
     
226 
 
H14b: Acquiring company’s asset 
utilisation ratio is lower after M&A 
Reject H14a 
(insignificant) 
Fail to reject 
H14b 
(Pre & post 3 
years) 
 
Multivariate analysis 
 
HT  
 
Tobit 
 
FEVD 
 
H2a: There is a positive relationship 
between the largest shareholder and 
PP conflicts associated with M&A 
 
H2b: There is a negative relationship 
between large shareholders and PP 
conflicts (performance 
measurement) associated with M&A 
Fail to reject 
H2a 
 
 
 
Negative 
coefficient 
(insignificant) 
Fail to reject 
H2a 
 
 
 
 
N/A 
 
 
 
Fail to 
reject H2a 
H3a: The ownership by large 
shareholder is non-linearly related to 
PP conflicts associated with M&A.  
 
H3b: There is a positive relationship 
at high levels of ownership and a 
negative relationship at low levels of 
ownership. 
 
Fail to reject 
H3a  
 
 
 
Fail to reject 
H3b  
 
 
N/A  
 
Fail to 
reject H3a  
 
H4:  There is a positive relationship 
between the largest shareholders 
concentrated (at 5%, 10%, 20%, 
30%, 40% and 50% cut off) and PP 
conflict associated with M&A.  
 
Fail to reject H4 (Significant at 20% and 
above threshold) 
 
 
H5: There is a negative relationship 
between second largest shareholders 
with PP conflicts associated with 
M&A.  
Negative 
coefficient 
(though 
insignificant) 
 Fail to 
reject H5  
H6: There is a negative relationship 
between leverage and PP conflicts 
associated with M&A 
 
Negative 
coefficient 
(insignificant) 
Fail to reject 
H6  
(div to 
earnings) 
Negative 
coefficient 
(insignificant) 
H7: There is a negative relationship 
between PP conflicts and growth 
rate associated with M&A 
Fail to reject 
H7 
Fail to reject 
H7  
(div to 
earnings) 
Negative 
coefficient 
(insignificant) 
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H8: There is a positive relationship 
between company size and PP 
conflicts associated with M&A 
 
Reject H8 
(Negatively 
significant) 
Reject H8 
(insignificant) 
Reject H8 
(insignificant) 
H9: There is a positive relationship 
between company age and PP 
conflicts 
Positive 
coefficient 
(insignificant) 
Reject H9 
(inconclusive) 
Positive 
coefficient 
(insignificant) 
H10: There is a negative relationship 
between M&A values and PP 
conflicts 
 
Negative 
coefficient 
(insignificant) 
Negative 
coefficient 
(insignificant) 
Negative 
coefficient 
(insignificant) 
H11a: There is a positive 
relationship between payment 
method using cash and PP conflicts 
 
H11b: There is a negative 
relationship between payment 
method using shares and PP 
conflicts 
Positive 
coefficient 
(insignificant) 
 
Reject H11b 
Fail to reject 
H11a 
 
 
Reject H11b 
(inconclusive) 
Positive 
coefficient 
(insignificant) 
 
Reject 
H11b 
(inconclusive) 
 
H12: There is a positive relationship 
between toehold companies with PP 
conflicts 
Reject H12 
(insignificant)  
Reject H12 
(inconclusive 
Reject H12 
(inconclusive 
H13: There is a negative relationship 
between related target companies 
with PP conflicts 
 
Negative 
coefficient 
(insignificant) 
Negative 
coefficient 
(insignificant) 
Negative 
coefficient 
(insignificant) 
H14c: There is a negative 
relationship between largest 
shareholders and PA conflicts 
associated with M&A   
Fail to reject H15 Negative 
coefficient 
(insignificant) 
 
8.4.1  Pair wise correlation results 
Table 10 shows the pair wise correlation matrix between the dependent and 
independent variables in the study. The highest correlation is 51.14% between 
dividend to cash flow and dividend to market capitalisation ratios. All the 
dividend ratios and efficiency ratios are found to be significantly correlated with 
each other which illustrate their tendency to vary together. Except for dividend to 
sales ratio, PP proxies for dividend show positive and significant correlation 
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coefficients with concentrated ownership consisting of large shareholders, large 
shareholder square and second large shareholders.   
 
This result thus offers strong support to the preliminary hypothesis that there is 
evidence of PP conflict using dividend ratios when there are large shareholdings 
within companies in Asean 5 during M&A.  
 
8.4.2  Analysis of PP and PP conflict changes associated with M&A 
This section answers the second research question whether dividend payout 
changes after M&A in Asean 5. The result for this analysis is shown in Table 11. 
Post M&A dividends (ratio of cash flow, earnings, and market capitalization) 
increased significantly after two years of effective M&A. This may indicate that 
PP conflict shows indefinitely after the second year of the acquiring companies. 
There is an increase of dividend in the first year but the expropriation by the large 
shareholders can only be seen after the second year of M&A as these companies 
are probably more stable by then and have more cash resources internally for 
dividend payouts.  
 
The asset utilisation ratio or total sales-total asset ratio (proxy for PA conflicts) 
does not show a significant change pre- and post-M&A. This supports the view so 
far, without a thorough analysis that PA conflicts may not be the agency problem 
in Asean 5, particularly in an M&A setting and that calls for further investigation. 
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8.4.3  Panel regression results: HT method 
The third research question in the study that seeks to find out if large shareholders 
in Asean 5 M&A exacerbate PP conflicts? The results generated in all models 
shown in Table 14, that there is a significant relationship between PP conflicts 
and large shareholders. The results remain significant even after controlling for 
country and industry effects. These results thus are in accord with the hypothesis 
that PP conflict increases with the level of shareholdings by the largest 
shareholder in M&A activities in Asean 5. Thus, this thesis argues that in Asean 
5, the higher payout of dividends after a major and expensive investment of  
M&A indicates higher expropriation by controlling shareholders. The notion of 
this is strengthen when the growth rate of the company is negatively related to the 
PP conflicts metric. This shows that as dividend paid more during M&A, the 
growth rate of the company seems to be falling.  
 
The comparative results of PP conflicts between countries in Asean 5 and among 
the 15 industries are presented in Appendix 5. Malaysian companies with large 
shareholders seem to pay higher dividend rates than the other four countries. As 
for the industry effects on PP conflicts, results show that four industries, namely 
food, clothes, transportation and retail stores have significant effects on PP 
conflicts using all three dummy variables. As such, this study suggests that there 
is a significant relationship between PP conflicts using dividends and the 
independent variables even after controlling for industry. 
 
This study suggests that for Asean 5, the relationship between PP conflicts and 
large shareholder is concave, which means that dividends increase with ownership 
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of the largest shareholder; however dividend payout ratios start to decrease as the 
percentage continuously increasing. The possibility of large shareholders 
unwilling to pay higher tax at this higher end is investigated and it is found that 
the insignificant coefficient results for all specifications confirm the notion that 
tax payments do not influence dividend policy (La Porta et al., 2000b). The 
possibility of this finding may be that large shareholder during an M&A process 
act as a monitoring role at the lower end and higher end of dividend policies. 
However, the role shifts to entrenchment behaviour at the increasing stage of 
ownership to the point that they are in the position to extract company’s earnings 
associated with M&A.  
 
This study supports previous studies on this issue and thus suggests that for Asean 
5, older companies with higher concentration of large shareholder have higher 
dividend payout ratios, and this is especially so when concentration of large 
shareholders increases. When testing the concentration threshold cut-off or sub-
group, significant relationships are to be found when the coefficient of the largest 
shareholder is at 20% and more. This finding affirms that for Asean 5 countries, 
PP conflicts is significant at a minimum ownership concentration level of 20% 
and PP conflicts increases as the level of ownership concentration increases. 
 
The fourth research question is asking do second large shareholders exacerbate PP 
conflicts. Previous studies in developed markets suggest that the presence of a 
second largest shareholder may act to curb expropriation from the controlling 
shareholder. In this study, the role of second shareholder is tested. The negative 
but insignificant coefficients upon addition of the second large shareholder as 
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another variable suggest that there is no relationship between PP conflicts and 
second large shareholder. This is aligned with the notion that second largest 
shareholder has no impact to dividend ratio policy in East Asian companies 
(Claessens et al. 2000a) and is still true during M&A activities. 
  
The results on the utilisation of Tobin’s q as a proxy for PP conflicts are presented 
in Table 18. The results show that the coefficients of large shareholders are 
negative, but insignificant. This result suggests that as large shareholders increase, 
company performance tends to deteriorate. However, this remains inconclusive 
due to the insignificant p-values. The question remains if whether using a 
performance-based study to explore expropriation is sufficient in the context of 
the Asean market. This is because financial data may be manipulated by the large, 
controlling shareholders as well as the managers to project better performance. 
 
8.4.4  Robust analysis: Panel Tobit regression of PP conflicts and explanatory 
variables 
Tobit regression analysis is a robust method used to test whether large 
shareholders also play a part in the decision to pay or not to pay dividends in 
Asean 5 acquiring companies. This analysis is necessary given that there are 
companies in the sample that do not pay out dividends. The coefficient results on 
large shareholders are positive and significant across all models. Tobit regression 
also supports the hypothesis that there is a non-linear relationship between the 
large shareholder and PP conflicts in Asean 5 M&A. This again supports the 
notion that large shareholders of acquiring companies in Asean 5 play a main role 
in deciding to pay out dividends. 
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8.4.5 Robust analysis: FEVD of PP conflicts and explanatory variables  
FEVD analysis is also used to allow for time-invariant variables (large 
shareholder and M&A variables) to be incorporated in the regression models. The 
results indicate that the large shareholders’ explanatory variable is significant and 
positive. The positive sign implies that as dividends increase the percentage level 
of large shareholders grows. This method also support results from HT analysis 
whereas dividend payouts as indication of PP conflicts increased, the growth rate 
of the company is falling significantly. There is also support for a non-linear 
relationship between large shareholders and PP conflicts.  
 
The coefficients for second large shareholder are found to be positive, similar to 
using HT analysis. However, FEVD shows it to be significant. There is an 
increase of dividend ratio of 0.34 with an increase of 1% in the percentage of 
second large shareholder. This may support the notion of collaboration in 
determining PP conflicts between large and second large shareholders during 
M&A. 
 
8.4.6  PA conflict and large shareholders 
HT analysis is used to test the hypothesis that there is a negative but significant 
relationship between PA conflict and large shareholders using asset utilisation 
ratio associated with M&A in Asean 5 companies. The results shown provide the 
answer to the last research question in this thesis whether principal-agent (PA) 
conflict is a prominent problem for the acquiring companies in Asean 5. The 
analysis probe an important implication where not only are PP conflicts found to 
be rampant in Asean 5 M&A, PA conflict is also substantial. The results also 
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indicate that there is a linear relationship between PA conflict and large 
shareholders in Asean 5 companies. The negative relationship between relatedness 
of the acquisition to the target’s industry may also indicate that it might be more 
efficient to acquire a non-related industry when undertaking M&A.  
 
8.5   Contribution and implication of the study 
This thesis provides profound evidence of the existence of PP conflicts in M&A 
activities in Asean 5 countries. These are supported in the hypotheses by La Porta 
et al (1998) and Claessens et al (1999) that concentrated ownership leads to 
conflict of interest between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders.  
Companies examined in this study tend to pay higher dividends to their 
shareholders post M&A. The growth rate of these companies has been found to be 
deteriorating with higher payment of dividends paid out to the shareholders. In 
addition, this study also provides concrete evidence that PA conflict is also 
relevant in Asean 5 countries, which strongly contradicts some literature. Thus, 
the main contribution of this study is to affirm with empirical evidence that in 
Asean 5 countries during M&A activities, the conflicts that are relevant and, more 
importantly need to be addressed, are the conflicts among large shareholders as 
well as the traditional principal-agent conflicts.  
This study has provided two alternative measurements for PP conflicts. The two 
measurements, namely the dividend ratio used in the accounting-based 
measurement and Tobin’s q. The accounting-based measurement measures the 
actual dividend payout of the acquiring companies’ pre- and post- M&A, while 
the market-based measurement of Tobin’s q measures the firm values as 
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perceived by investors as a result of the business combination. The 
inconsistencies in the performance-based results  have practical implication for 
investors and minority shareholders. It shows that expropriation by large 
shareholders might not be fully reflected in the predominant research on market-
based performance measurement. Given that most of the Asean market is less 
efficient compared with developed markets; the availability of dividend ratio 
policies to the public should provide a more reliable indicator for PP conflicts. 
 
Although there are differences in dividend policies among the Asean 5 countries, 
in general, payment of dividends is at the discretion of boards of directors. There 
are just several skeleton rules and regulations pertaining to payment of dividends 
but none of them has been enforced specifically to curb PP conflicts. As this study 
provides evidence of the existence and influence of PP conflicts in M&A 
activities in Asean 5 countries, it is appropriate for authorities, regulators, and 
policy makers to introduce a measure to curb or limit the extent of PP conflicts as 
well as PA conflict in M&A activities. This thesis suggests an upper limit of 
dividend payout ratio post-M&A that a company must adhere to as a measure to 
ensure that controlling shareholders are not expropriating company income via 
payment of high dividends to shareholders. 
 
Additionally, this study adopts HT and FEVD regression methods to control for 
endogeneity effect and reverse causality of independent and dependent variables 
of dividend, performance, other control and M&A to provide robust results. Most 
previous studies do not explore these problematic effects that may produce bias 
coefficient results, while some use 2SLS regression technique that requires strict 
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suitability in choosing a proper instrumental variable (IV) in the model. More 
importantly, these methods allow for the challenge of incorporating time-variant 
and time-invariant variables into the same model. The current research extends the 
econometric robustness of analysis using Tobit regression. 
Much attention has been given to the impact of M&A performances examining 
for abnormal returns for market based research or accounting based returns using 
profitability ratios. Other M&A research also involve activities on employees both 
of the acquiring companies and the target companies. This includes matters 
pertaining to redundancy, employees’ benefits, remuneration of boards of 
directors, compensation to chief executive officers, and branding issues. 
Nevertheless, such research focuses on PA conflicts and deliberately ignores the 
existence of PP conflicts, either because of lack of understanding of the existence 
and impact of PP conflicts, or because there has been no previous study that 
measures and explains PP conflicts in Asean 5 countries. Regardless of the 
reason, it is understandable that PP conflicts have been ignored because it is a 
relatively new discovery as opposed to the more well-known and widely-
researched PA conflict. 
The seriousness of this study’s findings should not be understated. Rules and 
regulations in financial markets are drawn and enforced based on the 
understanding of the authorities, regulators, and policy makers. If previously these 
parties have been relying on their understanding of PA conflicts only and thus 
drafted their rules and regulations based on this understanding, it is now clear 
with profound evidence that they are missing significant and important 
information regarding conflicts, namely, PP conflicts.  
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This study is useful especially for non-controlling or minority shareholders who 
provide capital funds in exchange for risky returns, especially in the context of 
large shareholders making M&A investment decisions that may compromise the 
benefit to overall company value.  
 
Findings from this study thus conclude that both PP and PA conflicts are relevant 
and significant in Asean 5 countries. These findings provide a new dimension for 
the authorities, regulators, and policy makers in Asean 5 countries, such as 
Financial Institutions Supervisory Board (Bapepam-LK) in Indonesia, Securities 
Commissions in Malaysia, Securities Industry Council in Singapore, Securities 
Regulation Code (SRC) in Philippines and The Securities Exchange Commission 
(SEC) in Thailand. Not undermining the importance of these matters, authorities, 
regulators, and policy makers in Asean 5 countries should now also acknowledge 
the importance of having rules and regulations pertaining to expropriation of 
income by large, controlling shareholders.  
 
At the time that this thesis is written, only Malaysia and Singapore have special 
M&A regulations to regulate the M&A activities conducted there. Hence, it is 
about time that the other markets in the Asean region to address the issue of 
regulating and implementing M&A guidelines to monitor the inevitable growing 
M&A activities in their market to promote investments.  
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8.6   Limitations of the study 
 
Having an uneven distribution of the number of effective M&A deals among the 
five countries included in this study has been highlighted as its main limitation. 
The sample data clearly noted the low number of effective M&A deals in 
Indonesia and Philippines while Malaysia dominates by having the highest 
number of effective M&A deals. As a result, observations from Indonesia and 
Philippines have to be excluded from the model when conducting regression 
analyses. 
 
Being a multi-country study, albeit from the same region, this study has to deal 
with diversity of regulatory framework and non-standardized rules and regulations 
pertaining to M&A and dividend policy. Although there are similarities among 
these rules and regulations, the differences cannot be ignored. Being the most 
developed country among the five countries and positioned as a major financial 
centre in Asia, Singapore has more structured and internationally common rules 
and regulations. As for Malaysia, there are issues pertaining to shareholders 
protection and foreign investment that are more restrictive and unique. On the 
other hand, Thailand is progressing well in liberalization of its financial sector and 
thus is changing to attract foreign investment. The financial markets in Indonesia 
and Philippines are still developing and have not reached the level of maturity 
enjoyed by Singapore and Malaysia. As such, findings of this study are 
generalized for the Asean 5 countries and should not be referred specifically for 
any single country. 
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Data for this study are mainly sourced from Securities Data Corporation’s (SDC) 
Platinum
TM
 Worldwide Mergers & Acquisition Database which are comprised of 
information collated and gathered from annual reports of public listed companies 
in the five countries from 2000 to 2008. Although there is a requirement for 
disclosure of top 20 shareholders in the annual reports of public listed companies 
in the Asean 5 countries, there is no restriction for the use of nominee account 
name as shareholders. Thus, as a result of this leniency, many large shareholders 
display the nominee account name when listing top 20 shareholders in their 
company annual reports. As such, there may be cross-holding of large 
shareholders in the top 20 shareholders of a company or cross-holding of large 
shareholders in the top 20 shareholders of multiple companies that cannot be 
detected by the database. Unfortunately, empirical research conducted in this 
thesis is limited to using the data as collated and gathered by Securities Data 
Corporation’s (SDC) PlatinumTM Worldwide Mergers & Acquisition Database. 
 
8.7   Suggestions for future research 
 
Due to unavailability of data, this study has been limited to analysing PP conflicts 
arising in M&A activities. However, M&A alone is not the only major corporate 
restructuring exercise. Changes in ownership structure may happen without 
involving M&A, and PP conflicts may be evidenced and prevalent in such cases. 
In addition, companies may also undergo major restructuring as a result of a 
significant individual investment project which, again, may attract PP conflicts. 
These areas are not covered in this thesis and may be explored for further 
research. 
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Furthermore, this thesis is limited in studying the impact of PP conflicts on 
minority shareholders. Expropriation of income by controlling shareholders is 
indeed very detrimental to minority shareholders and should be investigated. 
While acknowledging the importance of a proposed study on minority 
shareholders, researchers may face a daunting task to gather data on minority 
shareholders as information on minority shareholdings is not required to be 
disclosed in the annual reports of public listed companies, at least in Asean 5 
countries. An initial study may be conducted in other developed countries in 
Europe and North America where information on minority shareholdings can be 
obtained. 
 
This thesis also only analyses PP conflicts from the perspective of acquiring 
companies. The impact of PP conflicts on target companies is not explored in this 
thesis and thus represents an opportunity for further research. Again, data 
gathering may be more difficult given that not all of the target companies are 
public-listed companies. If an M&A involves a private company as the target 
entity, information on the target company may be difficult to obtain. 
 
The region that comprises Asean 5 countries has been identified as a region that 
provides exceptional opportunities to businesses and investors. The buoyant 
economies of the five countries bring along a wave of corporate restructuring 
activities which include M&A. These M&A deals may be done with good 
intention to expand the business and eventually enhance shareholder wealth. 
However, it should also be acknowledged shareholders and managers may take 
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advantage of an M&A deal to benefit them. Unfortunately, many M&A deals are 
too complex and complicated for small and minority shareholders to understand, 
and thus ‘greedy’ large shareholders may expropriate income from the company 
for their own private benefits. 
Ownerships of Asean 5 companies are concentrated in the period of analysis in 
this thesis that suggest strongly for corporate dividends to be an indicator for PP 
conflicts and hence, may prevent from the problem of expropriation by large 
shareholders from escalating in the event of M&A. 
As a result of these findings, authorities, regulators, and policy makers in Asean 5 
countries should change their perspective on rules and regulations pertaining to 
M&A. As such, they should treat the findings of this study as an eye-opener; that 
they have been ignoring an important side of conflicts which have now been 
found to have significant impact on firm performance and affecting interests of 
minority shareholders. More importantly, their ignorance has provided 
opportunities for unscrupulous controlling shareholders to expropriate from 
minority shareholders. Thus, it is extremely important for the authorities, 
regulators, and policy makers in Asean 5 to have a regulatory body for each 
market, to realise the importance and significance of this study so that they can 
effectively introduce and enforce effective mechanisms, rules and regulations that 
can prevent, curb, or at least minimise expropriation by controlling shareholders 
which is identified in this thesis as PP conflicts.  
Findings of this study provide empirical evidence that may affirm the existence of 
PP conflicts in M&A activities in Asean 5 countries. Alongside this issue, PA 
conflict is also found to be rampant in Asean 5 countries. As such, this thesis 
     
241 
 
concludes that in Asean 5 countries during M&A activities both conflicts are 
relevant and should be addressed and this study may carve a different way of 
thinking for regulators in this region.  The potential for further studies on these 
issues is immense.  
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix 1: Country Group Information 
 
Country Groups Information 
 
 
   
 
World 
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Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, 
The, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, 
Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, 
Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Democratic Republic of, Congo, Republic of, 
Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, 
Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, 
Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, The, Georgia, 
Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, 
Honduras, Hong Kong SAR, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Islamic Republic 
of, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kiribati, 
Korea, Kuwait, Kyrgyz Republic, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, 
Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Former Yugoslav Republic 
of, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, 
Mexico, Moldova, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, 
Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, 
Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, 
Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Samoa, São Tomé and Príncipe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, 
Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Solomon 
Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and 
the Grenadines, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab 
Republic, Taiwan Province of China, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Tonga, 
Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab 
Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela, 
Vietnam, Yemen, Republic of, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. 
  
 
Advanced economies 
Composed of 33 countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Cyprus, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong SAR, Iceland, 
Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, Portugal, Singapore, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Taiwan Province of China, United Kingdom, and United States. 
  
Major advanced economies (G7) 
Composed of 7 countries: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom, and 
United States. 
  
Newly industrialized Asian economies 
Composed of 4 countries: Hong Kong SAR, Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan Province of 
China. 
  
European Union 
Composed of 27 countries: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, 
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Romania, and United Kingdom. 
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Emerging and developing economies 
Composed of 149 countries: Afghanistan, Republic of, Albania, Algeria, Angola, 
Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, The, Bahrain, 
Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, 
Cambodia, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, 
Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Democratic Republic of, Congo, Republic of, Costa Rica, 
Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El 
Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, The, 
Georgia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, 
Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Islamic Republic of, Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, 
Kenya, Kiribati, Kuwait, Kyrgyz Republic, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, 
Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Lithuania, Macedonia, Former Yugoslav Republic of, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, 
Moldova, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, 
Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, 
Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Samoa, São Tomé and 
Príncipe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, 
South Africa, Sri Lanka, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, 
Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, 
Timor-Leste, Democratic Republic of, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, 
Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, 
Vanuatu, Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen, Republic of, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. 
 
 
Commonwealth of Independent States 
Composed of 13 countries: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz 
Republic, Moldova, Mongolia, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and 
Uzbekistan. Georgia and Mongolia, which are not members of the Commonwealth of 
Independent States, are included in this group for reasons of geography and similarities 
in economic structure. 
  
Developing Asia 
Composed of 26 countries: Afghanistan, Republic of, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Brunei 
Darussalam, Cambodia, China, Fiji, India, Indonesia, Kiribati, Lao People's Democratic 
Republic, Malaysia, Maldives, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, 
Philippines, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Democratic 
Republic of, Tonga, Vanuatu, and Vietnam. 
  
ASEAN-5 (edited by author) 
Composed of 5 countries: Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, and Singapore. 
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Appendix 2: SIC broad categories 
 
SIC Codes Particular 
1 Food 
2 Mining and minerals 
3 Oil and petroleum products 
4 Textiles, apparel and footwear 
5 Consumer durables 
6 Chemicals 
7 Drugs, soaps, perfumes and tobacco 
8 Construction and construction materials 
9 Steel works etc 
10 Fabricated products 
11 Machinery and business equipment 
12 Automobiles 
13 Transportation 
15 Retail stores 
17 Other such (supplies and wholesale services) 
 
             Source: Fama, E. H., & French, K. R. 17 Industry Portfolios, 2011 
 
Appendix 3: Descriptive statistics of variables in each Asean 5 countries 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Dividend/cash flow 
Indonesia 6282 0.508365 6.185002 -168.229 168.6935 
Malaysia 6282 8.827201 24.17898 -206.16 357.5879 
Philippines 6282 0.146371 2.302119 0 102.3523 
Singapore 6282 6.358132 23.93052 -205.035 417.2047 
Thailand 6282 1.526603 9.121734 -63.8437 257.9473 
Dividend/Earnings 
Indonesia 6362 0.003104 0.033507 0 0.8 
Malaysia 6362 0.068477 0.39233 -13.07 10.84 
Philippines 6362 0.003123 0.11224 0 7.17 
Singapore 6362 0.056888 0.401163 -10.76 13.02 
Thailand 6362 0.013361 0.204462 -10.99 6.65 
Dividend/Sales 
Indonesia 6398 0.000894 0.009182 0 0.2423 
Malaysia 6398 0.015068 0.050113 0 1.4279 
Philippines 6398 0.000652 0.017366 0 0.9741 
Singapore 6398 0.016012 0.312077 0 19.2195 
Thailand 6398 0.003139 0.027392 0 0.9692 
Dividend/Market Capitalisation 
Indonesia 6411 0.000721 0.01272 0 0.9094 
Malaysia 6411 0.01181 0.028735 0 1.0728 
Philippines 6411 0.000507 0.015015 0 0.9962 
Singapore 6411 0.009244 0.038164 0 1.1274 
Thailand 6411 0.002309 0.013894 0 0.2569 
Efficiency Ratio 
     
261 
 
Indonesia 6401 0.023235 0.180124 0 2.615 
Malaysia 6401 0.445479 0.560927 0 7.9218 
Philippines 6401 0.014162 0.150218 0 3.6598 
Singapore 6401 0.321894 0.681615 0 13.6845 
Thailand 6401 0.065864 0.292039 0 4.4987 
Large Shareholder 
Indonesia 2736 0.999222 7.121295 0 87.31 
Malaysia 2736 16.84641 19.10873 0 79 
Philippines 2736 0.67807 5.924586 0 81.28 
Singapore 2736 11.67393 20.69237 0 87.7 
Thailand 2736 1.783542 8.065627 0 79.74 
Tobin’s q 
Indonesia 6131 0.0372655 0.3421102 0 10.94552 
Malaysia 6131 0.5318714 0.8197946 0 10.61276 
Philippines 6131 0.0142451 0.1343376 0 2.949276 
Singapore 6131 0.3149597 0.7520296 -0.0611865 10.61555 
Thailand 6131 0.0651183 0.3215589 0 9.461576 
Value of Transactions 
Indonesia 63 0.277023 1.391169 1.9604132 2.6967433 
Malaysia 1,785 0.7685628 1.6629738 0.9996553 3.0413927 
Philippines 54 0.3010703 0.9026742 1.4492667 2.2289134 
Singapore 939 0.8843677 1.8385792 1.3944328 3.16396 
Thailand 198 0.4003027 1.5769847 1.5863682 3.0384711 
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Appendix 4: Analysis using kruskal-wallis for one-way analysis of variance 
 
 kwallis    cf, by (year) 
 
Kruskal-Wallis equality-of-
populations rank test 
 
+-----------------------+ 
year  Obs  Rank Sum  
------+-----+---------- 
-3  821  2.28e+06  
-2  913  4.55e+06  
-1  958  2.82e+06  
0  975  2.90e+06  
1  970  2.89e+06  
------+-----+---------- 
2  959  2.95e+06  
3  921  2.85e+06  
+-----------------------+ 
 
chi-squared =   903.760 with 6 
d.f. 
probability =     0.0001 
 
chi-squared with ties =   903.760 
with 6 d.f. 
probability =     0.0001 
 
. kwallis  mcap, by (year) 
 
Kruskal-Wallis equality-of-
populations rank test 
 
+------------------------+ 
year  Obs   Rank Sum  
------+-----+----------- 
-3  736   2.37e+06  
-2  536  143916.00  
-1  911   3.01e+06  
0  971   3.17e+06  
1  968   3.13e+06  
------+-----+----------- 
2  957   3.14e+06  
3  936   3.12e+06  
+------------------------+ 
 
chi-squared =  1467.021 with 6 
d.f. 
probability =     0.0001 
 
chi-squared with ties =  1467.021 
with 6 d.f. 
probability =     0.0001 
 
. kwallis  earnasset, by (year) 
 
Kruskal-Wallis equality-of-
populations rank test 
 
+-----------------------+ 
year  Obs  Rank Sum  
------+-----+---------- 
-3  787  2.41e+06  
-2  818  2.16e+06  
-1  947  2.91e+06  
0  966  3.10e+06  
1  962  3.17e+06  
------+-----+---------- 
2  948  3.21e+06  
3  923  3.21e+06  
+-----------------------+ 
 
chi-squared =   116.451 with 6 
d.f. 
probability =     0.0001 
 
chi-squared with ties =   116.451 
with 6 d.f. 
probability =     0.0001 
 
. kwallis  ta, by (year) 
 
Kruskal-Wallis equality-of-
populations rank test 
 
+------------------------+ 
year  Obs   Rank Sum  
------+-----+----------- 
-3  792   2.73e+06  
-2  871  380627.00  
-1  932   3.25e+06  
0  953   3.45e+06  
1  967   3.56e+06  
------+-----+----------- 
2  964   3.61e+06  
3  938   3.60e+06  
+------------------------+ 
 
chi-squared =  2285.642 with 6 
d.f. 
probability =     0.0001 
 
chi-squared with ties =  2285.642 
with 6 d.f. 
probability =     0.0001 
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Appendix 5:  Hausman-Taylor results for the country and industry dummy 
variables  
used in Table 14 (PP conflicts and large shareholders) 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 Dividend to cashflows 
 
Dividend to EBITDA 
 
Dividend to Mktcap 
 
acquirornation
==Indonesia 
-37.7186 -62.0185 -1.2728 -1.1620 -0.1474 -0.1646 
 (0.78) (1.47) (1.45) (1.19) (1.80) (1.81) 
acquirornation
==Malaysia 
52.4183 46.7534 0.4327 0.7714 0.0436 0.0504 
 (2.13)** (2.45)** (2.11)** (1.90)** (1.17) (1.21) 
acquirornation
==Philippines 
-11.2855 -13.287 0.3932 -13.28752 0.0238 0.0525 
 (0.72) (0.66) (1.18) (0.66) (0.27) (0.48) 
acquirornation
==Singapore 
39.1372 29.6986 -0.0510 0.1898 -0.0005 -0.0003 
 (1.84)** (1.68)* (0.27) (0.50) (0.01) (0.01) 
acquirornation
==Thailand 
40.9242 35.6869 0.0057 0.5388 0.0368 0.0417 
 (1.66)* (1.74)* (0.01) (1.25) (0.92) (0.93) 
Food  -11.5947  -0.3166  -0.0433 
  (1.64)*  (2.30)*  (2.69)*** 
Mines  81.0359  0.7404  0.0609 
  (2.29)*  (0.98)  (0.76) 
Oil  -4.4664  -0.7184  -0.0089 
  (0.39)  (1.18)  (0.34) 
Clothes  -19.5836  -0.6266  -0.0447 
  (1.70)*  (2.75)***  (1.73)* 
Consumer 
durables 
 -4.0134  -0.0892  -0.0011 
  (0.50)  (0.53)  (0.06) 
Chemicals  -9.0967  -0.3261  -0.0345 
  (1.05)  (1.77)  (1.77) 
Consumer: 
drugs, soaps, 
perfumes, 
tobacco 
 -7.6134  -0.1384  -0.0226 
  (0.71)  (0.62)  (0.95) 
Construction 
and 
construction 
materials 
 -0.3852  -0.1805  -0.0166 
  (0.06)  (1.42)  (1.17) 
Steel works  -12.4834  -0.3763  -0.0143 
  (1.50)  (2.25)*  (0.76) 
Fabricated 
products 
 -6.1105  -0.3290  -0.0285 
  (0.35)  (0.92)  (0.74) 
Machinery 
and business 
equipment 
 -6.1178  -0.1039  -0.0145 
  (0.82)  (0.74)  (0.86) 
Automobiles  -10.5421  -0.1815  -0.0177 
  (1.16)  (0.99)  (0.88) 
Transportation  -19.0120  -0.4682  -0.0488 
  (2.30)**  (2.95)**  (2.56)** 
Retail stores  -28.7935  -0.4476  -0.0594 
  (2.22)**  (1.80)*  (2.01)** 
Other supplies  18.1356  1.0181  0.0972 
  (0.41)  (0.49)  (0.56) 
 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses (* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%) 
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Appendix 6: Regression analysis to check collinearity for country dummy 
variables 
 
-------------------------------------- 
Variable  |   reg1        reg5 
-------------+------------------------ 
Divcflow |   -0.0003      0.0003 
|    0.0018      0.0018 
dividendeb~a  |   -0.0003      0.0003 
|    0.0016      0.0016 
dividendsa~s  |    0.0004     -0.0004 
|    0.0020      0.0020 
dividendmcap  |   -0.0162      0.0162 
|    0.0174      0.0174 
tdta   |   -0.0001      0.0001 
|    0.0000      0.0000 
Lnta  |   -0.0000      0.0000 
|    0.0000      0.0000 
lgcf   |    0.0005     -0.0005 
|    0.0004      0.0004 
beta   |   -0.0002      0.0002 
|    0.0009      0.0009 
sales1yrgrth  |   -0.0000      0.0000 
|    0.0000      0.0000 
lgage   |    0.0004     -0.0004 
|    0.0010      0.0010 
LDivCFlow_1  |   -0.0002      0.0002 
|    0.0008      0.0008 
AcqNat2  |   -0.0515***     -0.9485*** 
|    (0.0041)      (0.0041) 
AcqNat3  |   -0.0515***     -0.9485*** 
|    (0.0069)      (0.0069) 
AcqNat4  |   -0.0517***     -0.9483*** 
|    (0.0042)      (0.0042) 
_cons   |    0.0452***      0.9548*** 
|    (0.0081)      (0.0081) 
_cons   |    0.0452      0.9548 
|    0.0081      0.0081 
-------------+------------------------ 
N   |      3140        3140 
r2   |    0.0529      0.9481 
F   |   12.4622**   4081.7195** 
-------------------------------------- 
legend: b/se 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
265 
 
Appendix 7: HT for PP conflicts and tax-rate 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 CDCF Dividend/EBITDA Dividend/Sales Dividend/Mcap 
Lship 1.653674 0.103789 0.006667 0.007966 
 (2.64)** (3.50)** (1.78) (2.89)** 
LagDivCFlow 1.159630    
 (0.40)    
LDivEbitda_1  -0.463315   
  (8.65)**   
LDivSales_1   0.176117  
   (1.84)  
ldivmcap    -0.320492 
    (6.17)** 
Profitability -0.000000 -0.142283 -0.000000 -0.000000 
 (0.89) (1.40) (1.33) (0.80) 
Lag_prof 0.000000 0.087173 -0.000000 -0.000000 
 (0.83) (0.57) (0.72) (0.15) 
TDTA -0.083921 0.010700 0.000145 0.001040 
 (0.53) (2.51)* (0.17) (2.50)* 
lnTotalAssets -0.054970 -0.020254 0.002926 0.000043 
 (0.26) (2.05)* (2.10)* (0.06) 
Sales1YrGrth -0.008446 -0.001313 -0.000034 -0.000050 
 (0.22) (1.33) (0.47) (0.53) 
Beta 6.547903 0.426321  0.028186 
 (1.62) (2.13)*  (1.50) 
TaxRate 0.001149 0.000020 -0.000065 -0.000019 
 (0.06) (0.04) (0.71) (0.47) 
lgage 8.627462 -0.018686 -0.002210 0.006819 
 (2.54)* (0.12) (0.16) (0.47) 
dY0 2.057746 0.208956 0.005580 0.011504 
 (0.67) (1.47) (0.40) (1.94) 
lgValTrans -0.097889 -0.039339 0.003305 -0.000439 
 (0.08) (0.70) (0.70) (0.08) 
paymmdummy==     
1.0000 
38.314210 1.607343 0.181196 0.130614 
 (1.74) (1.46) (1.90) (1.32) 
paymmdummy==     
2.0000 
13.179653 0.752035 0.083229 0.071086 
 (1.09) (1.30) (1.72) (1.40) 
paymmdummy==     
3.0000 
8.783543 0.392236 0.056771 0.049827 
 (0.73) (0.68) (1.19) (0.98) 
relateddumm==     
1.0000 
-1.910964 0.335829 0.022502 0.007375 
 (0.24) (0.86) (0.72) (0.20) 
Ordinalform -0.012022 -0.005294 0.000100 -0.000353 
 (0.10) (0.85) (0.21) (0.61) 
LDivEbitda_1  -0.463315   
  (8.65)**   
Constant -70.488361 -4.030205 -0.609159 -0.309216 
 (2.35)* (3.01)** (3.33)** (2.13)* 
Observations 575 592 688 580 
Number of 
IDCODE 
257 262 312 257 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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Appendix 8: PP conflicts and large shareholder square using Tobit regression 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 divcflow 
lship 
divcflow 
lship 
divcflow 
lship 
divcflow 
lship 
divearnDum 
lship 
divearnDum 
lship 
divearnDum 
lship 
divearnDum 
lship 
divMCapDum 
lship 
divMCapDum 
lship 
divMCapDum 
lship 
divMCapDum 
lship 
Lship 0.293831 0.183650 0.184543 0.223100 0.228633 0.196950 0.212391 0.181828 0.321464 0.086870 0.084553 0.085105 
 (1.51) (1.77) (1.81) (1.56) (1.37) (1.12) (1.06) (1.27) (1.21) (1.91) (1.92) (1.94) 
Lshipsquare -
0.002723 
0.009242 0.009311 0.009040 -0.002125 0.009405 0.009453 0.009157 -0.003096 -0.000774 0.009648 -0.000743 
 (1.49) (1.73) (22.60)** (1.53) (1.34) (1.09) (22.93)** (22.45)** (1.19) (1.78) (1.76) (24.08)** 
lgcf -
0.054158 
0.317884 0.017951 0.072207 0.009949 0.524137 0.490666 0.133643 0.527552 0.382130 0.355160 0.087667 
 (0.46) (0.90) (0.82) (0.89) (1.98)* (0.25) (1.19) (1.70) (2.06)* (1.09) (1.01) (2.51)* 
TDTA 0.002616 -0.079166 -0.085157 0.013237 -0.039848 -0.091955 -0.097071 0.008426 -0.037858 -0.073266 -0.080415 -0.084208 
 (0.25) (0.59) (0.65) (2.59)** (1.62) (0.41) (2.73)** (0.50) (0.26) (2.05)* (2.24)* (2.35)* 
lnta -
0.140478 
0.303464 -0.042282 0.161259 -0.099714 -0.041727 0.295970 -0.015586 -0.113055 -0.009486 0.232117 0.139135 
 (1.06) (0.92) (0.60) (0.49) (0.93) (0.48) (0.45) (0.23) (0.81) (0.27) (0.22) (0.42) 
Beta 0.282670 0.370768 -2.440603 -2.184834 -1.095846 0.413090 -2.387533 -2.114728 0.356663 -2.219709 -2.235278 -1.918710 
 (1.02) (2.79)** (2.82)** (1.18) (1.79) (0.95) (2.78)** (2.44)* (1.00) (1.37) (2.62)** (1.39) 
Sales1YrGrth 0.000545 0.002436 0.009310 0.002037 0.001031 0.004019 0.001535 0.004733 0.003096 0.002565 0.007344 0.002335 
 (0.11) (0.67) (0.49) (0.47) (0.48) (0.21) (0.35) (0.25) (0.22) (0.19) (0.39) (0.21) 
lgage 0.288760 -2.199750 -2.288056 0.391275 -0.973599 -2.147957 0.408725 -1.951610 -1.534431 0.139903 0.134714 -2.499564 
 (1.05) (1.26) (2.44)* (2.19)* (0.82) (0.90) (0.86) (2.09)* (1.01) (2.69)** (0.96) (0.87) 
LDivCFlow_1 -
0.357976 
-0.080411 -0.040682 -0.081584         
 (0.73) (0.32) (0.16) (0.45)         
dY0 0.124435 0.227103 0.144649 0.214385 0.069977 0.075597 -0.032513 0.123026 0.391152 0.114917 -0.013331 -0.316565 
 (0.39) (0.17) (0.56) (0.24) (0.03) (0.07) (0.02) (0.12) (0.23) (0.86) (1.04) (1.21) 
lgValTrans  -0.099950 0.611008 0.831006  -0.114709 0.505173 0.792049  0.471354 0.438424 0.723521 
  (1.22) (2.09)* (1.26)  (1.89) (1.73) (2.66)**  (1.64) (1.52) (2.45)* 
PaymentCash  0.689092 0.664591 0.563683  -0.037843 0.127037 0.671362  0.648657 0.638110 0.597797 
  (0.74) (0.29) (0.51)  (0.77) (0.03) (0.74)  (0.10) (1.37) (0.05) 
PaymentShare  0.133482 0.186736 1.730131  0.521605 0.173546 -0.096205  0.141622 0.175735 0.087336 
  (0.29) (0.42) (0.74)  (0.24) (0.10) (0.78)  (0.16) (0.04) (0.35) 
PaymentMixed  0.399096 -1.779158 0.371772  0.410364 -1.954077 0.309756  0.232680 -1.606051 0.536075 
  (0.82) (1.07) (0.31)  (0.50) (0.78) (0.12)  (0.92) (1.17) (0.66) 
Related  0.015381 -0.041747 -0.004848  0.084445 0.035516 0.077958  -0.015031 0.555421 0.366276 
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  (0.04) (0.11) (0.01)  (0.20) (0.02) (0.14)  (0.08) (0.28) (0.21) 
Toehold  -0.000737 0.021401 -0.002085  0.013686 0.017827 -0.000930  0.025392 0.000060 -0.000080 
  (0.12) (0.23) (0.72)  (0.46) (0.60) (0.69)  (0.86) (1.03) (1.22) 
o. 
acquirornation==Indonesia 
  0.000000 0.000000   0.000000 0.000000   0.000000 0.000000 
   (.) (.)   (.) (.)   (.) (.) 
acquirornation==Malaysia   1.185891 -5.180318   1.329824 -4.633506   -5.036285 0.552934 
   (1.25) (1.33)   (1.36) (1.06)   (1.31) (1.31) 
acquirornation==Philippines   0.393663 0.743064   -1.216319 0.783604   0.198915 -3.884579 
   (0.37) (0.68)   (0.22) (0.57)   (0.32) (0.48) 
acquirornation==Singapore   0.979076 0.870275   -4.798215 0.809147   -5.578348 -4.480457 
   (1.08) (0.83)   (1.23) (0.91)   (1.17) (1.07) 
o. 
acquirornation==Thailand 
  0.000000 0.000000   0.000000 0.000000   0.000000 0.000000 
   (.) (.)   (.) (.)   (.) (.) 
ldivmcap         -2.709877 14.541401 0.015560 0.097223 
         (0.51) (1.30) (1.34) (1.32) 
Profitability     -0.254829 -0.841298 -0.209558 -0.404284 -1.195927 0.000167 -0.000922 -0.000761 
     (0.72) (0.58) (0.49) (1.30) (1.23) (0.38) (0.74) (0.30) 
Lag_profitability     -0.856622 -0.212983 -0.809511 0.050015 -1.195927 -0.048824 14.934222 14.518919 
     (0.64) (0.51) (0.53) (0.03) (1.23) (0.04) (0.01) (0.07) 
Industry    Yes    Yes    Yes 
        (.)    (.) 
Constant -
2.098681 
-3.695018 -0.668363 2.407275 -0.230564 -0.636377 -6.186851 -0.183068 -0.322659 -0.653215 -0.657323 31.440780 
 (1.02) (1.79) (14.24)** (1.58) (1.43) (1.58) (1.41) (13.80)** (17.20)** (1.81) (67.49)** (66.64)** 
Dividend/EBITDA     1.530486 1.338028 1.255842 1.495490 0.841238    
     (1.41) (1.16) (1.08) (1.32) (1.21)    
LDivEbitda_1     0.080231 0.060804 0.016958 -0.089857     
     (0.40) (0.11) (0.13) (0.25)     
Observations 659 396 396 396 669 400 400 400 638 388 388 388 
Wald chi 7.3 11.42 11.69 8.98 12.62 10.83 9.54 13.90 6.76 35.32 37.63 40.03 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses(* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5% and ** significant at 1%) 
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Appendix 9: FEVD analysis of PP conflicts (dividend to cashflows) 
 
Dependent Variable: Ratio of dividend to cash flow 
  
Model 
1 
Model 
2 
Model 
3 
Model 
4 
Model 
5 
Model 
6 
Model 
7 
Model 
8 
Model 
9 
Model 
10 
LagDivCFlow 4.9134 -0.4612 -0.4637 -0.4654 -0.4612 -0.4639 -0.4657 -1.3598 -1.3686 -1.4024 
  (3.27)*
* 
-0.2800 -0.2800 -0.2800 -0.2800 -0.2800 -0.2800 -0.9000 -0.9000 -0.9000 
Earnasset 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
  -1.1700 -1.0300 -1.0200 -1.0000 -1.0300 -1.0200 -1.0000 -1.9500 -1.9300 -1.9100 
Learnasset 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
  -0.7600 -1.4300 -1.4200 -1.4100 -1.4300 -1.4200 -1.4100 (2.22)* (2.22)* (2.20)* 
Largest Shareholder 0.2436 0.3623 0.3624 0.3626 0.1579 0.1580 0.1580 0.3963 0.3974 0.3970 
  (6.11)*
* 
(7.36)*
* 
(7.02)*
* 
(6.72)*
* 
(2.25)* (2.24)* (2.14)* (8.10)*
* 
(7.80)*
* 
(7.40)*
* 
SecondlargestSharehold
er 
        0.0034 0.0034 0.0034       
          (3.95)*
* 
(3.86)*
* 
(3.69)*
* 
      
LargestShareholderSqua
red 
              0.3490 0.3487 0.3500 
                (2.77)*
* 
(2.75)*
* 
(2.69)*
* 
lnCashFlow -0.4997 2.6568 2.6563 2.6545 2.6569 2.6562 2.6542 2.4001 2.4011 2.3771 
  -0.9700 (3.99)*
* 
(3.97)*
* 
(3.78)*
* 
(3.98)*
* 
(3.96)*
* 
(3.75)*
* 
(3.64)*
* 
(3.63)*
* 
(3.40)*
* 
TDTA -0.1326 -0.0118 -0.0119 -0.0117 -0.0118 -0.0119 -0.0117 0.0017 0.0015 0.0025 
  (3.61)*
* 
-0.2600 -0.2600 -0.2500 -0.2600 -0.2600 -0.2500 -0.0400 -0.0400 -0.0600 
Beta -0.5070 -0.0145 -0.0112 -0.0119 -0.0145 -0.0111 -0.0116 0.0773 0.0939 0.1003 
  -0.5500 -0.0100 -0.0100 -0.0100 -0.0100 -0.0100 -0.0100 -0.0600 -0.0800 -0.0800 
lnTotalAssets 0.0403 0.1042 0.1041 0.1037 0.1042 0.1040 0.1036 0.1304 0.1302 0.1272 
  -0.3500 -0.6400 -0.6400 -0.6200 -0.6400 -0.6400 -0.6200 -0.8300 -0.8300 -0.7900 
Sales1YrGrth 0.0000 -0.0537 -0.0537 -0.0535 -0.0537 -0.0537 -0.0535 -0.0603 -0.0604 -0.0602 
  -0.4600 (2.43)* (2.42)* (2.35)* (2.43)* (2.42)* (2.34)* (2.77)*
* 
(2.76)*
* 
(2.67)*
* 
Age 0.1565 0.0081 0.0081 0.0086 0.0081 0.0081 0.0085 0.0175 0.0173 0.0186 
  (3.09)*
* 
-0.1200 -0.1200 -0.1200 -0.1200 -0.1200 -0.1200 -0.2700 -0.2600 -0.2700 
dY0   5.9141 5.9140 5.9139 5.9141 5.9140 5.9139 5.1588 5.1562 5.1528 
    (2.67)*
* 
(2.67)*
* 
(2.64)*
* 
(2.67)*
* 
(2.67)*
* 
(2.64)*
* 
(2.44)* (2.44)* (2.41)* 
lnValueTransacton   -0.0135 -0.0140 -0.0128 -0.0136 -0.0139 -0.0127 0.0129 0.0112 0.0187 
    -0.0300 -0.0300 -0.0300 -0.0300 -0.0300 -0.0300 -0.0300 -0.0300 -0.0400 
PaymentCash   0.0975 0.0965 0.0962 0.0973 0.0967 0.0974 0.1023 0.0948 -0.0584 
    -0.0100 -0.0100 -0.0100 -0.0100 -0.0100 -0.0100 -0.0100 -0.0100 -0.0100 
PaymentShares   0.0513 0.0479 0.0608 0.0512 0.0481 0.0614 0.3202 0.3139 0.4158 
    -0.0100 -0.0100 -0.0100 -0.0100 -0.0100 -0.0100 -0.0900 -0.0800 -0.1100 
PaymentMixed   0.0303 0.0246 0.0339 0.0304 0.0244 0.0339 0.3815 0.4153 0.5937 
    -0.0100 -0.0100 -0.0100 -0.0100 -0.0100 -0.0100 -0.1000 -0.1000 -0.1400 
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RelatedInd   -0.0524 -0.0509 -0.0812 -0.0527 -0.0506 -0.0803 0.0577 0.0697 0.1067 
    -0.0200 -0.0200 -0.0300 -0.0200 -0.0200 -0.0200 -0.0200 -0.0200 -0.0300 
Country control     Yes Yes   Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
Industry Control       Yes     Yes     Yes 
Constant 20.219
8 
-
35.961
4 
-
35.885
0 
-
35.830
6 
-
34.993
3 
-
34.913
7 
-
34.855
6 
-
36.395
8 
-
36.487
0 
-
35.950
9 
  (2.21)* (2.97)*
* 
(2.63)*
* 
(2.45)* (2.88)*
* 
(2.54)* (2.36)* (3.05)*
* 
(2.74)*
* 
(2.53)* 
Observations 1173 669 669 669 669 669 669 612 612 612 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses where * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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Appendix 10: FEVD analysis of PP conflicts (dividend to 
earnings) 
 
 Dependent Variable: Ratio of  dividend to earnings 
  
Model 
1 
Model 
2 
Model 
3 
Model 
4 
Model 
5 
Model 
6 
Model 
7 
Model 
8 
Model 
9 
Model 
10 
LagDivEarn -0.0053 -0.0751 -0.0756 -0.0793 -0.0755 -0.0760 -0.0797 -0.0764 -0.0769 -0.0807 
  (4.37)*
* 
(2.57)* (2.57)* (2.62)*
* 
(2.57)* (2.58)* (2.62)*
* 
(2.50)* (2.51)* (2.55)* 
Earnasset 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
  -0.9400 -1.8100 -1.8000 -1.7900 -1.8100 -1.8000 -1.7800 -1.5800 -1.5800 -1.5800 
Lagearnasset 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
  -0.3300 -0.0500 -0.0600 -0.0500 -0.0500 -0.0600 -0.0500 -0.7700 -0.7700 -0.7600 
Largest Shareholder 0.0035 0.0001 0.0057 0.0058 0.0055 0.0056 0.0056 0.0057 0.0058 0.0058 
  (6.01)*
* 
-0.1600 (6.75)*
* 
(6.52)*
* 
(4.74)*
* 
(4.73)*
* 
(4.55)*
* 
(6.30)*
* 
(6.11)*
* 
(5.84)*
* 
SecondlargestShare
holder 
              0.0004 0.0004 0.0005 
                -0.1800 -0.1700 -0.2200 
LargestShareholder
Squared 
        0.0000 0.0000 0.0000       
          -0.1800 -0.2100 -0.1900       
lnCashFlow -0.0359 -0.0983 -0.0982 -0.0982 -0.0984 -0.0983 -0.0983 -0.0999 -0.0999 -0.0999 
  (4.68)*
* 
(8.23)*
* 
(8.18)*
* 
(7.86)*
* 
(8.22)*
* 
(8.17)*
* 
(7.85)*
* 
(7.51)*
* 
(7.48)*
* 
(7.09)*
* 
TDTA -0.0013 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 
  (2.53)* -0.1300 -0.1300 -0.0800 -0.1400 -0.1400 -0.0900 -0.1300 -0.1400 -0.0900 
Beta -0.0014 0.0031 0.0036 0.0048 0.0032 0.0039 0.0051 0.0038 0.0045 0.0053 
  -0.1100 -0.1400 -0.1700 -0.2100 -0.1500 -0.1800 -0.2200 -0.1700 -0.1900 -0.2200 
lnTotalAssets -0.0012 -0.0114 -0.0114 -0.0114 -0.0114 -0.0114 -0.0115 -0.0117 -0.0117 -0.0118 
  -0.7000 (4.09)*
* 
(4.08)*
* 
(4.02)*
* 
(4.09)*
* 
(4.09)*
* 
(4.02)*
* 
(3.86)*
* 
(3.85)*
* 
(3.78)*
* 
Sales1YrGrth 0.0000 -0.0010 -0.0010 -0.0010 -0.0010 -0.0010 -0.0010 -0.0010 -0.0010 -0.0010 
  -0.5500 (2.66)*
* 
(2.65)*
* 
(2.59)*
* 
(2.66)*
* 
(2.65)*
* 
(2.58)*
* 
(2.36)* (2.35)* (2.30)* 
Age -0.0016 0.0008 0.0007 0.0008 0.0007 0.0007 0.0008 0.0009 0.0009 0.0010 
  (2.15)* -0.7000 -0.6800 -0.7000 -0.6800 -0.6500 -0.6800 -0.7300 -0.7200 -0.7500 
dY0   0.0869 0.0869 0.0875 0.0870 0.0870 0.0876 0.0809 0.0810 0.0815 
    (2.38)* (2.38)* (2.37)* (2.38)* (2.38)* (2.37)* (2.05)* (2.04)* (2.03)* 
lnValueTransacton   0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0003 0.0003 0.0004 0.0002 0.0002 0.0005 
    -0.0300 -0.0200 -0.0300 -0.0400 -0.0300 -0.0500 -0.0300 -0.0200 -0.0600 
PaymentCash   0.0088 0.0082 0.0032 0.0090 0.0085 0.0042 0.0080 0.0075 -0.0002 
    -0.0700 -0.0600 -0.0200 -0.0700 -0.0700 -0.0300 -0.0600 -0.0600 0.0000 
PaymentShares   0.0075 0.0071 0.0070 0.0079 0.0076 0.0077 0.0062 0.0058 0.0065 
    -0.1100 -0.1100 -0.1000 -0.1200 -0.1100 -0.1100 -0.0900 -0.0800 -0.0900 
PaymentMixed   -0.0025 -0.0009 -0.0022 -0.0028 -0.0013 -0.0021 -0.0032 -0.0011 -0.0005 
    -0.0400 -0.0100 -0.0300 -0.0400 -0.0200 -0.0300 -0.0400 -0.0200 -0.0100 
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RelatedInd   -0.0027 -0.0029 -0.0051 -0.0019 -0.0019 -0.0041 -0.0024 -0.0020 -0.0028 
    -0.0500 -0.0600 -0.1000 -0.0400 -0.0400 -0.0800 -0.0400 -0.0300 -0.0500 
u[idcode]   1.0408                 
    (22.44)
** 
                
Country control     Yes Yes   Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
Industry Control       Yes     Yes     Yes 
Constant 0.7507 2.0011 1.8204 1.8567 1.8295 1.8229 1.8600 1.8527 1.8511 1.8479 
  (5.43)*
* 
(8.96)*
* 
(7.51)*
* 
(5.27)*
* 
(8.29)*
* 
(7.51)*
* 
(5.27)*
* 
(7.56)*
* 
(6.91)*
* 
(4.44)*
* 
Observations 1170 672 672 672 672 672 672 615 615 615 
R-squared 0.3000 0.4800 0.4800 0.4800 0.4800 0.4800 0.4800 0.4800 0.4800 0.4800 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses where * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 11: FEVD analysis of PP conflicts (dividend to sales) 
 
 
 
 Dependent Variable: Ratio of dividend to sales 
  
Model 
1 
Model 
2 
Model 
3 
Model 
4 
Model 
5 
Model 
6 
Model 
7 
Model 
8 
Model 
9 
Model 
10 
LagDivSales -0.6529 0.0349 0.0348 0.0347 0.0349 0.0349 0.0348 0.0378 0.0378 0.0373 
  (9.96)*
* 
-0.5900 -0.5900 -0.5700 -0.5900 -0.5900 -0.5700 -0.6000 -0.6000 -0.5800 
Earnasset 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
  -0.6300 -0.9400 -0.9300 -0.9200 -0.9400 -0.9300 -0.9200 -0.7800 -0.7800 -0.7700 
LagEarnasset 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
  -0.0700 -0.4400 -0.4400 -0.4400 -0.4400 -0.4400 -0.4400 -0.0600 -0.0600 -0.0500 
Largest Shareholder 0.0016 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
  (6.72)*
* 
-0.1400 -0.1300 -0.1300 -0.0900 -0.0900 -0.0800 -0.1300 -0.1200 -0.1100 
SecondlargestShare
holder 
              0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
                -0.0400 -0.0400 -0.0400 
LargestShareholder
Squared 
        0.0000 0.0000 0.0000       
          0.0000 -0.0100 -0.0100       
lnCashFlow -0.0673 0.0216 0.0216 0.0216 0.0216 0.0216 0.0216 0.0222 0.0222 0.0222 
  (22.07)
** 
(6.53)*
* 
(6.49)*
* 
(6.20)*
* 
(6.51)*
* 
(6.47)*
* 
(6.16)*
* 
(5.93)*
* 
(5.90)*
* 
(5.61)*
* 
TDTA -0.0007 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
  (3.40)*
* 
-0.5100 -0.5100 -0.4900 -0.5100 -0.5100 -0.4900 -0.4900 -0.4800 -0.4700 
Beta -0.0012 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0001 
  -0.2200 -0.0200 -0.0200 -0.0200 -0.0200 -0.0200 -0.0200 -0.0200 -0.0200 -0.0200 
lnTotalAssets -0.0090 0.0034 0.0034 0.0034 0.0034 0.0034 0.0034 0.0034 0.0034 0.0034 
  (12.96)
** 
(4.17)*
* 
(4.16)*
* 
(4.08)*
* 
(4.16)*
* 
(4.15)*
* 
(4.06)*
* 
(3.85)*
* 
(3.84)*
* 
(3.76)*
* 
Sales1YrGrth 0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0005 
  (9.93)*
* 
(4.10)*
* 
(4.09)*
* 
(3.98)*
* 
(4.10)*
* 
(4.09)*
* 
(3.97)*
* 
(3.82)*
* 
(3.80)*
* 
(3.70)*
* 
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Age -0.0002 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
  -0.6600 -0.0900 -0.0900 -0.0800 -0.0900 -0.0900 -0.0800 -0.0500 -0.0500 -0.0500 
dY0 2.7974 1.0001 1.0001 1.0001 1.0001 1.0001 1.0001 1.0001 1.0001 1.0001 
  (123.88
)** 
(160.41
)** 
(159.59
)** 
(157.51
)** 
(160.29
)** 
(159.44
)** 
(157.33
)** 
(152.81
)** 
(151.89
)** 
(149.81
)** 
lnValueTransacton   0.0200 0.0200 0.0200 0.0200 0.0200 0.0200 0.0217 0.0217 0.0217 
    -1.8400 -1.8300 -1.8100 -1.8300 -1.8300 -1.8100 -1.8200 -1.8200 -1.8000 
lgValTrans   0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0001 
    -0.0200 -0.0200 -0.0200 -0.0200 -0.0200 -0.0200 -0.0200 -0.0200 -0.0300 
PaymentCash   -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0014 -0.0015 -0.0017 
    0.0000 0.0000 -0.0100 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0100 -0.0300 -0.0400 -0.0400 
PaymentShares   -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0007 -0.0008 -0.0010 
    -0.0100 0.0000 -0.0100 -0.0100 0.0000 -0.0100 -0.0300 -0.0400 -0.0500 
PaymentMixed   -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0007 -0.0008 -0.0012 
    -0.0100 -0.0100 -0.0100 -0.0100 -0.0100 -0.0100 -0.0300 -0.0300 -0.0500 
RelatedInd   0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0017 0.0017 0.0018 
    -0.0200 -0.0200 -0.0200 -0.0200 -0.0200 -0.0200 -0.1000 -0.1000 -0.1000 
Country control     Yes Yes   Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
Industry Control       Yes     Yes     Yes 
Constant 1.2954 -0.3393 -0.3395 -0.3400 -0.3393 -0.3395 -0.3402 -0.3494 -0.3499 -0.3528 
  (23.75)
** 
(5.62)*
* 
(4.94)*
* 
(3.31)*
* 
(5.58)*
* 
(4.89)*
* 
(3.30)*
* 
(5.13)*
* 
(4.51)*
* 
(2.89)*
* 
Observations 1188 681 681 681 681 681 681 624 624 624 
R-squared 0.9300 0.9800 0.9800 0.9800 0.9800 0.9800 0.9800 0.9800 0.9800 0.9800 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses where * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
           
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 12: FEVD analysis of PP conflicts (dividend to market capitalisation) 
Dependent Variable: Ratio of Dividend to market capitalisation 
  
Model 
1 
Model 
2 
Model 
3 
Model 
4 
Model 
5 
Model 
6 
Model 
7 
Model 
8 
Model 
9 
Model 
10 
lagdivmcap -0.1859 -0.2986 -0.2987 -0.2987 -0.2986 -0.2987 -0.2987 -0.2981 -0.2983 -0.2983 
  (5.72)*
* 
(8.48)*
* 
(8.44)*
* 
(8.34)*
* 
(8.47)*
* 
(8.44)*
* 
(8.33)*
* 
(8.07)*
* 
(8.04)*
* 
(7.94)*
* 
Earnasset 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
  -0.7700 -0.6800 -0.6700 -0.6600 -0.6800 -0.6700 -0.6600 -0.8200 -0.8100 -0.8000 
Lagearnasset 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
  -0.7600 -0.5400 -0.5400 -0.5300 -0.5400 -0.5400 -0.5300 -0.7600 -0.7600 -0.7500 
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Largest Shareholder 0.0003 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006 
  (4.51)*
* 
(5.66)*
* 
(5.41)*
* 
(5.20)*
* 
(3.97)*
* 
(3.94)*
* 
(3.77)*
* 
(5.05)*
* 
(4.86)*
* 
(4.63)*
* 
SecondlargestShare
holder 
        0.0000 0.0000 0.0000       
          -0.0100 0.0000 -0.0100       
LargestShareholder
Squared 
              0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
                -0.0300 -0.0400 -0.0300 
lnCashFlow -0.0033 -0.0027 -0.0027 -0.0027 -0.0027 -0.0027 -0.0027 -0.0030 -0.0030 -0.0030 
  (3.57)*
* 
(2.03)* (2.02)* -1.9300 (2.02)* (2.01)* -1.9200 (1.99)* (1.98)* -1.9000 
TDTA -0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
  (3.56)*
* 
-1.1600 -1.1400 -1.1100 -1.1600 -1.1400 -1.1000 -1.1400 -1.1300 -1.0800 
Beta -0.0012 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
  -0.7400 -0.0100 -0.0100 -0.0100 -0.0100 -0.0100 -0.0100 -0.0400 -0.0300 -0.0300 
lnTotalAssets 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
  -0.3800 -0.1500 -0.1500 -0.1500 -0.1500 -0.1500 -0.1500 -0.0100 -0.0100 -0.0300 
Sales1YrGrth 0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 
  -0.4200 (2.08)* (2.07)* (2.01)* (2.08)* (2.07)* (2.01)* -1.9600 -1.9600 -1.8900 
Age 0.0005 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 
  (5.02)*
* 
-0.9700 -0.9600 -0.9100 -0.9600 -0.9500 -0.9100 -0.7800 -0.7600 -0.7200 
dY0 1.0511 1.0063 1.0064 1.0065 1.0063 1.0064 1.0065 1.0057 1.0059 1.0062 
  (22.61)
** 
(23.85)
** 
(23.69)
** 
(23.01)
** 
(23.83)
** 
(23.67)
** 
(22.99)
** 
(22.32)
** 
(22.22)
** 
(21.53)
** 
lnValueTransacton   0.0137 0.0137 0.0137 0.0137 0.0137 0.0137 0.0134 0.0134 0.0134 
    (3.12)*
* 
(3.11)*
* 
(3.08)*
* 
(3.12)*
* 
(3.11)*
* 
(3.07)*
* 
(2.81)*
* 
(2.81)*
* 
(2.78)*
* 
lgValTrans   0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
    -0.0300 -0.0300 -0.0300 -0.0300 -0.0300 -0.0300 -0.0600 -0.0700 -0.0700 
PaymentCash   0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
    0.0000 0.0000 -0.0100 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0100 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
PaymentShares   0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0003 
    -0.0200 -0.0200 -0.0200 -0.0200 -0.0200 -0.0200 -0.0200 -0.0200 -0.0300 
PaymentMixed   0.0001 0.0002 0.0002 0.0001 0.0002 0.0002 0.0003 0.0004 0.0006 
    -0.0200 -0.0200 -0.0300 -0.0200 -0.0200 -0.0300 -0.0300 -0.0400 -0.0600 
RelatedInd   -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 
    -0.0100 -0.0100 -0.0100 -0.0100 -0.0100 -0.0100 -0.0100 0.0000 -0.0100 
Country control     Yes Yes   Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
Industry Control       Yes     Yes     Yes 
Constant 0.0729 0.0631 0.0627 0.0628 0.0631 0.0627 0.0628 0.0664 0.0665 0.0670 
  (4.41)*
* 
(2.61)*
* 
(2.28)* -1.5200 (2.60)*
* 
(2.26)* -1.5100 (2.45)* (2.19)* -1.8300 
Observations 1189 683 683 683 683 683 683 626 626 626 
R-squared 0.3500 0.5000 0.5000 0.5000 0.5000 0.5000 0.5000 0.4900 0.4900 0.4900 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses where * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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Appendix 13 : FEVD analysis of PA conflicts and large shareholder 
 (1) (2) 
 Efficiency Ratio (PA Conflicts) 
Lship 0.000001 0.000004 
 (0.00) (0.01) 
Lshipsquare  -0.000000 
  (0.01) 
Earnasset 0.000000 0.000000 
 (1.61) (1.61) 
Learnasset_1 0.000000 0.000000 
 (0.97) (0.97) 
lgcf 0.004793 0.004796 
 (1.16) (1.16) 
TDTA -0.000195 -0.000195 
 (0.73) (0.72) 
Beta -0.000227 -0.000227 
 (0.03) (0.03) 
lnTotalAssets 0.000977 0.000977 
 (0.98) (0.98) 
Sales1YrGrth 0.001595 0.001595 
 (11.73)*** (11.72)*** 
Age -0.001465 -0.001464 
 (3.66)*** (3.63)*** 
dY0 -0.000980 -0.000982 
 (0.07) (0.07) 
lgValTrans 0.000021 0.000019 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
paymmdummy==     1.0000 -0.000202 -0.000206 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
paymmdummy==     2.0000 0.000179 0.000170 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
paymmdummy==     3.0000 0.000142 0.000150 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
relateddumm==     1.0000 -0.000385 -0.000399 
 (0.02) (0.02) 
Ordinalform 0.000005 0.000005 
 (0.02) (0.02) 
Constant 0.822359 0.822282 
 (11.03)*** (10.96)*** 
Observations 683 683 
R-squared 0.9576 0.9576 
 883.2*** 832.88*** 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
 
